

THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES

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THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES

THE GREEK TEXT OF PLATO

*Edited, with Introductory Notes, Commentary, and
English Translation, by*

EDWARD HENRY BLAKENEY

‘Socrates,
Who, firmly good in a corrupted State,
Against the rage of tyrants single stood
Invincible! calm Reason’s holy law,—
That voice of God within the attentive mind,—
Obeying, fearless of life or death.’

THOMSON

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VIRO DOCTO
MONTAGUE JOHN RENDALL, LL.D.

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OLIM INFORMATORI

IN ARTIBUS INGENUIS PENITUS VERSATO
IN OFFICIIS FUNGENDIS ACRI ET STRENUO

IN AMICITIA SEMPER FIDELI
HOC OPUSCULUM QUAECUNQUE
MULTA EIUS BENEFICIA RECOLENs

GRATO ANIMO VELIT DEDICARE

EDITOR

B.C. 399 : A.D. 1929

*I gazed, in thought, upon the crowded space
Where, in the light of that disastrous day,
Stood Socrates to face his enemies.
Grave with the wisdom of the accomplished years,
By threats undaunted and by fear unmoved,
But panoplied in faith, the old man spoke
His final message. What to him the wrath
And malice of detraction, who had known
The presence of the Invisible, had heard
The word divine that thro' the silence stole
To his own heart and whispered all was well ?
Not in those noises might he seek or reach
Strong Hope's fruition ; but, at last—far off—
In some Ideal World of joy and peace,
Which the fell fume of envy cannot mar,
Should he hold converse with the hosts of God
And find immortal solace. For a life
Spent in the service of mankind, his foes
Doomed him to death ; and Death came softly by
And drew him—unreluctant, dowered with fame—
Where Justice, Righteousness, and Truth sit crowned
For evermore. Yet still we seem to hear
Across the heights and depths of Time and Place
The golden echoes of his last farewell.*

E. H. B.

PREFACE

THE present edition of the *Apology* is not meant to compete with existing editions of that acknowledged masterpiece of the ancient world. Scholars and advanced students will find little or nothing in this book to compel attention. It is meant for those whose knowledge of Greek is small, but who desire to become familiar, at first hand, with Plato's work.

I have tried to make the translation practically useful ; it is fairly close to the Greek, though not (I hope) slavishly literal. The annotations, somewhat desultory though they are, may perhaps be useful, and even of interest, to a few. It will be noticed that critical questions of every sort have been avoided ; in a work of the kind proposed they would be out of place. At the same time, care has been taken to produce a tolerably satisfactory text ; but oversights, both here and elsewhere, doubtless occur : *cujusvis hominis*.

I desire, once and for all, to acknowledge freely my indebtedness to previous commentators (Adam and Burnet in particular), and to such works as Prof. A. E. Taylor's recent volume on Plato. Some of these books are, from time to time, mentioned by name in the course of the volume ; but, in order to make my debt the clearer, I have added a list of some of the chief authorities consulted during the preparation of my book. I trust this general acknowledgment will suffice : the perpetual use of inverted commas is apt to prove a distraction to the ordinary reader.

In that delectable treatise, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, Burton speaks of those who 'lard their thin books with the fat of others' works.' Unquestionably I am one of that great company. 'Nullumst jam dictum quod non sit dictum

prius,' said Terence and he, like the redoubtable Burton, ought to have known

The *Introductory Notes*—they hardly deserve the title of an Introduction proper—are rather a collection of casual suggestions and occasional hints than anything else, but "twill serve" For further information the reader will naturally turn to Grote, and Jowett, or (best of all) to Dr Phillipson's recently published treatise, which did not reach me, unfortunately, till after my manuscript was practically completed I have, however, added a few references to this admirable and exhaustive study The various excursuses (not least the *Life of Socrates*, abbreviated from Diogenes Laertius) may perhaps be found useful

Should any critic discover that, here and there, I have been guilty of some small repetition, I shall not complain, remembering the old adage, *bis repetita docent*

I have to thank my colleague, Mr J B Poynton, for help with the proof sheets, and Messrs MacLehose's readers for their care with the book generally

E H B

August 1929

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INTRODUCTORY NOTES

§ 1. *The Forerunners of Socrates*

GREEK Philosophy had its beginnings not on the mainland of Greece, but on the shores of Asia Minor : Ionia was the cradle of free thought and speculation. It was here that the early thinkers sought to ascertain the origin, laws, and destiny, of the visible world, untrammelled by traditional theologies and unfettered by orthodox conventions. Nobody seems to have interfered with the activities of these enquirers as they moved from place to place, despite the fact that they called in question many a cherished belief. Crude their speculations appear to us, but we do well to remember that they were pioneers, heralds of good things to come, desiring (as they did) to replace outworn and childish cosmogonies by something like a scientific interpretation of Nature. Whether these early thinkers and investigators were indebted to the Orient for any of their germinal ideas is a disputed point ; yet it is hard to suppose that dwellers in Ionia did not come into contact with Oriental speculations, and were not in some degree influenced by the 'grey-haired wisdom of the East.' But at most the debt was small. Greek philosophy was to work out its own salvation in its own way.

What, then, was the chief question in which the early Ionians interested themselves ? Briefly this : *What is Being ?* And they found an answer to that conundrum in the idea of an existent One underlying the varying plurality of things. It does not, for our immediate purpose, greatly matter that this One was a material, rather than a spiritual, substance ; what does matter is that what was sought for was some principle

of unity at the base of phenomenal existences. In one sense, by imaginative genius these thinkers managed to reach some of the conclusions of modern science, for it is the task of science to be for ever looking for the single primordial 'thing' which is the source of all the material diversity of the visible Universe.*

The first name in Greek philosophy is the founder of what is often known as the 'physical school'—Thales of Miletus (640-550 B.C.) He may not unjustly be termed the first scientific thinker. His theory was that water is the original substance, the stuff out of which all things are evolved. Whether he was a pure materialist or a theist is something we can never be quite sure about, though Cicero tells us that Thales held that it was 'a divine mind' which formed all things from the one aqueous substance. The point to remember is that he postulated an organic theory of the world, the motive with him was cosmological, not theological or mythical, the forces of nature were inherent in the cosmos, not in personal powers acting from without. With his famous maxim (if, indeed, it be his), 'Know thyself,' he marked a new departure in western thought. It was a first attempt to analyse the human consciousness.†

The second of these Ionic philosophers was Anaximander (610-540 B.C.) Like Thales he was bent on finding some single primordial substance, but, for him, it consisted in an indeterminate, indestructible and therefore eternal something to which he gave the name of *the boundless* (τὸ ἄπειρον)—a spatial infinity encompassing those unnumbered worlds which it generates, only to retract them finally into itself. Tennyson may have derived hints from Anaximander for his *Ancient Sage*—compare the lines in *Locksley Hall* sixty years after—

* Cornford, *Greek Religious Thought*, chap. iv

† See Appendix IV

‘Sent the shadow of Himself, the Boundless, thro’ the
human soul,
Boundless inward in the atom, boundless outward in
the whole.’

It is worth while observing that, whereas Thales pictured the Earth as floating on the water, Anaximander maintained that it hung, self-poised, in space, thus anticipating in some degree the Copernican theory of the universe.

Anaximander was followed by Anaximenes (also a Milesian), and his theory was that the first principle, or ἀρχή, is air. This agrees with what Augustine tells us, *de Civit. Dei*, viii. 2: ‘omnes rerum causas infinito aeri dedit, nec deos negavit aut tacuit [in contrast to his predecessors]; non tamen ab ipsis aerem factum sed ipsos ex aere ortos credidit.’* Not only did he teach that air was the ἀρχή, but he appears to have conceived of the world as a breathing whole: can it be said that, in so doing, he anticipated the later doctrine of an ‘anima mundi’? Gomperz (*Greek Thinkers*, vol. i. 57) holds that his title to fame rests on the fact that he was the first to proclaim, as the ultimate reason of all material transformation, a ‘vera causa’ in the Newtonian sense. In so far, his doctrine affords a foretaste of the atomic theory of matter—which, indeed, seems to have been the drift of the whole Ionian tradition.

He was followed by a far more imposing figure in the history of philosophy, Heraclitus of Ephesus (? 530-470 B.C.)—known among the ancients as the ‘obscure’ (σκοτεινός) and the ‘weeping sage.’† He, too, assumed a single sub-

* Cf. Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil. Graec.* §§ 17-21.

† Montaigne, *Essays*, i. 50 (in contrast to Democritus, the ‘laughing sage’): ‘Heraclitus, taking pity and compassion of the same condition of ours, was continually seen with a sad, mournful, and heavy cheer, and with tears trickling

stance as the ὤλη, or ground/work, of the cosmos, only with him it was not water, nor air, nor the boundless, but fire, which was not so much flame as a rarefied dry ether, akin to soul, source of all intelligence, the Logos (in *Frag* I, Bywater's ed) conceived in terms of matter * For Heraclitus, Logos=Fire=God identities in difference. All things, he said, were in a state of flux (πάντα ῥεῖ), like water in an ever-flowing stream † Only one thing is permanent amid 'this coil and errancy' Thus

'Isled from the fireful hour he stood alone
And heard the eternal movement, and beheld
Above him and around and at his feet,
In million-billowed consentaneousness,
The flowing, flowing, flowing of the world' ‡

And that one permanency in the ever-changing order is the universal Law—the Reason of the Cosmos—which men call

down his blubbered eyes' (Florio's version) Cf Mayor on *Juvenal* x. 28, Burton, *Anat of Melancholy*, iii. 4

* Burnet, however, denies that the λόγος here=reason. EGP³ p. 133 n. 'What then, does it mean?' May we not believe that, to Heraclitus, the secular movement of the Universe was indeed the manifestation of the Supreme Thought that 'steers all things through all things'? Compare Cornford in the *Cambridge Ancient Hist* vol. iv p. 553, and Thompson's note in Archer Butler's *Lectures*³, p. 198

† Plotinus saw that the 'perpetual flux' of Heraclitus is meaningless, unless there is also an eternal and spiritual One (Inge, *Philosophy of Plotinus*³, vol. II. 129) If his theory seems to materialize mind, it is equally true that it spiritualizes matter

‡ William Watson.

Zeus. His recognition and proclamation of the reign of Law, to which even the heavens are subject, marks a turning-point in the history of human thought. Heraclitus was not only a great speculative genius, but a master of wise sayings :

‘Jewels five words long
That on the stretched forefinger of all Time
Sparkle for ever.’ *

He was nobody’s pupil—nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri : his boast was that he enquired of himself (μαθεῖν πάντα παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ, says Diogenes Laërtius). The Ionians, we may say, quietly ignored the deities of popular religion : they were Rationalists (in the best sense) to a man.

We pass on to Pythagoras of Samos (sixth century B.C.), who settled in Italy, and founded the ‘Italic School,’ an order or brotherhood with moral or religious aims, bound by a strict ‘rule’ †—the Pythagoreans being the ‘Regulars’ of the ancient world, as the Cynics may be called its ‘Mendicants’—based on the belief in transmigration and immortality.‡ ‘In his precepts,’ says Sidgwick (*History of*

* See Thompson’s note in Archer Butler’s *Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy*, p. 199 ; Cornford, *Greek Religious Thought*, chap. vii.

† Pythagoras was a vegetarian among other things ; *Juvenal*, xv. 173, 4 (Mayor) :

‘cunctis animalibus abstinuit qui
tanquam homine, et ventri indulsit non omne legumen.’

The place of asceticism in Greek religion is important : the reader is referred to Inge, *The Church in the World* (1927), pp. 127 sq.

‡ See J. E. B. Mayor’s exhaustive note on Tertullian, *Apologeticus*, pp. 457, 458, and consult Adam, *Religious*

Ethics), 'we may discern an effort, striking in its originality and earnestness, to mould the lives of men as much as possible into the likeness of God' These precepts were in the nature of dogmatic statement, rather than the result of philosophic investigation, they were accepted by his disciples unhesitatingly, on the authority of the 'ipse dixit' of the master (αὐτός ἔφαρ) He differed from the early Ionians, in looking for the key to the universe not in a single material principle, but in number, but it may be remarked that the Greeks did not think of numbers as pure abstractions, but as figures, limited portions of space This number-symbolism, though popular at the time, was too fantastic to endure, what did last was the mystery-cult he introduced, founded on Orphic discipline Pythagoreanism, says Cornford, was an attempt to intellectualize the doctrines of Orphism while preserving its social form. Now the definitely Orphic element in religion—apart from the endless series of births and deaths involved in metempsychosis, and apart from the theory of the 'group-soul,'—was the doctrine of the Fall of Man, and his return, by sacramental means, to his 'original brightness' (Inge, *Philosophy of Plotinus*², vol 1 82-88) In Pythagoras' view the soul was a harmony,* the body a prison (σῶμα

Teachers of Greece, pp 194 sq—Cf Shakespeare's reference to Pythagoras in *Twelfth Night*, IV 11

Clown What is the opinion of Pythagoras concerning wild-fowl?

Malvolso That the soul of our grandam might haply inhabit a bird

Clown What thinkest thou of his opinion?

Malvolso I think nobly of the soul, but no way approve his opinion.

* Pythagoras was devoted to music, and it is to him that we owe the lovely, though mystical, fancy of the polyphonic Music of the Spheres, made familiar to us by Shakespeare

οἴμα); *; and he believed that men were punished after death for their misdoings in this life—an adumbration of the later doctrine of Purgatory.† One of the many ‘obiter dicta’ of Pythagoras is this: ‘Be sleepless in the things of the spirit, for sleep there is akin to death’—a fine thought.

(e.g. *Merchant of Venice*, v. sc. i.) and Milton (*Arcades*, 63-73). Sir T. Browne, *Religio Medici*, ii. § 9: ‘There is a music wherever there is harmony, order, or proportion: and thus far we may maintain the Music of the Spheres.’ There is a beautiful sentence from Philo Judaeus: ὁ δὲ οὐρανὸς ἀει μελωδεῖ, κατὰ τὰς κινήσεις τῶν ὄντων ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν πάμμουσον ἁρμονίαν ἀποτελῶν. Cf. Cicero’s *Somnium Scipionis*, and Tennyson’s *Parnassus*:

‘Sounding for ever and ever thro’ Earth and her listening nations,

And mixt with the Great Sphere-music of stars and of constellations.’

* Plato, *Cratylus*, 400; *Gorgias*, 492. Wordsworth, *Ode on the Intimations of Immortality*: ‘Shades of the prison-house | Begin to close upon the growing boy.’ Similarly in the *Excursion*: ‘that dark house in which his soul is pent,’ and in Waller: ‘the soul’s dark cottage, battered and decayed.’ As Browning finely put it (*à propos* of the doctrine of μάθησις):

‘To know

Rather consists in opening out a way

Whence the imprisoned splendour may escape,

Than in effecting entry for a light

Supposed to be without.’

Cf. Prudentius, *Cathemerinon*, x.: ‘generosa caducis | ceu carcere clausa ligantur,’ with Walpole’s note (*Early Latin Hymns*, p. 142).

† See Adrian Fortescue’s ed. of *Boëthius*, p. 116.

But it is curious that, among thinkers of high repute in antiquity, there are few about whom we know less than about Pythagoras—legend rules over all. What is certain is that he exercised no small influence on the thinkers of a later age—Plato, for example. His fame, in a mathematical regard, rests on his noted demonstration that the square on the base of a rectangular triangle = the sum of the squares of the two containing sides—a notable discovery, but it was already known to the Hindu algebraists (Monier Williams, *Indian Wisdom**, p. 181). Heraclitus (Frag. xvi) rather sarcastically refers to Pythagoras as one whose vast learning (πολυμαθῆν) had not brought wisdom in its train—Tennyson's 'Knowledge grows, but wisdom lingers'. One might add that there is a good deal of similarity between the doctrine and practice of the Pythagoreans and those of the Jewish Essenes, and it has been suggested that there is an Oriental origin for both. There are Indian and Persian parallels to Pythagoreanism, which ought not to be overlooked. The tradition that Pythagoras travelled as far as India may be something more than an idle tale.

Pythagoras was followed by three philosophers, commonly called Eleatics, from their personal connexion with Elea, a town in Italy. These three were respectively Xenophanes, of Colophon, in Asia Minor, Parmenides (the foremost of Eleatic thinkers), and Zeno—they all belong to the sixth and following century. After them came another triad—Empedocles the Sicilian, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, and Democritus of Abdera in Thrace. A word or two on these eminent and representative freethinkers will suffice for our present purpose.

There is something exhilarating about Xenophanes (sixth century B.C.), because of his vigorous opposition not only to divination, but to anthropomorphism and polytheistic fancies. 'If oxen or horses (said he) had hands and made works of art, horses would draw gods like horses, oxen like oxen.'

Similarly men create God in their own image—‘man’s Giant Shadow hailed divine.’ To claim him as a monotheist, on the ground of some stray fragments of his writing, is to press his language too far: if anything, he was a pantheist. ‘Xenophanes sounds the note of negative scepticism which, for lack of fruitful scientific research, was to become more and more common in Greek thought.’ * No man, he avows, knows anything truly, and no man ever will: all is illusion. It is pleasant to remember that Xenophanes was one of the few to protest against the extravagant cult of athletics: of course, nobody heeded. Pretty obviously, we need him to-day; but he would still be preaching to deaf ears.

The philosophy of Parmenides (born 515 B.C.) is in sharp opposition to that of Heraclitus. The latter had affirmed that as all things are in a state of flux, the appearance of fixity is a sense-illusion; Parmenides, on the other hand, maintained what is illusory is the appearance of change. His thesis is that Reality is One: things are a Unity. Jowett, in his introduction to Plato’s exceedingly difficult dialogue, the *Parmenides*, calls him ‘the founder of idealism and also of dialectic, or, in modern phraseology, of metaphysic and logic.’ The whole system of this abstruse thinker was delivered in the form of a poem: only fragments of it survive.† Not the least celebrated of his *dicta* is the remarkable sentence, τὸ αὐτὸ νοεῖν τε καὶ εἶναι, generally rendered *idem est cogitare atque esse* (thought and being are one)‡. Whatever its precise

* J. M. Robertson, *A History of Freethought* ³, vol. i. 143.

† These are translated by Burnet in his *Early Greek Philosophy* ³, pp. 172 sq. The original Greek will be found in Ritter and Preller, *Historia Philosophiae Graecae*, §§ 91-102. Platonic references to Parmenides will be found in the *Theaetetus*, the *Sophist*, as well as in the dialogue called after him.

‡ Cf. Berkeley’s *esse = percipi*. For Burnet’s view, see his *E.G.P.* p. 173, note 2.

meaning, one thing seems evident for Parmenides the unity that pervades nature must be no single element—such as the Ionians sought—as the substrate of material phenomena, but a real principle, eternal and unchanging, distinct from the endless variety of the visible world ‘And not only must it be verily existent, it must be the sum total of all existence’* Being is, for Parmenides, what never was nor shall be, but only is† The last word of Greek philosophy, says Bergson (*Creative Evolution*), is that a perpetuity of mobility is possible only if it is backed by an eternity of immobility, which it unwinds in a chain without beginning or end The most interesting fragment of Parmenides is that in which he enunciates his mystical doctrine of eternity as a timeless ‘now’ see Inge, *Phil of Plotinus*, vol II, p 4 Philosophy began, then, with the Eleatic school, and especially with Parmenides, who gave a new metaphysical meaning to the pantheistic principles of his forerunners His system was a thorough-going Monism.

Zeno, the disciple of Parmenides (not to be confused with Zeno the Stoic, who lived nearly two centuries later), is best known for the arguments he developed to show the inherent contradictions involved in the ordinary conception of the world as we see it Pretty well every conclusion derivable from experience was discarded by this doughty champion of paradox, he is said to have denied Space, argued against Motion, and disputed the possibility of any *sensible* unity at all He would tell you that the doctrine of the Parmenidean ONE is difficult, but the belief in the multiplicity of things impossible As the inventor of the art of dialectic (for so Diogenes Laertius calls him) he taught an art of logic that must have puzzled the men of his day as it has puzzled people since The clever polemic of the Elea-

* Archer-Hind, *Timaeus*, p 6

† Cf John, viii 58

tics against the possibility of Becoming is preserved in Zeno's famous fallacy of 'Achilles and the Tortoise,' and the 'Flying Arrow' that never moves; * though to be sure a practical world has long since replied to the system defended by such paradoxes (as Dr. Johnson on a well-known occasion 'answered' Bishop Berkeley's theory of knowledge) by a plain 'solvitur ambulando.'

The list of Eleatic philosophers is doubtfully closed by the name of Empedocles (*flor.* 450 B.C.), who in legend almost rivals Pythagoras. His mingling of philosophy with mysticism, the strangeness and beauty of his poetic utterances, his reputation alike as physician and mage, his exalted political enthusiasms, have all contributed to make him one of the most romantic figures in the history of Greek philosophy. The story of his 'passing'—for it was said that he ended his life by plunging into the crater of Etna †—has been drawn

* Discussed by Bergson in his *Creative Evolution*, pp. 325-330. Cf. Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx* (1910), p. 433; Mill's *Logic*, Book V. chapter on 'Fallacies'; Burnet, *E.G.P.*³ p. 318. The story of Zeno's death by torture was a commonplace in antiquity: cf. Cicero, *de Nat. Deor.* iii. § 82; Diog. Laert. ix. 26, and elsewhere.

† Milton, *P.L.* iii. 471:

'He, who to be deemed
A god, leaped fondly into Aetna flames,—
Empedocles.'

The fragments of Empedocles are translated by Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*. For a careful estimate of this brilliant, if wayward, thinker, cf. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, vol. i. chap. 5; and for a more popular account J. A. Symonds, *The Greek Poets*, vol. i. See, too, Frazer, *The Golden Bough*³ ('Magic Art,' vol. i. p. 390), where it is pointed out that Empedocles gave himself out to be not merely a wizard but a 'god.'

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for us with great beauty by Matthew Arnold, in his dramatic poem *Empedocles on Etna*. We still possess nearly 500 verses of his two poetic treatises (περὶ φύσεως and Καθαρμοί), in which his system was published *urbi et orbi*. Lucretius praised his work in generous fashion (1 731)

‘Carmina quin etiam divini pectoris ejus
vociferantur et exponunt praeclara reperta,
ut vix humana videatur stirpe creatus,’

and could even say of the man himself that Sicily had never produced any holier or dearer thing. The influence of the Orphics and of Pythagoras is seen in Empedocles, who taught a doctrine of the Fall of Man from bliss, of transmigration and the re-ascent of the soul, and of the negation of death. He seems to have believed in a God at once invisible, omnipotent, omnipresent, though it is not easy to reconcile this with the philosopher's physical speculations. He postulated four elements, inherent in which were two rival forces, Love and Hate, the interaction of which formed the systole and diastole of the whole round of creation. His resolution of the Universe into those four Elements has stamped itself on the language of mankind, while his employment of the twin principles of attraction and repulsion, as efficient causes of phenomena, anticipated much that proved serviceable in subsequent philosophy. Half mystic, half rationalist, he was inconsistent in his doctrine, and wrought out no solid self-contained intellectual system, but he had flashes of intuition and insight which partially compensated for these defects. His idea of God is finely expressed in these words

ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴ καὶ ἀθεσφατος ἔπλετο μῶνον
φροντίσι κόσμον ἀπαντα κατὰίσσουσα θεῶσιν

(‘God is a sacred and unutterable Mind, darting with swift thoughts throughout the Cosmos’)

Passing over Democritus—interesting as he undoubtedly

is—on the ground that he does not fall within the ambit of the pre-Socratic philosophers, we come finally to the Sophists.

§ 2. *The Sophists*

The fifth century was one of great intellectual ferment. The speculations of the Ionian enquirers, and of their disciples, were everywhere being canvassed by thinking men. The successful issue of the armed resistance to the Persian power had helped to weld together Greek thought and feeling; fresh hopes were born, new prospects unfolded. The long period of anxious anticipation which had held men breathless between 500 and 479 B.C. was succeeded by a sense of exultation which thrilled the heart of every patriotic Greek. Not otherwise was it in England after the defeat of the Armada, when, an intolerable load having been taken away, the national spirit clothed itself in brilliant attire, and a new era dawned. Nowhere was this intellectual movement, this spiritual exultation, felt with a more quickened sense of reality than in Athens, then as never before 'the eye of Greece, Mother of Arts and Eloquence.' A city had suddenly arisen from comparative inactivity to an imperial position. Within a hundred years from the date of Marathon it passed through a complete gamut of change—political, moral, intellectual, religious—which has had no parallel since, until the days of the Italian Renaissance. The great tragedians sounded a note of emancipation: men felt that, almost without warning, the old order had changed, giving place to new. Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, spoke with profound insight, though with varying degrees of conviction, upon the great problems that beset life: in their dramas they visualized, for all men to mark, that sense of struggle between humanity and those Powers which, unseen but vaguely felt, brood over the stage on which man acts his part in the drama of existence. Intercourse, too, with peoples from overseas

was cultivated Athens became a sort of *παιδοκρίον* for the entertainment of new fashions of living, new modes of thought. The imperial interests of the city necessitated a fresh orientation of ideas, a readiness—hitherto, perhaps, little known—to welcome unfamiliar views of the world. Freedom of thought was to become no longer the privilege of a few select spirits, but to permeate, in divers degrees and ways, all classes of the community through the intercourse of mind with mind, and through the ready comparison of experience. The realm of ideas was enlarging, it should embrace things hitherto but dimly recognized. Of these foreign influences none were of more lasting significance than the teachings and doctrines of a class of men who now appeared for the first time—the Sophists*. The word has become one of the degraded words of speech, but it was not so at the beginning. Who were these Sophists? and what, if any, was their contribution to the intellectual enrichment of the world? True, the word ‘Sophist’ is used in a very wide sense, but perhaps we may not unfairly describe the Sophists as professional teachers, moving from place to place and lecturing on all subjects of interest and importance—not wholly unlike the University Extension lecturers of our own day. They ‘professed’ an art of life, the art of getting on in the world and of managing public affairs. Commonplace enough, this,—or so we think now, but in the fifth century B.C. the rise of these professional teachers of ‘virtue,’ † was a remark-

* An interesting passage on the Sophists occurs in Bacon’s *Novum Organum*, l. 71, where he anticipates that estimate of the Sophists made familiar to us by the work of Grose.

† of *φασκόντες παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν*, are Plato’s words in the *Gorgias*, 519. But observe that *ἀρετή* has a much wider meaning than ‘virtue’, it denotes any kind of human excellence (like the word *virtu* in Italian, which

able feature of society. Philosophers, in the ordinary sense of that misapplied word, they were not, though they indirectly taught a great deal of philosophy. They set out to provide for the higher education of youth, in some way or another ; they were the critics (and we might even add the journalists) of their time, and undoubtedly did much, not only to set novel ideas afloat, but to assist the new knowledge with which they imagined themselves to be amply endowed. Why was it that Socrates and Plato—who, we might well suppose, should have welcomed such teachers and lecturers and critics—so clearly acted in opposition to these school-masters of antiquity? Mainly, no doubt, because they felt that there was something essentially superficial and specious about

changes its colour according as it is used by, say, Machiavelli or Cellini or Aretino). The Sophists did not form a separate class or school in the history of Greek thought ; they were not a sect, but a profession.—See Grote's famous chapter on the Sophists in his *History of Greece*. It is only right to point out that this great scholar overestimates the Sophists : ' his whitewashing process cannot avail against the combined testimony of Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle and Isocrates ' (Phillipson, *The Trial of Socrates*, chap. i.). The first effect of their teaching—which was to bring a questioning spirit to bear on morals and politics—was undoubtedly useful ; they did awake new intellectual interest in their hearers (as Newman points out in his *Politics of Aristotle*, vol. i. 386) ; but they were too prone to employ their dialectic methods for unworthy ends. The era of the Sophists, says Grant (*Ethics of Aristotle* ⁴, vol. i. 154), must be regarded as a necessary, though in itself unhappy, step in the progress of the human mind. The rationalist movement they inaugurated was bound to come, and one may well ask, with Zeller, whether, apart from the Sophists, we should ever have had a Socratic philosophy.

them they did 'profess too much' They did not probe deep enough, they spoke constantly of wisdom (σοφία), but without getting to its roots, in their hands philosophy tended to become a trade, and had its price in the market. They were ready enough to lay the axe at the root of the conventions both of thought and life, but they were not equally keen to recognize 'the indestructible actualities which often lie at the root of the destructible conventions' Consequently, unlike Socrates and Plato they were frequently unable to distinguish (to use Bernard Shaw's remark) 'between the shock of unfamiliarity and the genuine ethical shock.' They were apt to use words and phrases as counters in the game of life, without accurately weighing their merits in the scale of real values, and, as we know, the tendency of phrases, as they grow old, is to turn into totems *

The following passage from Sidgwick's *History of Ethics* is much to the purpose

'Throughout the age of Socrates, Sophists and philosophers were commonly regarded, by those who refused to recognize their higher claims, as teaching *an art of words*. It is easy to see how this came about: when the demand for an art of conduct made itself felt, it was natural that the Rhetoricians, skilled as they were in handling the accepted notions and principles of practice, should come forward to furnish the supply. Nor is there any reason for regarding them as *conscious* charlatans for so doing, any more than the professional journalist of our day, whose position as a political instructor of mankind is commonly earned by a knack of ready writing rather than by any special depth of political wisdom. As Plato's Protagoras says, the Sophists in professing to teach virtue only claimed to do somewhat better than

* Result—'Quod mavult homo verum esse, id potius credit' (Bacon)

others what all men are continually doing ; and similarly we may say that, when tried by the touchstone of Socrates, they only exhibited, somewhat more conspicuously than others, the deficiencies which the great questioner found everywhere.'

We see, then, that Sophistry, with all its eager interest in culture and the things of the mind, had an unfortunate side, just because its exponents had no burning passion for clear thinking ; it became too often rather the ' mimicry of wisdom ' without its substance ; Sophists were artists of philosophy rather than profound enquirers. Combined with Rhetoric *—the art of eloquence—it did not too closely distinguish between right and wrong ; hence, as others have noted, the moral scepticism which came to be its concomitant. That, too, is why Cicero, for one thing, dubs the Sophists as men who philosophize for the sake of ostentation, or to win gain (*Acad.* ii. 72). Socrates, on the other hand (though no doubt he loved a little ἐπίδειξις, now and again), refused all payment for his teachings ; but, then, he was a real missionary in the intellectual and spiritual empires. As of old, the vision of God is the call of the prophet. The Sophists were as much apostles of an *Aufklärung* as Voltaire and the Encyclopaedists of the eighteenth century,—the *Illuminati* of their age. In the course of their speculative activities they were quite ready to assume a positive attitude towards any ethical question ; but for Socrates that was ' not enough.' As Acton says (in the *History of Freedom and other Essays*) : ' He urged men to judge of right and wrong, not by the will or sentiment of others, but by the light which

* As rhetoric was the most important branch of that education which the Sophists undertook to give, the word ' sophist ' became more and more to be nearly identified with rhetorician, until, under the Empire, it appeared as its recognized synonym (Jebb, *Characters of Theophrastus*, vii. (=xxi).

God has set in each man's reason and conscience' Hence he could but conclude that a teacher who came to some dogmatic conclusion not genuinely based on real knowledge was doing no good to his fellows, for to *know*, not merely to hold an opinion (δόξα), was the key to right action. Is it wonderful that Socrates, who sought in all things a standard of conduct, rebelled against the insecurity to which all purely sophistic teaching was bound to lead? On the other hand, the less scrupulous criticism levelled at the Sophists may have been due not so much because their efforts were subversive, as because they were successful *

Unquestionably the Sophists were, according to their lights and up to a certain point, honest enough, they were not conscious humbugs, they usually approached questions of ethics and politics in a reasonable and even candid spirit this we may admit, but, for all that, in so far as they did not ground their teaching on real knowledge, that teaching was bound to become, in the long run, subversive of all moral standards Sophism did make, ultimately, for a paralysing scepticism, it frequently proved destructive rather than constructive, its critical analysis of traditional theologies, though justified and more than justified in part, did definitely tend to cast doubt on the foundations of all religion. The Sophists, like many fashionable Rationalists of our own time, prided themselves on their 'advanced' ideas, but, as Hardy wrote (in *Tess*), 'advanced ideas' are, in great part, merely the latest fashion in definition.

The 'principle' of Sophism (wrote Dr J. H. Surling, in his *Philosophy and Theology*) was this truth as truth is only what we feel, and perceive, or think. All was to be learned and won from the examination of external objects. Hence it is not unimportant to note that this

* *The Times* (Lit. Suppl., Nov. 1, 1928), in a fine review of Dr Phillipson's work on the *Trial of Socrates*

movement, 'despite Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle who, in absolute correction and repudiation of it, followed it, in the end destroyed Greece.'* That the 'philosophy' of Socrates grew out of the same soil as Sophism, and in some of its tendencies resembled that movement, will not be denied. But, Thirlwall justly observes (*History of Greece*, vol. iv.), it would be an injustice to Socrates to confound him—the man who strove to establish principles of conduct by which men might be guided aright—with teachers who, at any rate in many cases, appeared to furnish each man with pretexts for following his own inclination, and sacrificing law and right to his own instincts. 'It was the one great aim of Socrates to give a new and firmer stay to the mind, which had been detached from all outward bases of authority, by insisting on the Idea of the Good.'† If Socrates appears to exaggerate the influence of intellectual clarity as the one requisite of the 'good life,' and to attempt a *science* of morality, he was not wrong in believing that intellectual clearness

* There is an illuminating passage in the *Logic* of Hegel (chap. viii., 'On the Doctrine of Essence') which somewhat bears out this contention; at the end of it, he says: 'The objective foundation of what ought to have been the absolute and universal creed for the acceptance of men, was undermined; and Sophistry, by this destructive action, drew upon itself merited obloquy.'

† 'When the focus of Greek intellectual activity shifted to Athens, the leading minds concentrated their attention on ethical problems. Socrates, more especially, set the fashion of a kind of inverted Agnosticism by teaching that the problems of physics lie beyond the reach of the human intellect; that the attempt to solve them is essentially vain; that the one worthy object of investigation is the problem of ethical life' (Huxley, *Romanes Lecture* for 1893). Cf. John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, vii. 5.

about the ideal of Life is one, at least, of the influences making for morality (Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. II. 450)

'Superstition, bending before an idol just as an idol, provokes the unbelief which refuses to worship even the God' A truth, indeed, but how often lost sight of! The rationalism of the Sophists (valuable enough, in its way) ends as all rationalism tends to end—in a universal denial that, behind the bare mechanic facts of the world, there stands that perennial Truth apart from which the facts themselves are but external and unrelated projections of a Reality they are incompetent to express.

§ 3 *The Trial*

The Peloponnesian war had been over for five years when the trial of Socrates began. It was a sorry time for all patriotic Athenians. Their Empire, once so brilliant and apparently so impregnable, was in ruins. Humiliated in the eyes of the outside world, Athens was the prey of faction and rent with internal troubles. The old order was indeed changing. People began to ask themselves what could be the cause of so grievous a *débâcle*. The more conservative-minded among them were abundantly conscious that a new spirit was working in the old state. Ancient religious sanctions were gone, or discredited; political principles, which had seemed so secure, were being rudely challenged, and though attempts had been made, from time to time, to stem the rising tide of discontent, they had proved largely ineffectual. More than ever men felt that some cause should be found for this disquieting condition of affairs. Little by little it was whispered that one man more than any other was primarily responsible—Socrates, in whose company, and through whose unsettling doctrines and discussions, men like Critias and Alcibiades had been trained. If anyone had retorted, 'How could a

mere talker have brought all this about ? ' the answer would have been, ' Consider the facts.' Socrates had long been a *persona ingrata* to old-fashioned people, not only on religious but on political grounds ; and, years before, he had been mercilessly criticized and ridiculed by that brilliant wit, Aristophanes the playwright. The feeling that there was something wrong and dangerous in the teaching of such a man as Socrates had been slowly gathering strength ; and the philosopher was not the man to soften animosity by a policy of conciliation or compromise. Unmoved and undaunted, he went on in his own peculiar path, despite the wagging of venerable beards or the gibes of opponents. Wherever folk met, at home or in the Agora, conversation was soon likely to turn on the burning question—Socrates and his doctrine. At last the storm, which had long been sullenly rolling up, was ready to break. A little knot of discontented and enquiring spirits took shape, under the auspices of one Anytus, an influential and popular man, well known as a rigid conservative, and a cordial hater of all Sophists, among whom he ranked Socrates as the most able and the deadliest. And this committee determined finally to assume the offensive. They would be rid of Socrates, for good and all : he should be compelled to stand his trial as a public nuisance.

Contrary to expectation Socrates at once resolved to obey the citation, though he might have avoided possible risk by quietly leaving the city. But that was not his way. His enemies had deliberately challenged him : his life and—what was far more important—his principles were at stake. He would reply to the challenge, and put forward a defence of his conduct both as a man and a citizen.

It was a spring morning early in the year 399 B.C. when the trial opened. The Court was crowded with eager listeners. Five hundred and one jurors had drawn the lot, and these were at once empanelled preparatory to the hearing

of the case before the King Archon in person * The clerk of the Court read out the formal indictment, which was couched in these terms

'Socrates is guilty (1) because he does not recognize the gods recognized by the city, but introduces strange, supernatural beings, (2) because he corrupts the youth'

Meletus, one of the creatures of Anytus, opened the case

* Charges of impiety at Athens were always tried before the King Archon. Now the term 'impiety' had a wide scope (see Phillipson, chap x), it embraced any sort of blasphemy, deliberate neglect of public worship, contempt of the State religion, and the inculcation of mischievous and subversive doctrine. Naturally it was difficult to define accurately, and it could be made (as in Socrates' case) a convenient pretext for unjust persecution. The Athenians were, in the main, not an intolerant people, though they had their theological prejudices, like other people. Prosecutions for 'heresy' were not common, though by no means unknown, but anything remotely resembling the methods of the Inquisition would have been out of the question. The best-known instances of legal action for 'impiety' were those of Anaxagoras, who was, like Galileo, prosecuted for setting forth certain astronomical opinions, Protagoras, who (so it is alleged) was banished for openly doubting the existence of the gods, Diogenes of Melos—the 'atheist'—who was forced to fly from the city, with a price on his head; Andocides, who was accused of having profaned the mysteries, and Aristotle, who, when charged with paying divine honours to a mortal, prudently left Athens on the ground that he did not wish the Athenians to sin a second time against philosophy. Later on, Aristarchus of Samos was prosecuted on the ground that he had offended against the gods by asserting that the earth revolved on its own axis. There were other cases, of the same sort, *sed hæc hæcenus*

for the prosecution, and was followed by Anytus himself and Lycon. We know nothing of the actual evidence brought forward by the prosecutors, who were careful to imply that they were moved not by personal malice, but by patriotic reasons. Their speeches ended, Socrates arose. He spoke, amid constant interruptions from the dour Meletus, in measured language and in his usual tranquil fashion. His defence, one of the most memorable ever made in a Court of Law, was in the nature of an improvisation—or so Plato makes it appear; and indeed it is probable, if not certain, that we have in this *apologia pro vita sua* the gist of what Socrates said, but set in the artistic framework provided by his great disciple.* One is naturally reminded of the speeches put into the mouth of Jesus Christ by the anonymous author of the Fourth Gospel—discourses infinitely moving, strangely effective, and embodying genuine historical truth, but passing out beyond the mere truth of act and fact into the higher truth of idea. The defence of Socrates, though signalized by no word of weakness or of compromise, must have made a profound impression on the thronged assembly, for, when it came to voting, the prosecution won by only a narrow majority. This portion of the proceedings having terminated, at once the question arose, What penalty ought to be assigned? By law, in a charge like this, the culprit was allowed to offer a counter-penalty to that proposed by the prosecution; and this counter-penalty, if deemed reasonable, might be accepted by the Court. But, to the surprise of everybody, and the consternation of his friends, Socrates, instead of proposing some commonplace penalty, declared that, as a true benefactor to his fellowmen, he deserved—

* Prof. Gilbert Murray, in his *Literature of Ancient Greece* (p. 174), calmly writes: 'Of course the Platonic *Apology* is fiction.' There is no 'of course' about it. Cf. Phillipson, *The Trial of Socrates*, pp. 16 sq.

public maintenance at the city's cost¹ Naturally there was an uproar, for, by his action, Socrates had obviously flouted the jurors It was only at the urgent request of his friends that, finally and reluctantly, he suggested a very moderate fine This being considered utterly inadequate, the Court proceeded to vote again, and this time the voting against the accused was heavy The penalty assigned was death

'Socrates' so-called *Apologia* is really anything but a serious defence against the charges adduced. They were indeed, in the circumstances, practically unanswerable' *

'We see how utterly impossible it was for Socrates to answer the accusation. He enters into an explanation of his life and motives, and has no difficulty in showing that many things popularly alleged against him are false. But with the actual charge of holding and diffusing heterodox views he deals briefly and unsatisfactorily He was not condemned unjustly—according to the law And that is the intensity of the tragedy There have been no better men than Socrates, and yet his accusers were right.' † But this is a moot point, which has been debated from the days of Plato to those of Libanius, and such a dogmatic assertion is not convincing The accusers might certainly have retorted on their critics that the verdict was not illegal, in just such a fashion, doubtless, could Caiaphas and his friends have justified their action in condemning Jesus to death, by emphasizing the strict legality of the sentence Here, as so often, *summa lex, summa injuria* That Socrates was, from a purely Athenian point of view, guilty of the two main charges levelled against him, might perhaps be hard, even now, to deny, though we

* A. D. Godley, *Socrates and Athenian Society*

† J. B. Bury, *History of Greece*, chap. xiii. For a very different view, see Phillipson, *The Trial of Socrates*, chap. xx. He fully agrees with Zeller that the condemnation was fundamentally unjust.

may well agree with the vigorous remark of Bernard Shaw when he says : ‘ One of the most famous feats of the Athenian Democracy was to execute Socrates for using his superior brains to expose its follies.’* Instinctively the Athenians felt that his teaching *was*, in some mysterious fashion, subversive in tendency : and so, perforce, it was bound to be. Socrates had introduced a new spiritual and intellectual era ; and pioneers, then as ever, are required to pay the penalty of their unwelcome activities. Had he not asserted the supremacy of the individual conscience over man-made legislation ? Had he not, in season and out, insisted on the public value of free discussion, and so by his example justified a free-thinking attitude to all questions that impinge on human life ? † He had laid down the doctrine that perfect freedom of discussion possessed not merely a social value, but was an indispensable

* *The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism*, p. 453.
Byron, *Don Juan* (c. xv.) :

‘ And persecuted sages teach the schools
‘ Their folly in forgetting there are fools.’

One may note Shelley's words (in a letter to Lord Ellenborough, who had imprisoned one Daniel Eaton in 1812 for publishing part of Paine's *Age of Reason*) : ‘ The crime of inquiry is one which religion has never forgiven. Implicit faith and fearless inquiry have in all ages been irreconcilable enemies. Unrestrained philosophy has, in every age, opposed itself to the reveries of credulity and fanaticism.’ True—up to a point—no doubt ; but Shelley strangely misunderstands the true meaning of ‘ faith,’ which, as Dr. Martineau finely said, is a belief of *real Being* on the strength of *what ought to be* (*Ideal Substitutes for God*, in vol. iv. of his collected Essays).

† Compare J. B. Bury, *A History of Freedom of Thought*, and his article in the *Rationalist P.A. Annual* for 1926.

factor in the whole-hearted pursuit of truth. It was both an intellectual and a moral necessity. Certainly his foes were not wrong in declaring that he corrupted the youth and brought new divinities into Athens, if it were corrupting the youth to teach them to set reason above authority, and if it were bringing new divinities into Athens to appeal to inward conviction as the one authentic voice of God.*

The once popular notion that the witty buffoonery of Aristophanes was the occasion of Socrates' death cannot be maintained. It is doubtful if the poet, though he indulged his ribaldry at the cost of veracity, entertained any special antipathy to Socrates. Probably he did not intend it to be taken too seriously. The fact is Socrates, with his oddities, his ugliness, his shabby appearance, and his incurable love of button-holing all and sundry, was the common butt of all the comic poets, 'who apparently regarded him as a sort of Edie Ochiltree'†. That Aristophanes—a stalwart conservative and upholder of the old political and religious order—disliked much of what Socrates stood for will hardly be denied, nor need we seriously doubt that the philosopher's enemies made use of the comedian's ridicule to damage the old man's character in the general estimation. Be it remembered that the play—the *Clouds*—met with its deserved fate, and, notwithstanding the exquisiteness of the wit, was rejected. A second attempt succeeded no better, and the abettors of the poet were so discouraged from pursuing their design that it was not till twenty years after the publication of the play that they brought their accusation against Socrates.‡

* Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vol. 1 p. 76

† Rogers, *Introduct. to the Clouds*, p. xxii

‡ Isaac Disraeli, *Calamities and Quarrels of Authors*. For a careful discussion of the Aristophanic attack, see Phillipson, *The Trial of Socrates*, chap. viii. Dr Phillipson justly points

What, then, was the *real* count on which Socrates was condemned? The late Prof. Henry Jackson * pointed out, with considerable force, that the main motive for the accusation was not religious but *political*. If (he says) Socrates was a representative person on the 'moderate' side—that is, on the side of those persons at Athens, like Theramenes, who, while they loathed Critias and his gang of oligarchical conspirators, were nevertheless anxious to see the former democratic principle modified to something less violent in its extent and working—it is well within the bounds of probability that the leaders of the Radical-Democratic party, in order to be rid of uncongenial elements in the city, would be only too eager to strike, *through Socrates*, a heavy blow against the Moderates. Socrates, like Plato, was no whole-hearted democrat: he knew far too well to what pass an unchained democracy had brought his country. But neither was he an oligarch: his behaviour over *l'affaire Leon* was enough to prove that. 'On the expulsion of the oligarchs, the "Moderates" were strong enough to assert their views, but not to carry them; so the old democracy was restored. Singling out Socrates, as type of the noxious party, who

out that, above his comic purpose, Aristophanes had a serious aim in the *Clouds*; but it seems to me doubtful if his influence on public opinion was as far-reaching as Dr. Phillipson asserts. The effect of his play on contemporary thought may be compared to that exercised by Gilbert on the 'aesthetic' craze by his clever play *Patience* (produced in 1881). It was certainly a contributory factor in routing the devotees—

'the peripatetics of long-haired aesthetics'—but the main fact was the gradual change in the climate of human opinion. Similarly with the *Clouds*.

* Cambridge Prelection, 1889; reprinted in *A Memoir of Henry Jackson*, by R. St. J. Parry (1926).

had done much to foster the oligarchs (and were therefore a more dangerous form of anti-democratic sentiment), the popular leaders, now again fairly entrenched, indicted him as an offender against religion and morality; and, under cover of these charges, represented him as a traitor to the sovereign *Δῆμος* and the city. Probably they expected he would leave the country, but they were disappointed, so they had no choice but to press the capital charge. His eccentricity and heterodoxy, as well as the personal animosities he had provoked, doubtless contributed, as his accusers had foreseen, to bring about the conviction, but it was the fear of Socrates' "philosophic radicalism" that prompted the action of Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon. The result was wholly what they hoped it would be. The friends of Socrates abandoned the struggle and went into exile, and, when they returned to Athens, the most prominent of them [Plato] was careful to announce that he had withdrawn from the practical politics of Athens, and regarded himself as the citizen of a city which is not on earth, but in heaven.

All this is true enough, yet it seems to me unlikely that the condemnation of Socrates rested on any one single count. That the motive was, in the main, political, may be admitted, but other motives were at work. Religious prejudice, rancorous and unintelligent, then as ever, genuine fears for the future unless the growing influence of Socrates, and his philosophical nihilism, were not promptly countered, anger and irritation at his open disregard of conventionalism in ethics and in politics alike, finally personal feeling—at the root of most things in human life—all these were factors in bringing about the tragedy. On any one ground Socrates would probably have been let go, with a verdict of 'not proven', but the cumulative effect of all the factors together proved irresistible. For a man cast in the mould of Socrates, compromise—which might have saved him at the last—was plainly impossible. Is not compromise the

pact between cowardice and comfort, under the specious title of expediency ?

The death of Socrates was of a piece with his whole life. In language of deep but restrained feeling, yet with no touch of ineffectual pity, Plato records the last moments of his beloved master and friend,—there, in the silent prison, at the close of the day, just when the shadows of the evening had begun to fall and the lights of the city to gleam. With unfailing serenity Socrates had faced his accusers ; with no less courage, amid his sorrowing comrades, he was to face the last enemy, Death. He died as he had lived, tranquil, gracious, undaunted. If ever man was martyred in the service of what he believed to be truth, that man was Socrates the Athenian. We take leave of him in the splendid words of Milton over the dead champion of Israel :

‘ Nothing is here for tears, nothing to wail
Or knock the breast ; no weakness, no contempt,
Dispraise or blame ; nothing but well and fair,
And what may quiet us in a death so noble.’

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

1.—"Ὅτι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἑμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἀληθές γε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρῆν ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνηθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὴν μὴδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τάληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοῖην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθές εἰρήκασιν· ὑμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν—οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλὰ ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασιν—πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω—καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήπου πρέποι, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὥσπερ μεираκίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ μου ἀπολογουμένου, δι' ὧν περ εἶωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἄλλοθι, μῆτε θαυμάζειν μῆτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἕνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτωςί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγωνὼς ἑβδομήκοντα· ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὥσπερ οὖν

ἂν, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτυχχανον ὦν, ξυνεγιγνώσκετε
 δῆπου ἂν μοι, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ
 ἔλεγον, εὐ οἷσπερ ἑτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο
 ὑμῶν δεομαι δικαίον, ὥς γέ μοι δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον
 τῆς λέξεως ἔαν—ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χεῖρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων
 ἂν εἴη—αὐτὰ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τουτῷ τὸν νοῦν προσ-
 ἔχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μὴ δίκαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη
 ἀρετὴ, ῥήτορος δὲ τάλιθθι λέγειν

2—Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὧ
 ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μου ψευδῇ κατηγορη-
 μενα καὶ τοὺς πρωτοὺς κατηγοροὺς, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ
 ὕστερα καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατηγοροὶ
 γεγονασὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ παλαιὰ πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν
 ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ
 Ἄνυστον, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι
 δεινότεροι, ὧ ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παιδῶν
 παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγοροῦν ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν
 ἀληθές, ὡς ἔστι τις Σωκράτης σοφὸς ἄνθρωπος, τὰ τε μετέωρα
 φροντιστὴς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκῶς καὶ τὸν
 ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν οὗτοι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
 οἱ ταυτὴν τὴν φημὴν κατασκεδασάντες, οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶν
 μοι κατηγοροὶ οἱ γὰρ ἀνουντες ἡγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα
 ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν ἔπειτα εἰσὶν οὗτοι οἱ
 κατηγοροὶ πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη κατηγορη-
 κότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταυτῇ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς
 ἐν ἣ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστευσάτε, παῖδες ὄντες ἔνιοι ὑμῶν
 καὶ μεираκία, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρημνὴν κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογου-
 μένου οὐδενός· ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ
 ὀνόματα οἷον τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἰ τις
 κωμῳδιοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὦν ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ
 χρωμένοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον (οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι
 ἄλλους πειθόντες) οὗτοι πάντων ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν οὐδὲ
 γὰρ ἀναβιβασάσθαι οἷον τ' ἔστιν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδ'
 ἐλέγξαι οὐδενά, ἀλλ' ἀναγκὴ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ σκισμαχεῖν

ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττοὺς μου τοὺς κατηγοροὺς γεγονέναι, ἐτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορήσαντας, ἐτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι, οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον ἠκούσατε κατηγορούντων καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερον. εἰεν· ἀπολογητέον δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολήν, ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτως γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ πλεον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστιν. ὅμως τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπη τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

3.—Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστίν, ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἥ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητος με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. εἰεν· τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγορῶν τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν· ‘Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν καὶ ἄλλους τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα διδάσκων.’ τοιαύτη τίς ἐστι· ταῦτα γὰρ ἑωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαίω. καὶ οὐχ ὥς ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός ἐστιν. μή πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαύτας δίκας φύγοιμι! ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστιν. μάρτυρας δὲ αὖ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πρόποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένου—πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν—φράζετε οὖν ἀλλή-

λοις, εἰ πωποτε ἢ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τάλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν

4 — Ἄλλα γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδέ γ' εἰ τινος ακηκόατε, ὥς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρηματὰ πρᾶττομαι, οὐδέ τοῦτο ἀληθές· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἶός τ' εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντίνος καὶ Προδικὸς ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἱππίας ὁ Ἡλείος· τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὡς ἄνδρες, οἶός τ' ἐστὶν ἰὼν εἰς ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ὥς ἂν βούλωνται, τούτους πείθουσι τὰς ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολιποντας σφίσιν ξυνεῖναι χρήματα δίδοντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἐστὶ Παρίος ἐνθαδὲ σοφός, ὃν ἐγὼ ησθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν ἀνδρί, ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλεῖω ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἱππονικῷ· τοῦτον οὖν ἀνηρόμην—ἐστον γὰρ αὐτῷ δυο υἱε—'ὦ Καλλία,' ἦν δ' ἐγώ, 'εἰ μὲν σου τῷ υἱε πωλῶ ἢ μοσχῶ ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι, ὃς ἐμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῶ τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ ποιήσειν τὴν προσηκουσαν ἀρετὴν· ἦν δ' ἂν οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἵππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστόν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν, τις τῆς τοιαυτῆς ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν, οἶμαι γὰρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν υἱέων κτῆσιν· ἐστὶν τις,' ἔφην ἐγώ, 'ἢ οὐ,' 'πανυ γέ,' ἦ δ' ὅς· 'τις,' ἦν δ' ἐγώ, 'καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ ποσὸν διδάσκει,' 'Εὐθησος,' ἔφη, 'ὦ Σωκράτης, Πάριος, πέντε μῶν'· καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐθηνον ἔμακαρισα, εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τεχνὴν καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει· ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνομένην τε καὶ ἡβρυνομένην ἂν, εἰ ἠπιστάμην ταῦτα· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι

5.—‘Υπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως· ‘ἄλλ’, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστὶ πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαὶ σοι αὐται γέγονασιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ τι ἔπραττες ἄλλοιον ἢ οἱ πολλοί· λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν, τί ἐστίν, ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν.’ ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κἀγὼ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δὴ. καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν, εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι’ οὐδὲν ἄλλ’ ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποίαν δὲ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός· οὗτοι δὲ τάχ’ ἂν, οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ’ ἀνθρώπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ’ ὅστις φησὶ ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καὶ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδὲ ἂν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον, ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστὶν σοφία καὶ οἷα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που. οὗτος ἐμὸς τε ἐταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἐταῖρός τε καὶ ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ’ ὑμῶν κατῆλθε. καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ’ ὅτι ὀρμήσειεν. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι· καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ, εἰ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνείλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων περὶ ὃ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὕτως μαρτυρήσει, ἔπειδ’ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκεν.

6.—Σκέψασθε δὲ ὧν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς

διδάξειν ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὕτως· τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνιττεται, ἐγὼ γὰρ δη οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρον ξυνοῖδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφός ὢν τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμέ σοφώτατον εἶναι, οὐ γὰρ δηπαυ ψεύδεται γε οὐ γὰρ θεμὶς αὐτῷ καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν τί ποτε λέγει ἔπειτα μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινα ἔτραπομην ἦλθον ἐπὶ τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἐνταῦθα, εἴπερ που, ἐλεγξων το μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι οὐτοσί ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμέ ἔφησθα διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον—ονόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δεομαι λέγειν, ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,—καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἄνηρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' οὐ κάπειτα ἔπειρωμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι, ὅτι οἴοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἴη δ' οὐ ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τουτῷ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παροντων, πρὸς ἑμαυτον δ' οὖν ἀπῶν ἔλογίζομην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερος εἰμι κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδετερος οὐδὲν καλὸν καγαθὸν εἶδεναι, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἶεται τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δὲ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶομαι ἔοικα γοῦν τουτου γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τουτῷ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἂν οἶδα οὐδὲ οἶομαι εἰδέναι ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ' ἄλλον ἦα τῶν ἐκείνου δοκουντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταυτα ταῦτα ἔδοξε καὶ ἐνταῦθα κάκεινω καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην

7 —Μετα ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἦα, αἰσθανόμενος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς ὅτι ἀπηχθάνομην, ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον εἶδοκε εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλειστοῦ ποιεῖσθαι ἴτεον οὖν, σκοποῦντι τον χρησμον τί λεγει, ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τοὺς τι δοκούντας εἶδεναι καὶ νη τον κύνα, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι—δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τάληθῃ λέγειν—ἡ μὴν ἐγὼ

ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἔδοξαν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικούς ἦα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε τῶν τραγωδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἃ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτούς τί λέγοιεν, ἵν' ἅμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τάληθ' ὅμως δὲ ῥητέον. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνω οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖεν ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοῦδοι· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες· καὶ ἅμα ἡσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τᾶλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῆα οὖν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι ὥπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

8.—Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνους ἦα· ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ ξυνήδη οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δέ γ' ἤδη ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην, ἀλλ' ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην καὶ μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταυτόν μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί· διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἡξίου καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἡ πλημ-

μελεια ἔκεινην τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν ὥστ' ἐμέ ἑμαυτὸν
 ανερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησιμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτω
 ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, (μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν την ἐκείνων σοφίαν
 μητε αμαθὴς τὴν αμαθίαν,) ἢ ἀμφοτέρω ἃ ἐκεῖνοι ἔχουσιν
 ἔχειν ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἑμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι
 μοι λυσαιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν

9 — Ἐκ ταυτησί δη τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
 πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπεχθεαὶ μοι γεγوناσι καὶ οἶαι χαλεπώταται
 καὶ βαρυτάται, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγο-
 νεναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι οἶονται
 γὰρ με ἐκαστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφον,
 ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω το δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὧ ἄνδρες, τῷ
 ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο
 λεγεῖν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλιγου τινος ἀξία ἐστίν
 καὶ οὐδενος· καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη,
 προσκεχρησθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνοματι, ἐμέ παράδειγμα
 ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι ὅτι οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὧ ἀνθρώ-
 ποι, σοφώτατος ἐστίν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἐγνώκεν
 ὅτι οὐδενος ἀξίός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν ταῦτ'
 οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιῶν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ
 τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀσπῶν καὶ ξενῶν ἂν τίνα οἶώμαι σοφόν
 εἶναι καὶ ἐπειδὴ μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι
 ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ σοφὸς καὶ ὑπο ταυτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε
 τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξαι μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἀξιον
 λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκειῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν πενία μυρία εἰμι δια-
 τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρεῖαν

10 — Πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις οἱ νεοὶ μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, (οἷς
 μάλιστα σχολὴ ἐστίν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων,) αὐτόμαται,
 χαιρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ
 αὐτοὶ πολλακίς ἐμε μιμοῦνται, εἴτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους
 ἐξετάζειν κάπειτα, οἶμαι, εὐρισκousι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν
 οἰόμενων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδοτων δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ
 οὐδὲν ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ

ὀργίζονται, οὐχ αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαιώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδὴν τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ, ὅτι ποιῶν καὶ ὅτι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, οἶομαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατὰ-δηλοὶ γίνονται προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἅτε οὖν, οἶμαι, φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοί, καὶ ξυντεταμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὥτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων· ὥστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἷός τ' εἶην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγонуῖαν. ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τάληθῆ, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος. καίτοι οἶδα σχεδόν ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι· ὁ καὶ τεκμήριον ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἢ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἷτια ταῦτά ἐστιν. καὶ ἕαντε νῦν ἕαντε αὐθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε.

11.—Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι κατηγοροῦν αὕτη ἐστὶν ἱκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς. πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὥς φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὐθις γὰρ δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγορῶν, λάβωμεν αὖ τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δὲ πως ᾧδε· Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὐς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἔγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· τούτου δὲ

τοῦ ἐγκληματος ἐν ἑκάστων ἐξετάσωμεν φησὶ γὰρ διὰ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα ἐγὼ δὲ γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται, ραδίως εἰς ἀγῶνα καθίστας ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι, ὧν οὐδεν τούτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν ὡς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πειρασομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι

12 —Καὶ μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἰπέ ' ἄλλο τι ἢ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται, ' ἔγωγε ' ' ἴθι δὴ νυν εἰπέ τοῖς, τίς αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ, δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἶσθα, μελον γέ σοι τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρων, ὡς φῆς, ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τοῖσι καὶ κατηγορεῖς τὸν δὲ διὰ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἴθι εἰπέ καὶ μνησθον αὐτοῖς, τίς ἐστιν ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγῶς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν, καίτοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἱκανὸν τεκμηρίον οὗ διὰ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν, ἀλλ' εἰπέ, ὦ ἄγαθε, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ, ' οἱ νομοὶ ' ' ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἀνθρώπος, ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νομοὺς ' ' οὗτοι, ὦ Σωκράτες, οἱ δικάσται ' ' πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Μέλητε, οἶδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἱοί τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν, ' ' μαλιστα ' ' ποτερον ἅπαντες, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὐ, ' ' ἅπαντες ' ' εὖ γε νῆ τήν ἥραν λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὠφελούντων τί δε διὰ, οἶδε οἱ ἀκροᾶται βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἢ οὐ, ' ' καὶ οὗτοι ' ' τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταὶ, ' ' καὶ οἱ βουλευταὶ ' ' ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μή οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασται, διαφθεῖρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους, ἢ κακείνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες, ' ' κακείνοι ' ' πάντες ἄρα, ὡς εἴοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς καγαθοὺς ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω οὕτω λέγεις, ' ' παννύ σφοδρὰ ταῦτα λέγω ' ' πολλὴν γ' ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν! καὶ μοι ἀποκρίναι ἢ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν, οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἀνθρώποι εἶναι,

εἰς δέ τις ὁ διαφθείρων ; ἢ τούναντίον τούτου πᾶν εἰς μέν τις ὁ βελτίους οἷός τ' ὢν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἵππικοί· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐάνπερ ξυνῶσι καὶ χρῶνται ἵπποις, διαφθείρουσιν ; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ζώων ; πάντως δήπου, ἐάντε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε ἐάντε φῆτε· πολλή γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἰς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὠφελοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι, ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέληκεν περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

13.—Ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, πότερον ἔστιν οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἢ πονηροῖς ; ὦ τᾶν, ἀπόκριναι· οὐδέν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς αἰεὶ ἐγγυτάτω ἑαυτῶν ὄντας, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθὸν τι ;' 'πάνυ γε.' 'ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι ; ἀπόκριναι, ὦ ἀγαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔσθ' ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι ;' 'οὐ δῆτα.' 'φέρει δὴ, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα ;' 'ἐκόντα ἔγωγε.' 'τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλητε ; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὢν, ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται αἰεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἦκω, ὥστε καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι, ἐάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακὸν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φῆς σὺ ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλητε, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλ' ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων, ὥστε σὺ γε κατ' ἀμφοτέρα ψεύδει. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν,

ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω, παυσομαι ὃ γὰρ ἄκων ποιῶ σὺ δὲ ξυγγενεσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρα δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ νομος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ' οὐ μαθησεως·

14 — Ἄλλα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον ἤδη ἐστίν, ὃ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μέλητω τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πωποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὁμῶς δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῆς διαφθείρειν, ὦ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεώτερους, ἢ δῆλον δι' ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ἣν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καίνα, οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω,· ἴπανυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω· ἰπρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὦ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν, ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, εἰπέ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν τουτοῖς· ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναι τινὰς θεοὺς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοὺς, καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταυτὴ ἀδικῶ, οὐ μὲντοι οὕσπερ γὰρ ἡ πόλις, ἄλλα ἐτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὃ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἐτέρους· ἢ πανταπασί με φῆς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταυτα διδάσκειν· ἰταῦτα λέγω, ὥς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεοὺς· ὦ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τι ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι,· ἰμα Δί', ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τον μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν· ἰἈναξαγορου οἶε κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε, καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἶε αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἶδεναι ὅτι τα Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων, καὶ δι' καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχηστρας πριαμένοισι Σωκρατοὺς καταγελαῖν, ἐὰν προσποιῇται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα· ἀλλ', ὦ πρὸς Διός,

οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ; οὐδένα νομίζω θεὸν εἶναι; ’ οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία οὐδ’ ὁπωστιοῦν.’ ’ ἄπιστός γ’ εἶ, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ.’ ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὕτωςί, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνυ εἶναι ὑβριστῆς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὑβρεῖ τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι γράψασθαι. εἰσιν γὰρ (ὥσπερ αἰνιγμα ξυντιθέντι) διαπειρωμένῳ. ’ ἄρα γινώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ ἐναντί’ ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας;’ οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι· ’ ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων.’ καίτοι τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος.

15.—Ξυνεπισκέψασθε δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἢ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀποκρίναι, ὦ Μέλητε· ὑμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ· κατ’ ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρητησάμην, μέμνησθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότῳ τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. ’ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ’ εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖται· ἔσθ’ ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἵππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοῖσι. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀποκρίναι· ἔσθ’ ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ’ εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ’ οὐκ ἔστιν.’ ’ ὡς ὦνησας, ὅτι μόγεις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φῆς με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ’ οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιὰ· ἀλλ’ οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μέ ἐστιν· οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δὴ· τίθημι γὰρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνεις. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἦτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φῆς ἢ οὐ;’

‘πάνυ γε’· ‘ουκοῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι,—ὥς σὺ φῆς, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τινὲς εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες,—τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγὼ φημί σε αἰνιττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ηγούμενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὖ ηγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδὴ περ γε δαίμονας ηγοῦμαι· εἰ δ’ αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδες εἰσιν νοθοὶ τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἄλλων, ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ηγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή, ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ηγοῖτο ἢ ὄνων, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ηγοῖτο εἶναι ἄλλ’, ὧ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ ἀποπειρωμένος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω τὴν γραφὴν ταυτην ἢ ἀπορῶν ὅτι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα ὅπως δὲ σὺ τινα πειθοῖς ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὥς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔστιν καὶ δαιμονία καὶ θεῖα ηγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὖ μῆτε δαίμονας μῆτε θεοὺς μῆτε ἦρωας, οὐδεμὶα μηχανὴ ἔστιν’

16 — ‘Ἄλλα γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλὴ μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονεν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθὲς ἔστιν καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὃ ἐμε ἀιρήσει, εἰς περ ἀιρῇ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ ἄνυτος, ἀλλ’ ἢ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολῇ τε καὶ φθονος· ἃ δὲ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρας ἥρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἀιρήσειν οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στή· ἴσως δ’ ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις· ‘εἴτ’ οὐκ αἰσχύνηι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτηδεύμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν’, ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δικαίον λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λῆγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἶε δεῖν κινδυνὸν ὑπολογιζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα, ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὀφελὸς ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερα δίκαια ἢ ἀδίκῃ πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ· φαῦλοι γάρ ἂν τῷ γε σῶ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτηκασιν οἱ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ

τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησεν παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἑκτορα ἀποκτείνειν, θεὸς οὔσα, οὕτωςί πως, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· ‘ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἐταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἑκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ.’ αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ’ Ἑκτορα πότμος ἐτοῖμος· ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίνην δίκην ἐπιθείς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν ἄχθος ἀρούρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἶει φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὐ ἂν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ’ ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

17.—Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἵλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλῷ, τότε μὲν οὐ ἐκείνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὥς ἐγὼ ᾤκηθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. δεινὸν τὰν εἶη, καὶ ὥς ἀληθῶς τότ’ ἂν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιῶς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὢν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ’ εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὃν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δ’ ὥς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶ. καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν

αὕτη ἡ ἐπονειδιστος, ἢ τοῦ οἶεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν, ἐγὼ δ', ὧ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφωτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἂν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου οὕτῳ καὶ οἶμαι οὐκ εἰδέναι τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπείθειν τῷ βελτιονι, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν οἶδα πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν, ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακὰ ἐστίν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει σὺδεπτοτε φοβησομαι οὐδὲ φευξομαι ὥστε οὐδ' εἰ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἄνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὅς ἔφη ἡ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἢ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἶόν τ' εἶναι το μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι με, λεγὼν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς, εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σώκρατῃς διδάσκει πάντες πανταπασὶ διαφθαρῆσονται,—εἰ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε 'ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἄνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἔφ' ὧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητῇσῃ διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν εἰαν δὲ ἀλῶς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανεῖ'—εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τουτοῖς ἀφίοιτε, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνεῶ καὶ οἶός τε ὧ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενος τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἂν αἰεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λεγὼν οἷάπερ εἶωθα, ὅτι 'ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὢν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχυρ, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχυνεὶ ἐπιμελούμενος, ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλείστα, καὶ δοξῆς καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστῃ ἔσται, οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις,' καὶ εἰαν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητῇ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθύς ἀφησῶ αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἅπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρησομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλεγξω, καὶ εἰαν μοι μὴ δοκῇ ρεκτησθαι ἀρετὴν, φαναι δὲ, οὐκ οἶδω ὅτι τα πλείστου ἀξία περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τα δὲ φανυλότερα περὶ πλείονος ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω, καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστώ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς

ἄστοις, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυτέρῳ ἔστέ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μείζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὥς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὥς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων ὅτι 'οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.' εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά· εἰ δέ τίς μέψῃσιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἂν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετε ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὥς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσαντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι.

18.—Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐμμένετε μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἅττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα, οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάψειεν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἀνυτος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναίτο· οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε μὲντ' ἂν ἴσως ἢ ἐξελάσειεν ἢ ἀτιμώσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἴσως οἶεται καὶ ἄλλος τίς που μέγαλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἢ οὗτος νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτινύναι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἶοιτο, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μὴ τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥαδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς,—εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν—προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει,

ὥσπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπος τινος οἷον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πολεὶ προστεθεικέναι τοιοῦτον τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἓνα ἕκαστον οὐδεν παυομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥαδίως ὑμῖν γενησεται, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' ἔαν ἐμοὶ πειθησθε, φεισεσθέ μου ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως ταχ' ἂν ἀχθομενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ νυσταζοντες ἐγείρομενοι, κρουσαντες ἂν με, πειθομενοι Ἄνυσσ, ῥαδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε, εἴτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτε ἂν, εἰ μὴ τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιτέμψειεν κηδόμενος ὑμῶν ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὦν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπο τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πολεὶ δεδοσθαι, ἐνθένδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρώπινω ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνεχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν αἰεὶ, ἴδια ἑκάστῳ προσιοντα ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πειθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς καὶ εἰ μὲν τι ἀπο τούτων ἀπελαυνον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκλενομένην, εἶχον ἂν τινα λόγον νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατηγοροὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ἀναίσχυντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτο γε οὐχ οἷοι τε ἐγενοντο ἀπάναισχυντῆσαι παρασχομενοὶ μαρτυρα, ὡς ἐγὼ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπιδραξαμην μισθὸν ἢ ἤτησα ἱκανὸν γὰρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρεχομαι τὸν μαρτυρα ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν

19 — Ἰσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα συμβουλευὼ περιῶν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον συμβουλευεῖν τῇ πόλει τούτου δὲ αἴτιον ἐστὶν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλὰς ἀκηκοατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμονιον γίγνεται, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῳδῶν Μελητος ἐγραφατο ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον φωνῇ τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει

δὲ οὐποτε. τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικά
 πράττειν, καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· εὖ
 γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα πράτ-
 τειν τὰ πολιτικά πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλῃ καὶ οὗτ'
 ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὗτ' ἂν ἐμαυτόν. καὶ μοι μὴ
 ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τάληθῃ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων
 σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως
 ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα
 ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι
 μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον
 σωθήσεται, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

20.—Μεγάλα δ' ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων,
 οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δὴ μου
 τὰ ἐμοὶ συμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ ὑπει-
 κάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ
 ἅμ' ἂν καὶ ἀπολοίμην. ἔρῳ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ
 δικανικά, ἀληθῇ δέ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν
 ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἥρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα
 δέ· καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς πρυτανεύουσα,
 ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους
 τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλεσθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν, παρα-
 νόμως, ὥς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρω χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε. τότε
 ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἠναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν
 παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην· καὶ ἐτοιμῶν
 ὄντων ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν
 κελεύοντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου
 ὥμην μᾶλλον με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι
 μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα δεσμόν ἢ θάνατον.
 καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως·
 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὖ μεταπεμ-
 ψάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν
 ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, ἵνα
 ἀποθάνοι· οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ
 προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὥς πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι

αιτιῶν τότε μεντοὶ ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὐτὸ ἐνεδει-
 ξαμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον
 ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἀδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον
 ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ το πᾶν μέλει ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ
 ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν, οὕτως ἰσχυρά οὔσα, ὥστε ἀδικόν
 τι ἐργασασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξηλθομεν, οἱ
 μὲν τετταρες ὥχοντο εἰς Σαλαμῖνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα,
 ἐγὼ δὲ ὥχομην ἀπὶ ὧν οἴκαδε καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταῦτα
 ἀπεθάνουν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ δια ταχέων κατελυθῇ καὶ τού-
 των ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες

21 — Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι, εἰ
 ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς
 ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοηθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ, ὥσπερ χρὴ, τοῦτο
 περὶ πλείστου ἐποιοῦμην, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὥ ἀνδρες
 Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς ἀλλ'
 ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε, εἰ ποῦ τι ἔπραξα,
 τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος, οὐδενὶ
 πώποτε συγχωρήσας οὐδεν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ
 οὔτε τούτων οὐδενί, οὐς οἱ διαβάλλοντες ἐμὲ φασιν ἐμούς
 μαθητὰς εἶναι ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πωποτ'
 εἵνεκα εἴδεαι εἰ δὲ τίς μου λεγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράτ-
 τοντος ἐπιθυμῇ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος,
 οὐδενὶ πωποτε ἐφθονησα, οὐδε χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων
 διαλεγομαι, μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ
 καὶ πένητι παρεχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ ἔάν τις βούληται
 ἀποκρινομενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λεγῶ καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ
 εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μὴ, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν
 αἰτίαν ὑπεχοίμην, ὧν μὴτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδενὶ μηδὲν πώ-
 ποτε μαθήμα μὴτε ἐδίδαξα εἰ δὲ τίς φησὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ
 πωποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅτι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
 πάντες, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει

22 — Ἀλλὰ δια τί δὴ ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρουσί τινες
 πολὺν χρόνον διατριβόντες, ἀκηκοάτε, ὥ ἀνδρες Ἀθη-

ναῖοι· πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὓσι δ' οὐ· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδές. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὥπέρ τις ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἔστιν καὶ εὐλέγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐγωγε τῶν νέων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διέφθαρκα, χρῆν δήπου, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὓσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πῶποτε τι ξυμβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφούς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμνησθαι. πάντως δὲ πάρεσιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοῖ, οὓς ἐγὼ ὁρῶ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὐτοσί, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβούλου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὁ Σφήττιος, Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἔτι Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεὺς οὐτοσί, Ἐπιγένους πατήρ, ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι, ὧν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασιν, Νικόστρατος ὁ Θεοζοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος τετελεύτηκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδεηθείη—, καὶ Παράλιος ὃδε ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἦν Θεάγης ἀδελφός· ὃδε δὲ Ἀδείμαντος ὁ Ἀρίστωνος, οὗ ἀδελφὸς οὐτοσί Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὗ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὃδε ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὧν τινὰ ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω,—ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ,—καὶ λεγέτω εἴ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου πᾶν τούναντίον εὐρήσετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακῷ ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασὶ Μέλητος καὶ Ἄνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι,

πρεσβύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἄλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι ξυνίσασι Μελήτω μὲν ψευδομένω, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι,

23 — Εἰεν δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμ' ἂν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδὸν ἐστὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως τοιαῦτα τάχα δ' ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουὶ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἰκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παῖδια τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἵνα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐλεηθῇ, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλούς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον τάχ' οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδεστερον ἂν πρὸς με σχοίη, καὶ ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις θείτω ἂν μετ' ὀργῆς τὴν ψῆφον εἰ δὴ τις ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει,—οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γάρ ἐγωγε, εἰ δ' οὖν,—ἐπιεικῇ ἂν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων, ὅτι 'ἐμοί, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰσὶν μὲν πού τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τοῦ Ὀμηροῦ, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυος οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης πεφυκα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖοι μοὶ εἰσὶ καὶ υἱεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μεῖράκιον ἦδη, δύο δὲ παιδία ἄλλ' ὁμως οὐδενα αὐτῶν δεῦρο ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι' τί δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω, οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀπημαζων, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μὴ, ἄλλος λαγός, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει οὐ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἔμε τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχοντα, εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθές εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος ἄλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι τῷ Σώκρατι διαφέρειν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε ἀνδρεία εἴτε ἄλλη ἡτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἐσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη οἷουσπερ ἐγὼ πολλακίς ἐώρακά τινας, ὅταν κρίνονται,

δοκοῦντας μὲν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομένους, ὥς δεινόν τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι, εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων ἂν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε· οἱ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνην τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστ' ἂν τινὰ καὶ τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν, ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετὴν, οὓς αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἐν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι. ταῦτα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε ἡμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὅτιοῦν εἶναι, οὔτ', ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψηφιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος.

24.—Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κἀθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὁμῶμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὐκ οὖν χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιπορκεῖν οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτέ με, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἢ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια, ἄλλως τε μέντοι νῆ Δία καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτουί. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὁμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροίην ἂν ἑμαυτοῦ ὥς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοὶ τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

25.—Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἄλλα τέ

μοι πολλά συμβαλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονεν τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἄλλα πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἑκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ ὥοιμην ἔγωγε αὐτῷ παρ' ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ νῦν δέ, ὥς ἔοικεν, εἰ τριάκοντα μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀπεπεφεύγη ἂν Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λυκων κατηγορησοντες ἐμοῦ, καὶ ὥφλε χιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλαβὼν το πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων

26 — Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου εἶεν ἐγὼ δὲ δητίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμησομαι, ὥ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἡ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας, τί οὖν, τί ἀξίος εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὅτι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἤγον, ἀλλ' ἀμελησας ὧν περ οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἠγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ὄντι ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα σωθῆσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα οἱ ἔλθων μῆτε ὑμῖν μῆτε ἐμαυτῷ ἐμελλον μὴδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστον ἰὼν εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὥς ἐγὼ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦα, ἐπιχειρῶν ἑκάστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ προτερον μῆτε τῶν εαυτοῦ μὴδενος ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθεῖν, ὅπως ὥς βελτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μῆτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι—τί οὖν εἰμι ἀξίος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὢν, αγαθὸν τι, ὥ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι καὶ ταῦτά γε αγαθὸν τοιοῦτον, ὅτι ἂν πρέποι ἐμοὶ τι οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πενήτῃ εὐεργετῇ, δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρα παρακαλεῦσαι, οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτι μᾶλλον, ὥ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὥς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι, πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ τις ὑμῶν

ἵππῳ ἢ ξυνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγει νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπίασιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι· καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι,—ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως.

27.—Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥ Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διειλέγμεθα. ἐπεὶ, ὥς ἐγῶμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλὰς, ἐπείσθητε ἄν· νῦν δ' οὐ ῥάδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύεσθαι. πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἑμαυτὸν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἑμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτός, ὥς ἀξιὸς εἰμί του κακοῦ καὶ τιμῆσεσθαι τοιούτου τινὸς ἑμαυτῷ. τί δείσας; ἢ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο οὐ Μέλητός μοι τιμᾶται, ὃ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' εἰ κακὸν ἔστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔλωμαι ὦν εὖ οἶδά τι κακῶν ὄντων; τοῦ τιμησάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δεῖ ζῆν ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ αἰεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἑνδεκα; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι, ἕως ἄν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ ταυτόν μοι ἔστιν, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα, ὁπόθεν ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσωμαι; ἴσως γὰρ ἄν μοι τούτου τιμήσαιτε. πολλὴ μέντ' ἄν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολῖταί μου οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασιν καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι. ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥαδίως; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὥ Ἀθηναῖοι! καλὸς οὖν ἄν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελθόντι τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως

αμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν εὖ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ὅπποί ἂν ἔλθω, λεγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε κἂν μὲν τουτους ἀπελαύνω, οὗτοι ἐμέ αὐτοὶ ἐξελῶσι, πειθοντες τους πρεσβυτέρους· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκείοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους

28 — Ἴσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι· ‘σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ζῆν,’ τουτὶ δὴ ἐστὶ παντῶν χαλεπώτατον πείσαι τινὰς ὑμῶν· ἐάντε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωννεομένῳ· εἰ αὖτ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὃ δὲ ἀνεξετάστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἔτι ἥττον πείσεσθέ μοι λεγοντι· τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ὦ ἄνδρες, πειθεῖν δὲ οὐ ράδια· καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμα οὐκ εἰθίσμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦ οὐδενός· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἐμελλὸν ἐκτίσειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι, τοσούτου βουλευσθε μοι τιμῆσαι· ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι ὑμῖν μᾶν ἀργυρίου τοσούτου οὖν τιμῶμαι· Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κριτων καὶ Κριτοβούλος καὶ Ἀπολλοδώρος κελεύουσι με τριάκοντα μῶν τιμησασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσούτου, ἐγγυηται δὲ ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὗτοι ἀξιοχρεῶ

29 — Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἕνεκα χρόνου, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἔχετε καὶ αἵτιαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λαιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτῃ ἀπεκτονατε, ἄνδρα σοφόν φησουσι γὰρ δὴ με σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμι, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζειν· εἰ γοῦν περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον,

ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν, ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψηφισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἴσως με οἴεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀπορίᾳ λόγων ἐάλωκέναι τοιούτων οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ ὥμην δεῖν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορίᾳ μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οἷ' ἂν ὑμῖν ἡδιστα ἦν ἀκούειν, θρηνοῦντός τέ μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιούντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὥς ἐγὼ φημι· οἷα δὴ καὶ εἴθισθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε ῥήθηθην δεῖν ἔνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἰροῦμαι ᾧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίγνεται, ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἀφείς καὶ ἐφ' ἱκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων· καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλάί εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, ἐάν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἢ χαλεπόν, ὦ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν· θᾶττον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄτε βραδὺς ὢν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐάλων, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ κατηγοροὶ ἄτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὄξεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἅπειμι ὑφ' ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὀφλῶν, οὔτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἔγωγε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὔτοι. ταῦτα μὲν που ἴσως οὕτως καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

30.—Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρησμοδεῆσαι,

ὦ καταψηφισάμενοί μου¹ καὶ γάρ εἰμι ἤδη ἐνταῦθα ἐν ὧ μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι χρησιμωδοῦσιν, ὅταν μελλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι φημί γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἦξιν ευθύς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νῆ Δία ἢ οἷαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτονατε νῦν γάρ τοῦτο εἰργασθε οἰόμενοι ἀπαλλαξεσθαι τοῦ διδοναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὥς ἐγὼ φημί πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον, υμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ᾔσθάνεσθε καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσω νεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ υμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε εἰ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχῆσιν τοῦ ὄνειδιζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐκ ὀρθῶς διανοεῖσθε οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πανυ δυνατὴ οὔτε καλὴ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ῥαστή, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολουεῖν ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μαντευσαμένος ἀπαλαττομαι

31 —Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδεὺς ἂν διαλεχθεῖην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουί πράγματος, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἀγούσι καὶ οὕτω ἐρχομαι οἱ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι ἀλλὰ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἕως ἔξεστιν ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς φίλοις οὓσιν ἐπιδείξαι ἔθελω το νυνὶ μοι συμβεβηκός τί ποτε νοεῖ ἐμοὶ γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖην—θαυμασιόν τι γέγονεν ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πανυ πυκνῇ αἶ ἦν καὶ πανυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μελλοίμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν νυνὶ δὲ συμβέβηκε μοι ὅπερ ὀρᾷτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτὶ ἅ γε δὴ οἴηθείη ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἔωθεν οἴκοθεν ἠναντιώθη το τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἠνικά ανεβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ το δικαστηρίον, οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ

μέλλοντί τι ἔρεῖν. καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ· νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν πράξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἡναντίωταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγενῆσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἡναντιώθη ἂν μοι τὸ εἰσθὸς σημεῖον, εἰ μὴ τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

32.—'Εννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε, ὥς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστιν τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ αἴσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενοῦς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολὴ τις τυγχάνει οὔσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε μηδεμία αἴσθησις ἐστὶν, ἄλλ' οἷον ὕπνος, ἐπειδὴν τις καθεύδων μὴδ' ὄναρ μηδὲν ὁρᾷ, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἴ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα, ἐν ἣ οὔτω κατέδαρθεν ὥστε μὴδὲ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν, πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ,—οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους ἂν εὔρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν, κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὔτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἷον ἀποδημησαί ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆς ἐστὶν τὰ λεγόμενα, ὥς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσὶν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθνεῶτες, τί μείζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἂν, ὢ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γὰρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἀΐδου, ἀπαλλάγεις τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς,

οἵπερ καὶ λεγόνται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν,—Μινῶς τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθεῶν δίκαιοι ἐγενοντο ἐν τῷ εαυτῶν βίῳ,—ἄρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ σποδὴμία, ἥ αὖ Ὀρφεὶ συγγενεσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσιοδῷ καὶ Ὀμηρῷ ἐπὶ ποσῷ ἂν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν υμῶν, ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλακὶς θελῶ τεθνάναι, εἰ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἀληθὴ· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτοῦ, ὅποτε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμῆδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμώνος καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διακρίσιν ἄδικον τεθνήκεν, ἀντιπαράβαλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ παθὴ πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων—ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη—καὶ δὴ το μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διαγείν, τὶς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστιν καὶ τίς οἶεται μὲν, ἔστιν δ' οὐ ἐπὶ ποσῷ δ' ἂν τις, ὧ ἄνδρες δικάσται, δεξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγοντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατίαν ἢ Ὀδυσσεα ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας, οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλεγέσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας, πάντως οὐ δῆπου τούτου γε ἕνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τὰ τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροι εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοι εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθὴ ἔστιν.

33 —Ἄλλα καὶ ὑμᾶς χρὴ, ὧ ἄνδρες δικάσται, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τῷ τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἔμα νῦν ἀπο τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλον ἔστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βελτίον ἦν μοι· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαιμοῦ ἀπέτρεψεν τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἐγὼ γε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μοι καὶ τοῖς κατηγοροῖς οὐ πανυ χαλεπαίνω· καίτοι οὐ ταυτὴ τῇ διανοίᾳ καταψηφίζοντο μοι καὶ κατηγοροῦν, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι βλαπτεῖν τοῦτο· αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι· τοσονδε μὲντοι αὐτῶν δεομαι.

τούς υἱεῖς μου, ἐπειδὴν ἡβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὡς ἄνδρες, ταῦτά ταῦτα λυποῦντες ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπουν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς· καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ, καὶ οἶονταί τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιῇτε, δίκαια πεπονθῶς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ υἱεῖς. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθάνουμένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις· ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλήν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.

BEFORE THE VERDICT (124)

CHAPTER I

WHAT impression has been made on *you*, men of Athens, by my accusers, I do not know, at all events they made *me* well-nigh forget who I was, so plausible were they. And yet I will go so far as to assert that they have not uttered a single true thing. But of their many false statements what amazed me most was this—they maintained that you ought to have been on your guard not to be misled by my eloquence. That this statement caused them no shame (when they must have known they were sure to get a practical refutation at my hands, as soon as I was proved to be no great speaker at all) appeared to me the most shameful part of the business—unless, of course, by a great speaker they mean one who speaks the truth. If they mean this, I should certainly admit that I was eloquent—but not after *their* fashion. These people, however, have (I repeat) spoken little or nothing that is true, but from me you are to hear the whole truth. None the less I can promise you shall not hear a speech marshalled, like theirs, with fine phrases and words, but something spoken quite directly, just as the words come. For I am convinced that my cause is just, and let no one think otherwise, as it would be unbecoming for a man of my years to appear before you like a lad with a lie upon his lips. Yes, and I particularly beg this of you—if you hear me defending myself in the language I generally use in the market-place at the bankers' tables (and many of you have heard me, both there and elsewhere), do not be surprised and do not interrupt. For the case stands thus. This is the first time, though I am seventy years of age,

that I have ever appeared before a court : hence I am a stranger to the language of a court. Were I a foreigner, no doubt you would overlook it if I spoke in the dialect and in the fashion to which I was bred ; so now, as things are, I request you as an act of justice (for so I believe it to be) that you will allow me to speak in my usual way. It may be a good way, or it may not ; but what I want you earnestly to consider is whether what I say is just or the reverse. It is a judge's merit to come to a just decision ; a speaker's to speak the truth.

CHAPTER 2

To begin with, it is right, men of Athens, that I should defend myself against the old false charges and my earlier accusers ; secondly, against the later ones. For my accusers have been many, even from of old ; they have been talking for years, without saying a word of truth ; and these men I fear more than I do Anytus and his friends, dangerous though they are too. But still more dangerous are those others, who got hold of you in your childhood, trying to cajole you, and accusing me of what is, nevertheless, untrue,—namely, that ‘there is one, Socrates, a wise man, who speculates about the heavens, and has pried into all things beneath the earth, and who makes the worse appear the better cause.’ These men, my friends, who have published this scandal, are the accusers I dread, for their hearers imagine that such investigators are atheists as well.

In the next place, these accusers of mine are many, and have been busy for ever so long, speaking to you, moreover, at an age when you would be most likely to believe them ; for you were then quite young, some of you mere lads. Consequently, as there was no one to answer, judgement has literally come by default. Worst of all, it is impossible to find out who they are,—unless one of them happens to be a comic poet. As for those who sought to persuade you through

envy and malice (some, it may be, convincing others because convinced themselves), these are the most impracticable of all. One cannot summon any of them here for cross-examination, one is obliged, almost literally, to fight with shadows in one's own defence, and to put questions with nobody to reply. I want you to understand that, as I have said, there are two classes of accusers to be dealt with: those who have brought this charge recently, and those old accusers of whom I am now speaking. It is against the latter that I just defend myself first, for it was these you heard attacking me first, and for a far longer period than those that followed.

Very well, I must, of course, make a defence and try, in the brief while at my disposal, to rid you of a long-ingrained prejudice. I could wish that I might succeed in my efforts, if to succeed be good for you and me. The nature and difficulty of the task I do not disguise from myself. However, let the issue be as God wills. I must obey the law, and make my defence.

CHAPTER 3

LET us consider from the outset what the charge is which has given rise to that slander on which, I suppose, Meletus relied when he drew up this indictment against me. Now, what are the assertions my accusers have been busy spreading? Well, I must read out their affidavit and treat these people as formal accusers. 'Socrates is an evil-doer, he makes himself a nuisance probing into the earth beneath and the heavens above, and he makes the worse appear the better cause. Furthermore, he teaches others to do likewise.' Such is the charge. You saw for yourselves, in Aristophanes' comedy, a fellow called Socrates swinging about in a basket, saying that he trod on air, and talking a great deal of nonsense besides, not a word of which I understand. I do not say this because I despise such knowledge, if anyone is really skilled

in these matters : heaven forbid that Meletus should bring so serious a charge against me ! No, my friends, I have nothing to do with speculations of this sort. And again I call the bulk of you to witness, and ask you to inform one another (those of you, that is, who have heard me conversing,—and many of you have) : inform them, I say, whether anyone has ever heard me discussing such themes, either much or little. You know it is not so ; and you may conclude from this that the other false statements most people make about me are equally unfounded.

CHAPTER 4

THE fact is these tales are false ; and, if anyone has told you I undertake to educate people and exact fees for it, that is false too. Yet I think it would be a fine thing to be able to teach mankind as Gorgias of Leontini can, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elias. For each of these men may go to any city and persuade the young men there to quit the society of their fellow-citizens (with whom they are free to associate without paying a fee), and not only pay for instruction, but be thankful for being allowed to do so. For the matter of that, there is another philosopher here from Paros, who, I learn, is sojourning in our midst ; and I mention this because I chanced to light on a man who has lavished more money on Sophists than all the rest put together,—Callias, the son of Hipponicus. So I asked him a question (for he has two sons), saying ‘ Callias, if your two sons were foals or calves, we could have engaged a trainer for them, and he might have been expected to make them perfect in their own special excellence ; and this trainer would have been a groom or a farmer. But, as they are human beings, what sort of instructor do you propose to engage ? Who is there that is skilled in the qualities demanded of a man and a citizen ? As you have sons, doubtless you have considered the matter. Is there any such person or not ? ’ ‘ Oh,

certainly,' he replied 'Who is he,' I asked, 'and where does he hail from, and what are his charges?' 'Evenus is the man,' replied Callias, 'and he charges five minas. And I counted Evenus happy indeed, if he really has this power and can teach so cheaply. Had I possessed such knowledge, I should have preened myself and put on airs, but then, my friends, this is a knowledge I do not possess

CHAPTER 5

PERHAPS one of you may retort 'But, Socrates, what is *your* profession?' How have these calumnies arisen? Surely all these stories could never have got about, had your conduct been like that of other folk. you must have been doing something out of the common. Tell us, then, what your profession is, for we have no wish to pass a hasty judgement upon you.' That seems a fair request, and I shall endeavour to show what has given me such a bad name and provoked these calumnies. Listen, then, and though, possibly, some may think I am joking, I can assure you I shall tell the truth. The fact is, men of Athens, I have obtained my name thanks to a kind of wisdom I possess. What is this wisdom? A wisdom that is, I believe, possible to all mankind. Maybe I am really wise in this way, whereas these men, whom I was mentioning just now, may possess a more than human wisdom,—or I know not how to describe it. Assuredly I do not possess that. whoever says so lies, and is speaking to raise a prejudice against me. And here I beg you not to interrupt, no, not even if you think I am talking arrogantly, for the words I use are not mine. I shall refer you to a speaker whom you all reverence. he is the Delphic god, and he it is who is witness to my wisdom (if I have any). I suppose you knew Chaerephon? He was a friend of mine from very early days, and a friend of the democratic party, he went into exile with that party not long since, and with it he

returned. And you know, of course, his character,—how impetuous in all he undertook. One day he went off to Delphi, and was bold enough to put this question to the oracle (and again I ask you not to interrupt); he asked, forsooth, whether any man was wiser than I. The priestess replied, ‘No.’ Chaerephon himself is dead, but his brother, who is in court, will confirm my story.

CHAPTER 6

Now mark why I tell you this. I mean to show you how the calumny against me began. When I heard the reply of the oracle, I put this question to myself: ‘What does the god mean? at what is he darkly hinting? I am not conscious of being wise in anything, great or small. What can he mean, then, by asserting that I am the wisest of mankind? Obviously a god cannot lie: it is impossible.’ For a long while I was at a loss what he did mean, till, finally, with great reluctance, I proceeded to investigate the matter in the following way. I went to one of the men who have a reputation for wisdom, convinced that here, if anywhere, I should convict the oracle and be able to say to the god, ‘Look, you said I was the wisest of men; but here is one who is wiser than I.’ I examined the man (I need not mention his name: it was one of our politicians who produced this impression on me), and this was the result. During our conversation I noticed that he seemed wise to not a few, but particularly so to himself; yet he was not. And I then tried to point out to him that, for all his reputed wisdom, he was the reverse of wise. He finished by flying into a rage with me, and so did many of the bystanders. As I went away, I thought to myself, ‘Well, I am wiser than he. Probably neither of us knows anything really worth knowing: but whereas this man imagines he knows, without really knowing, I, knowing nothing, do not even suppose I know.’

On this one point, at any rate, I appear to be a little wiser than he, because I do not even think I know things about which I know nothing.' I then went to another man who was reputed even wiser than the first, but with the same result. And he, too, was enraged with me, and so were many others.

CHAPTER 7

I THEN visited one man after another, in succession, for I saw with pain and alarm that I was making enemies, yet, for all that, I deemed it right to regard the divine word as of paramount importance. I must needs go, then, to all the reputed wiseacres to find out the meaning of the oracle. And verily, men of Athens (for I must speak the truth to you), this is what befell me. In the progress of my quest, ordained by the god, I found that the people with the highest reputations were well nigh the most ignorant, while others, who were looked upon as inferior, fell less short. Now I must set before you the story of my wanderings: they were like the labours of a second Heracles, and all to prove that the oracle was beyond dispute. After visiting the politicians, I approached the poets—tragedians, writers of lyrics, and the rest—believing that there I should find myself manifestly less wise than they. Accordingly I would take up those poems of theirs on which, apparently, they had laboured most, and would ask what they meant, expecting to learn something from them. I am ashamed to state the facts, my friends, yet stated they must be. Almost any of the bystanders could have spoken better about these poems than could the writers themselves. In short, I noticed this about the poets: that their works were the offspring not of artistic skill, but of a kind of natural power and inspiration, like seers and prophets, who say many noble things, but understand nothing of what they say. I thought the poets were much like that, and, further, I perceived that their poetry made them believe

they were the wisest of people in other matters also,—which they were not. So I left the poets, feeling I had the same advantage over them as I had over the politicians.

CHAPTER 8

LAST of all, I approached the craftsmen. I was quite aware that I knew nothing worthy the name of knowledge, and equally sure that *they* knew many admirable things. And in this I was not mistaken ; they knew what I did not, and, so far, were wiser than I. But, men of Athens, even our good friends the craftsmen made the same mistake as the poets. Because he was skilled in his own craft, each man imagined he was supremely wise in matters of the highest moment also ; and this tactlessness tended to eclipse their real knowledge. So I asked myself, on the oracle's behalf, whether I would prefer to remain as I was, without either their skill or their ignorance, or, like them, possess both. And I made answer to myself and to the oracle that it was better for me to continue as I was.

CHAPTER 9

IT was this cross-examination, men of Athens, that brought me many enemies, of the deadliest and bitterest sort ; and the result has been a series of false charges and my being dubbed 'wise.' For in every case the hearers believe me to be wise when I prove another man wrong ; whereas, my friends, in point of fact it is the god who is really wise. Probably the meaning of the oracle is simply this, that human wisdom counts for little or nothing. I do not suppose the god was speaking of Socrates the man ; he made use of my name by way of illustration, as though to say : ' Good people, he is wisest among you who, like Socrates, has learned that his wisdom is of no value at all.' That is the reason why, till this present hour, I search and enquire as I go my rounds, in

obedience to the god, whenever I believe anyone to be wise, whether citizen or stranger, and when I am convinced he is not wise, then (to vindicate the oracle) I prove that he is not so. And owing to my unremitting toil I have no time, worth mentioning, for any business, public or private, but live in extreme poverty by reason of my service to the god.

CHAPTER 10

IN addition to all this, the young men that follow me of their own accord, sons of wealthy Athenians with abundance of spare time, delight to hear people cross-questioned, and frequently copy me, and go on and try to cross-question others. And they, I suppose, find plenty of men who think they know something, but really know little or nothing. And then the victims get furious, not with themselves but me! 'This Socrates,' they cry, 'is a pesulent fellow, he is corrupting our youths.' And when anyone asks them, 'Why, what harm is he doing?' and what does he teach?' they have nothing to say. None the less, in order not to appear at a loss, they take up the usual ready-made charges against all who study philosophy—charges of speculating upon things in heaven, and things under the earth, charges of atheism, charges of making the worse appear the better cause. The truth, I suspect, they would hardly care to confess,—which is that they are themselves convicted of pretending to a knowledge they do not possess. Because they are, in my opinion, ambitious and zealous and numerous, speaking about me in a vigorous and convincing fashion, they have this long time past been dinning your ears with their persistent calumnies. On the strength of this, Meletus and Anytus and Lycon have attacked me. Meletus in his indignation on behalf of the poets, Anytus on behalf of the artisans and politicians, and Lycon on behalf of the orators. So that, as I said at the start, I should be surprised if, in a brief while, I

could disabuse you of your prejudices, now that they have grown so powerful. There, men of Athens, is the truth ; I speak without concealing or suppressing a single fact. And I know pretty well that I am hated for so doing,—which is a clear indication that my words are true, and that the prejudice against me is this, and its causes these. And if you look into the matter, either now or at some future time, you will find it so.

CHAPTER 11

AGAINST my first set of accusers this defence is sufficient. I shall next try to defend myself against Meletus—that ‘good patriot,’ as he calls himself—and those who followed in his wake. As if they were a fresh batch, let us take in hand their indictment, as we did with the others. It is somewhat after this style : ‘Meletus insists that Socrates is an evil-doer, corrupting the youth, not acknowledging the gods acknowledged by the State, but practising a strange religion.’ Such is the gravamen of his charge. Let us proceed to examine it, count by count. Meletus really does maintain that I do evil by corrupting the young ; but I maintain, men of Athens, that Meletus is the evil-doer, in that he makes fun of earnest, and lightly brings men to trial, pretending to be deeply interested in matters for which he has no care whatsoever. And I shall now endeavour to prove to you that this actually is the case.

CHAPTER 12

COME here, Meletus, and answer this : Do you not regard it as really important that our young men should be as excellent as possible ? ‘Why, yes.’ Then kindly tell the judges who it is that makes them better. Obviously you know, seeing the interest you take in this matter. Now that you have discovered the man who corrupts them—myself, according to you—I am haled into court and accused. But come, point out

who it is that makes them better 'There! you are silent, and have no word to say. Don't you think it disgraceful and a clear proof of what I say, namely, that you have never troubled about the matter at all? Tell me, good sir, who makes the young men better?' 'Oh, the laws.' That is not the question, my friend, I want to ascertain who the man is that, starting from a knowledge of the laws, makes the young people better. 'The judges here, Socrates.' What do you mean, Meletus? Can these gentlemen train our young people and make them better?' 'Of course.' A capital answer, I swear! What a host of benefactors you name! Once more. Do the listeners here make the youth better, or not? 'Yes, they do so likewise.' And the Senators? 'Yes, and the Senators, too.' Well, Meletus, you surely cannot mean that the citizens in the Assembly corrupt our youth? Or do they, one and all, make them better? 'They do.' Apparently, then, every Athenian makes men good—except myself, and I alone corrupt them. Do you mean that? 'That is exactly my meaning.' Ah, what an unlucky fellow I am, in your estimation! But answer me. Is this your opinion where horses are concerned? Do you believe that those who improve them are men in general, and that only one person harms them? or, on the contrary, that there is but one person who benefits them—or a mere handful, at most, namely the horse-trainers, whereas most people (if they have to do with horses) harm them? Is this not true of horses and other animals, too? Why, of course, whether you and Anytus deny it or not. Our young men may be congratulated if—as you say—only one man corrupts them, while everybody else does them good. Be that as it may, you show pretty conclusively, Meletus, that you have never given a thought to our youths, and you actually proclaim your own indifference, in that you have never cared at all for the cause which has led to this prosecution.

CHAPTER 13

FURTHERMORE, Meletus, pray tell us whether it is better to live among good citizens, or bad? Answer, my friend, for the question is not difficult. Do not bad men do evil to those who are from time to time their neighbours, and good men good? 'Certainly.' Now does anyone desire to be injured rather than helped by his fellows? Please answer (for indeed the law requires you to do this): Is there anyone who desires to be injured? 'Of course not.' Come now, are you bringing me to trial in the belief that I corrupt and harm our youths of set purpose? 'I am convinced of this.' What, Meletus, are you, at your age, so much wiser than I at mine, that, whereas *you* know that evil men work evil to their neighbours and the good work good, *I* forsooth am such a fool that I am ignorant even of this that, by corrupting one of my companions, I run a grave risk of being injured by him? And yet you affirm that I commit such a crime intentionally! Meletus, I do not believe you, nor, I imagine, does anybody else. Either I do not corrupt others, or, if I do, it is done unintentionally; so you are wrong, either way. Now if I corrupt them unintentionally, you have no legal right to bring me into court for such unintentional misdemeanours; you should have taken me aside and instructed me and admonished me; for, clearly, if I am instructed, I shall leave off doing what I now do unintentionally. But you shrank from any such meeting; you refused to teach me; and, instead, you bring me to a place where those should be brought who require, not instruction, but punishment.

CHAPTER 14

BUT in point of fact, men of Athens, it has long been evident (as I said before) that Meletus never troubled his head about any of these matters, great or small. None the less, pray tell

me, Meletus, in what way you think I corrupt the youth Obviously—so runs the indictment—by teaching them not to believe in the orthodox deities, but in other novel divinities Is this your meaning when you tell us I corrupt young men by my doctrines? ‘That is precisely my meaning’ Then, in the name of these very gods who are under discussion, express yourself more plainly both to me and to the judges here. For I cannot make out whether you say I teach men to believe that there are *some* gods (in which case I must believe in their existence, and am no downright atheist, and so am not guilty in this respect), only not the gods recognized by the State, but different gods altogether Is this the charge against me? Or do you mean that I believe in no gods whatever, and teach others so? ‘My contention is that you do not believe in them at all.’ My dear Meletus, what makes you say this? Why, then, I do not believe the sun and moon to be gods, as everybody else does! ‘Indeed, gentlemen, he does not, for he says that the sun is a stone, and the moon earth’ My good sir, do you fancy that it is Anaxagoras you are prosecuting? and do you think so poorly of the jury, and imagine them to be so illiterate, that they do not know that the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae are full of these doctrines? Aye, and so our young men learn from me doctrines they can sometimes buy, for a shilling at most, at the Round Terrace, and laugh Socrates to scorn if he claims these theories for his own—especially as they are so peculiar But, in heaven’s name, is *this* your opinion of me? do I believe in *no* gods? ‘In none whatsoever’ Meletus, no one believes you, you do not believe it yourself. Men of Athens, this fellow is, I take it, an impudent knave, who has simply drawn up this indictment in a fit of insolence and shameless bravado By framing a riddle he seems to be trying an experiment on me to see whether Socrates, this wise man, will guess I am joking and contradicting myself, or whether I shall succeed in hood-

winking him and all who hear me.' For Meletus appears to me to be contradicting himself in the indictment, as though he were to say : ' Socrates is guilty : he does not believe in gods, yet believes in gods.' Now surely this is the argument of a trifler.

CHAPTER 15

PRAY consider, gentlemen, why I hold this to be his meaning. And you will have to answer us, Meletus ; and do you, Athenians, as I begged of you at the outset, kindly remember not to interrupt if I talk in my usual style.

Is there anybody, Meletus, who believes that things human exist, but that human beings do not ? Let him answer, gentlemen, but do not let him make constant interruptions. Is there a man who does not believe in the existence of horses, yet believes in horsemanship ? or does not believe in flute-players, but does believe in flute-playing ? My good fellow, it is impossible ; for, as you refuse to give a reply, I tell you and everybody here as well. But answer this one question, at least : Is there any man who believes in supernatural things, but not in supernatural beings ? ' No.' Very good of you, I must say, to answer at last under compulsion from the judges ! You say, then, that I believe in supernatural beings, and teach this ? So at all events, on your own showing, I do actually believe in things supernatural (be they new or be they old), and to this you swore in your affidavit. Now, if I believe in supernatural things, surely I am bound to believe in supernatural beings. Is not this so ? Of course : for I presume your silence implies consent. And do we not believe that supernatural beings are gods, or the children of gods ? Yes, or no ? ' Oh, certainly.' Well, then, if I believe in supernatural beings (as you allow), and if these beings are gods, this must be the riddle and jest which I attribute to you when you affirm that, while I do not believe in gods, I still do believe in gods,

seeing I believe in supernatural beings. Again, if these divinities are the bastard offspring of gods, whether by nymphs or some other mothers, as is generally supposed, who could believe in the children of gods, but not in gods? It would be as absurd as believing in the offspring of horses or asses, but not in horses or asses! The truth is, Meletus, it must have been to test me that you drew up that charge,—or else you were at a loss to find any real ground of accusation. But you cannot persuade any man with a grain of common-sense that it is possible for one and the same person to believe in things supernatural and divine, and at the same time disbelieve both in divinities and in gods.

CHAPTER 16

BUT in fact, men of Athens, the charge brought by Meletus, that I am an evil-doer, needs no laboured defence. I think I have said enough to confute this. Nevertheless that many are deeply prejudiced against me, as I said before, is certainly true. And what will bring about my condemnation (if I am condemned) is not Meletus or Anytus, but the envy and suspicion of the majority. Yes, the forces that have already ruined many a good man will probably ruin me; there is little fear that they will stop short at me.

But perhaps someone may say 'What! are you not ashamed, Socrates, of a practice that is imperilling your life?' I might fairly retort 'You are wrong, friend, if you believe that a man who is good for anything ought to weigh the chances of life and death, and not rather keep his eye fixed on this one point—whether his actions are just or unjust, whether they are the actions of a good man or a bad.' For, according to you, the heroes who perished at Troy must have been sorry folk—and the son of Thetis more than they all, seeing that he utterly despised death, when shame was the alternative. For when he was minded to slay Hector, and

his goddess mother spoke to him, if I recollect aright, somewhat after this manner : ‘ My son, if you avenge the slaughter of your friend Patroclus, and kill Hector, you will perish yourself,’ ending with these words, ‘ After Hector, death awaits you,’ what was his answer ? Just because he scorned to live a coward and not avenge his friend, he made light of death and danger, crying out, ‘ Let me die straightway, after punishing the miscreant, and not prove a laughing-stock to all men—

‘ Here, by the crooked ships, a cumberer of the ground,’—can you imagine a man like that cared aught for death and peril ? Men of Athens, here lies the truth of the whole matter : wherever a man posts himself (believing it his duty) or is posted by his captain’s order, there should he stay and face the odds, recking not of death or anything else in comparison with disgrace.

CHAPTER 17

MEN of Athens, I stood my ground, like everyone else, and risked my life at Potidaea, Amphipolis, and Delium, in the place where I was posted, in obedience to the officers you had chosen to command me ; and it would be passing strange if *now*, when the god (as I firmly believe) has bidden me live the life of a philosopher, I abandoned my post through fear of death or anything else. Yes, strange indeed ; and I should justly be brought to the bar for not believing in the gods, and for disobedience to the heavenly oracle, and for dreading death, and for imagining myself to be wise when I was not. For to fear death is simply to think we are wise when we are not ; it is to appear to know what we do not know. Nobody so much as knows whether death is not really the greatest of blessings ; yet men fear it as if they knew it to be the greatest of evils. Yet is not this the shameful folly of supposing we know what we do not know ? By this

much, my friends, I probably am superior to most others here too, and if I were to call myself wiser than others, it would be because, knowing nothing for certain about the other world, I do not even suppose I know. But wrongdoing, and disobedience to a higher power—be he god or man—I know well that this is base. Accordingly, because of evils which I know to be evils, I shall never fear nor fly from things which may, after all, be good. So, even if you acquit me now, refusing to do the bidding of Anytus, who said that I ought never to have come into court at all, or else (now that I am here) that you are bound to put me to death, because, if I should escape due penalty, your sons would immediately put my teaching into practice, and so become wholly corrupted,—if, in face of this, you said to me ‘Socrates, in the circumstances we shall refuse Anytus a hearing, and shall let you go, on condition that you waste no more time in these enquiries or in philosophical speculation, but should you be caught doing so again, you will be put to death’,—if, I say, you let me go on these terms, I should tell you frankly, ‘Men of Athens, I respect and esteem you, but I shall obey God rather than you, and, as long as I have life and breath, I shall never cease from the pursuit of philosophy, but shall exhort you and instruct everybody I meet, saying, in my usual fashion, “Look, my friend, you are an Athenian, a member of the greatest and most famous city in the world for strength and wisdom—are you not, then, ashamed that the object of all your care is to make money, as much of it as you can, and to win fame and reputation, whereas for wisdom and truth and the perfecting of your soul, you have not a single care?”’ And supposing he dispute this, and maintain that he does care, I shall not forthwith dismiss him, nor go my way, but shall question him, test him, and convict him, and if I do not find him to possess virtue (though he says he does), I shall reproach him for underestimating true, and overestimating false, values. This

I shall do for all I meet, old or young, particularly to you, my fellow-citizens, who are so close akin to me. For understand that this is God's will, and I am convinced no greater good has ever befallen you than this my service to God. My whole life is spent in going about trying to persuade you, both the young and the old, not to care so exclusively for your bodies or for money as for the soul's welfare. For I keep telling you that virtue does not spring from wealth, but that it is virtue that makes money and everything else good for mankind. If, by such words, I corrupt the youth, then my doctrine will be harmful ; but if anyone affirms that my teaching is something different, he is wrong. In the face of that I would conclude : ' Men of Athens, believe Anytus, or not ; acquit me, or not ; but be sure of this—that I shall never act otherwise, no, not if I must die a dozen deaths.'

CHAPTER 18

NAY, do not keep interrupting, my friends, but abide by my request and listen ; for I believe it will be to your advantage. I am about to say something else which will, perhaps, make you shout me down ; only pray do not so. Remember that, if you kill me for being what I tell you I am, you will harm yourselves far more than you harm me. Neither Meletus nor Anytus can harm me, for I do not suppose that heaven would suffer a good man to be harmed by a bad. Anytus could, perhaps, have me put to death or exile or loss of civic rights ; and probably both he and many another imagine these things to be great evils ; but there I disagree. What is, in my opinion, far worse is to do what Anytus is now doing—trying to kill a man unjustly. At the present juncture I am far from arguing on my own behalf, men of Athens ; no, it is on your behalf, that you may not be robbed of God's gift by condemning me. For if you kill me, you will not readily find my like,—one who, in obedience to God,

literally 'settles' on the city (grotesque as this simile sounds) as a gadfly settles on a horse that is tall and thoroughbred, but somewhat sluggish and in need of being aroused. Such am I, and it is God who has given me to Athens to rouse you and urge you on and reproach you; nor do I ever cease from settling upon you at every point all day long. Such another man you will not easily discover, and, if you listen to me, you will spare my life. Very likely you will be vexed—like drowsy people when they are being awakened—and, listening to Anytus, may with a single tap lightly put me to death, and then you will go on slumbering the rest of your days, unless God in his mercy send you another man like me. That I am the kind of man to be given by God to the city, may be learned from this. People do not usually neglect their own affairs and leave their belongings uncared for (as I have done) all these years, in order to mind your business, approaching each citizen individually, as if he were a father or elder brother, and urging him to make Virtue his prime care. No doubt, if I were getting something out of it and taking fees for my advice, my conduct would have been readily understood, but, as it is, you see for yourselves that my accusers, for all their insolence and effrontery, are unable to produce a single witness that I ever took payment from anyone, or asked for it. My own poverty is, I think, the fittest witness to the truth of what I say.

CHAPTER 19

PERHAPS you may feel surprise that, though I am so busy moving about and giving advice in private, I never venture to appear on the public platform and advise the State. You have heard me give my reasons, often and in many places. I possess something divine and supernatural, which Meletus, as you know, actually referred to in his indictment, by way of mockery. From childhood this Something has been with

me : it is a sort of Voice which, when it comes, always deters me from any contemplated purpose, but never urges me to act. This is what hinders me from taking any part in politics—rightly, I think. For be sure, men of Athens, if I had tried to take such a part, I should long since have perished, and done you no good, nor myself either. Pray do not be angry at my speaking the truth ; for no one will ever be safe who frankly opposes you or any other democracy, in his endeavour to prevent illegality and injustice in the city. He who is genuinely striving for the right, if he is to be safe even for a brief while, is bound to work in a private, not in a public, capacity.

CHAPTER 20

I SHALL give you convincing evidence of this—not by words, but by what you prize far more, deeds. Listen, then, to what once happened to me, that you may understand there is no man to whom I would yield, contrary to what is just, through fear of death : I would rather die than yield ! My story may be in questionable taste and smack of the courts, but it is true.

Now, men of Athens, though I never held office in the State, I did once sit on the Council. It so happened that my tribe, the Antiochis, had the presidency at the time when you proposed to try, in a body, the generals who had failed to pick up the drowning crews after the sea-fight at Arginusae. This was illegal, as you saw later. On that occasion I alone of all the committee opposed the illegality and voted against it ; and when the orators were ready to indict and arrest me, and you were vociferously urging them on, I deemed it my duty to side with law and justice, and take the risks, rather than support you in an unjust proposal through fear of imprisonment or death. This took place while the city was still a democracy. But when an oligarchy was established, the Thirty in their turn summoned me, with

four others, to the Rotunda, and told us to bring Leon from Salamis for execution. Similar commands they were frequently in the habit of giving to others also, desiring to implicate in their crimes as many as they could. There again I showed, not in word but in deed, that (to use a vulgar term) I care no farthing for death, what I *did* care about, and to the uttermost, was not to be guilty of any injustice or wrong-doing. The all-powerful Thirty did not scare me into an act of wickedness, when we came out of the Rotunda, the four went off to Salamis, while I quietly made my way home. Very likely I should have been put to death for this, had not the Government, shortly afterwards, fallen. And many will be able to prove to you the truth of my statement.

CHAPTER 21

Do you imagine I should have lived as long as I have, had I been engaged in politics and maintained justice, as an honest man should, tightly regarding this as my supreme duty? Why no,—nor any one else either! All my life through—in public, if I had any work on hand, and in private too—you will find that I never gave way to any man in defiance of right, not even if he were one of those whom my accusers falsely call ‘disciples’ of mine. Disciples I have never had, none the less, if anyone (young or old) desires to listen to me as I go about my business, I have never said to him, Nay, neither do I talk with him for a fee, and refuse to talk without. I submit myself to be questioned by rich and poor alike, and if any one is minded to answer, and then hear what I have to say in reply, he may do so. If one of my hearers turns out better or worse, why should I be held responsible, seeing I never taught, or promised instruction, at all? And if anyone says he ever learnt or heard a word from me in private to which all the world is not welcome, you may be sure he lies.

CHAPTER 22

Now, why is it that people like to spend so much time in my company? My friends, you have heard the reason. I have told you the whole truth: the reason is because they enjoy hearing me cross-question folk who imagine themselves wise when they are not. They find this a pleasant occupation. Now, as I have said, God has bidden me do this,—in dreams, in visions, and in all ways in which the divine power has commanded man to do anything whatsoever. That is the truth; and it can easily be verified. For if it be true that I am corrupting, and have corrupted, the young, surely, now they are grown up, if they had perceived I had given them bad advice in their youth, they would come forward of themselves and accuse me, and be revenged. Or, if they were reluctant to press the case personally, some of their kinsmen—fathers, brothers, or near relatives—would call to mind if their relations had really suffered at my hands. Certainly many of them are in court, here before my eyes—Crito, for example, my countryman and fellow-tribesman, father of Critobulus here; Lysanias of the Sphettian parish, father of Aeschines over there; Antiphon of the parish of Cephisia, father of Epigenes; and there are others besides, whose brothers have been in my company, Nicostratus, son of Theozotides, brother of Theodotus (Theodotus is dead, so *he* could not urge his brother to keep silent), and Paralus, son of Demodocus, whose brother was Theages. And there is Adeimantus, son of Ariston, whose brother Plato is here too; and Aiantodorus with Apollodorus his brother. I might name many others, some of whom Meletus ought, strictly, to have summoned as witnesses in the course of his indictment; but if he has forgotten them, let him call upon them now: I am ready to stand aside; let them speak if they have anything to say. No, quite the reverse, my friends! you will find them all ready to help me, the arch-corrupter,

the man who works their kinsfolk mischief, as Meletus and Anytus assert. Those who have actually been themselves corrupted might have some ground for assisting me, but the uncorrupted (relatives of these men, already well on in years), pray what other motive can *they* have for helping me, save the true and honest one that they know Meletus is telling lies, and that I am telling the truth ?

CHAPTER 23

THIS, gentlemen, is pretty well all I have to say in my own defence, yet there are, perhaps, one or two points besides. There may be some one among you who, remembering his own case, will feel aggrieved that, in a far less important trial than the present, he earnestly besought his judges with many tears, bringing his own children before you, by way of evoking as much compassion as possible, along with many others of his kinsmen and friends, whereas I shall, strangely enough, do none of these things—and that, too, though I am incurring what may be thought the supreme danger. Maybe such a one, with this in mind, will steel his heart against me, just because of this he may feel angry, and in his anger vote against me. If anyone feels like that—he need not, but assuming that he does—I believe it will be reasonable to reply. ‘My good Sir, I too have kinsmen, for (to quote Homer again) “I am no child of wood and stone,” but of flesh and blood, I too have relations and sons—yes, three sons, one a lad, the others mere children. None the less, I shall not fetch one of them here, and beseech for an acquittal.’ Why, then, you will ask, do I refuse to do anything of the sort? Not from obstinacy, men of Athens, nor out of disrespect for you. Whether I feel confident in the face of death, or not, is another matter. Anyway, for my credit’s sake and yours and the city’s, I cannot suppose it right, at my years, and with a reputation like mine—whether

it be a true or false one—to act thus. At all events, people have convinced themselves that Socrates surpasses the majority of mankind in something. If, therefore, those who have the reputation of being superior in wisdom and courage or some other virtue are to behave in this style, will it not be disgraceful? I have myself often seen others, men of repute, displaying extraordinary solicitude when brought to trial,—apparently with the idea that they would suffer some dire fate if they died: I presume they imagine they will live for ever, if you do not put them to death! To my mind, such men disgrace our city; a foreigner might well suppose that those Athenians who are eminent in virtue, men specially chosen by their fellows for high office and public rewards, behave like women. Such things, men of Athens, *you* ought not to do if you have the smallest reputation; and if *we* do them, you, as judges, ought not to sanction it. You should make it clear that you will be far more likely to condemn the man who introduces such sorry scenes, and makes the city a laughing-stock, than the man who keeps silent.

CHAPTER 24

BUT, the credit of Athens apart, I do not consider it just either, to escape condemnation by appealing to the judge: it is my business to convince him by argument. For the judge does not sit here to award sentence by favour, but to give a just verdict; and he has sworn not to show partiality but to decide according to law. We should not, then, persuade you to falsify your oath, nor should you allow yourselves to be so persuaded. In that case, both sides would be guilty of impiety. Do not think, men of Athens, that I ought to act towards you in a fashion that I consider unseemly, unjust, and unrighteous—particularly now, when I am being arraigned by Meletus here for impiety. If I could cajole you and constrain you by my entreaties to break your pact, I

should obviously be teaching you to disbelieve in the gods, and my defence would be simply a confession of atheism. No, that is not the case, for I believe in the gods as not one of my accusers believes, and I leave it to you and to God to decide what is best both for you and me alike.

AFTER THE VERDICT (25-28)

CHAPTER 25

MEN of Athens, you have condemned me, yet I am not distressed, for there are many causes that have contributed to this result. What has happened is not unexpected; what surprises me so much is the way the voting has gone. I never thought that the votes would be so nearly equal—rather the contrary. But, in the circumstances, if only thirty votes had changed over, apparently I should have been acquitted. From Meletus himself I think I have escaped, even as it is, not only so, but it is abundantly clear that, had not Anytus and Lycon come forward to accuse me, Meletus would have been heavily fined for not securing the fifth part of the votes.

CHAPTER 26

So, then, Meletus proposes death as the penalty. be it so, but what counter-penalty would you have me propose, men of Athens? Surely one commensurate with my deserts! What penalty do I deserve to pay, in person or in purse, because forsooth instead of being idle all my days I have scorned what most people care for—money, home interests, a soldier's life, politics, and everything else, such as state appointments, clubs, factions (whatever, in short, goes on in the city)? In reality I thought myself too honest a man to protect my interests by engaging in these things. I have never

done so ; otherwise I should not have been any use to you or to myself. Rather I made it my business to visit everyone privately, and do him the best of services, as I believe, trying to persuade each of you not to regard his belongings, but himself ; how to become good and wise, and not to consider the belongings of the city, but the city itself. And so with all things else in like manner. What, then, do I deserve for being what I am ? Something good, if I must propose what I really merit ; yes, and something befitting my character. What reward, pray, is befitting a poor man, your benefactor, who needs leisure if he is to bestow his services on the state ? Nothing is more becoming, men of Athens, than for a man like me to receive public maintenance in the Guildhall—a reward he deserves far more than a citizen who has won a victory at Olympia in horse or chariot race. The victor at Olympia gives you apparent happiness ; I give you the genuine thing ; and whereas he needs no maintenance, I do. If, therefore, I am to propose a just ‘ penalty ’ for all this, here is my proposal—maintenance at the Guildhall.

CHAPTER 27

PERHAPS these words will remind you of what I said about the lamentations and prayers. You may think me merely stubborn ; but it is not thus. I am convinced that I have never wronged any man intentionally ; yet you remain unconvinced, because our discussion has been but brief. Were it customary in Athens, as it is elsewhere, to spend not one day but several over a capital charge, I fancy you *would* have been convinced ; but, as things are, I cannot in so short a time clear myself of certain grave imputations. As I am persuaded that I have never wronged a soul, I am not going to injure myself and damage my own case, by saying that I deserve any evil, and by proposing some penalty harmful to myself. What should I dread ? To suffer the penalty Meletus

suggests—death, which, as I have told you, may or may not be an evil I am, forsooth, in place of this, to choose something I know is bad¹ But what penalty ought I to suggest? Imprisonment? And why should I live in prison, a slave of that annual board of officials, the Eleven? Or shall I pay a fine, and be kept in durance till the debt be paid? There comes up the old objection I have no money Well, then, am I to propose exile? Possibly that might meet with your approval My love of life must, however, be great if I am so dull as not to perceive that you, my fellow-citizens, have proved incapable of tolerating my discourses and words. Why, you have found them so burdensome and detestable that you now seek to be free of them and can you suppose others will readily endure them? It is highly improbable A fine sort of life for a man of my years, after going into exile, to spend his time in moving from city to city, and always being driven out¹ I am well aware that, wherever I go, the young men will listen to me as they do here, and if I drive *them* away, they will retaliate by driving *me* away, with the hearty consent of their elders And, if I do not, their fathers and relatives will banish me, for the young men's sake

CHAPTER 28

PERHAPS some one may exclaim 'Tell us, Socrates, can you leave Athens, and live elsewhere in peace and quiet?' Ah, it is the hardest of tasks to make my position clear to you For if I maintain that to keep silent is disobedience to God, and that I cannot do this, you will disbelieve me on the ground that I am guilty of affectation and insincerity And if I tell you again that man's highest good is talking about virtue and those other matters, on which you have often heard me dilating, and examining both myself and others, and that an unexamined life is not worth living,—why, you will disbelieve me yet the more What I say is

all true, my friends : but to convince you,—there's the rub ! And I am not in the habit of regarding myself as a criminal. To be sure, if I were a man of means, I should have proposed as large a sum as I could hope to pay : that would have done me no hurt ; but, as things are,—well, I have no money, unless perchance you will let me propose a sum within my power. I might manage five pounds. Well, then, I propose that. Plato here, and Crito, and Critobulus, and Apollodorus urge me to raise this to a hundred and fifty, and declare that they will act as sureties. Let this, then, be the sum ; they, as adequate sureties, will guarantee the money.

AFTER THE SENTENCE

CHAPTER 29

JUST to cut my life short by a few years, men of Athens, you will have the finger of scorn pointed at you by every detractor of Athens, who will say you murdered Socrates the Wise. For those who wish to upbraid you will declare that I am wise, even though I am not. Had you but waited a while, you would have had your way, in the natural course of things ; for you see how old I am, a man stricken in years, within sight of the end. I am not addressing all of you, but only those who have condemned me. And one thing more. You may possibly imagine that I have been convicted through lack of arguments by which I might have persuaded you, had I deemed it my duty to leave nothing unsaid or undone to secure an acquittal. But not so. Rather, I have been defeated, not through lack of arguments, but through lack of boldness and insolence and a will to put forward pleas you would have listened to gladly—the pleas of one moaning and bewailing himself, and saying and doing many unworthy things, as I hold—pleas you have often heard from others.

I did not think it my duty then, when faced with danger, to act unworthily of a free citizen, nor do I regret that I defended myself as I did—far better die, after making my defence, than accept your conditions and live. Neither in law-court nor on battle-field ought I, or anyone else, to devise means for escaping death at all costs. For, indeed, in war it is frequently found that a soldier may at least avoid death by throwing down his arms, and casting himself on the mercy of his pursuers, and, in each class of perils, there are many other devices for escaping death, provided a man hesitates at nothing, in word or deed. To escape death is, I fear, not hard—far harder is it to avoid unrighteousness, for that flies faster than death. Now that I am old and slow, I have been caught by the slower pursuer, whereas my accusers, sharp and clever as they are, have been caught by the swifter.

And now I go my way, sentenced to death—by you, and these go theirs, men whose wickedness and injustice have brought upon them the condemnation of Truth. And I abide by my sentence, and they by theirs. Perhaps it was inevitable—and I think it is well.

CHAPTER 30

IN the next place, I would make a prophecy to you, my fellow-citizens, who have sentenced me. For I have reached a moment at which, if ever, men see visions—when they are in the presence of death. I tell you, Athenians, you who are my murderers, that as soon as I am gone vengeance will overtake you, far sterner (God knows¹) than any vengeance you have obtained by compassing my death. For now you have done this thing, believing you will not have to give an account of your lives, but, I can safely say, you will be disappointed. Your accusers will henceforth be more in number (so far, I have held them back, though you knew it not), and

they will prove the more inexorable as they are younger ; and you will wince the more. For if you imagine that, by executing men, you will prevent others reproaching you for your misspent lives, you err indeed ; that method of escape is neither honourable nor possible ; the noblest and easiest method is, not to damage others, but to go on perfecting yourselves. That is my prophecy to all who have condemned me ; and, having spoken it, I go my way.

CHAPTER 31

To those who have acquitted me I would gladly talk about what has come to pass, while the Eleven are busy, and before I go to the place where I must die. Will you stay with me, dear friends, till then ? There is nothing to prevent our speculating together, while we may. I am ready to show you, as friends, the true meaning of this event. To me, O my judges (for I shall be using that term in its right sense), a wonderful thing has happened. My usual warning has been with me all my life, opposing me, even in trivial matters, if ever I meant to act amiss ; but to-day, as you can see for yourselves, there has befallen me what might well be thought, and is generally reckoned, the supreme evil. But, when I left home this morning, the divine sign did not oppose me, nor yet when I was on my way here to the Court, nor at any moment during my defence ; notwithstanding that, on other occasions, it has often withstood me in the act of speaking. But in this matter it has never once countered me in anything I said or did. What can be the reason, I wonder ? I will tell you. I am convinced that what has happened to-day is a good thing, and that those of us who regard death as an evil cannot possibly be right. And the proof is manifest : the customary sign would assuredly have stopped me, unless in some way I were about to fare well.

CHAPTER 32

FURTHER, let us consider the question from this point of view, that we have strong reasons for regarding death as a blessing. For it must be one of two things—either death is a complete cessation of being, the dead man losing all sensation, or else, as people tell us, it is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another. If it means absence of sensation, like a dreamless sleep, death must be a singular gain. For I think that if a man had to pick out that night on which his slumber was too deep even for dreams, and were to set beside it all the other nights and days of his life, and then tell us definitely how many of these days and nights he had found sweeter and more delightful than that one night,—I think that not only the average man, but even the Great King himself, would find those other days and nights easy to reckon. If death means this, I count it a gain, for, on this view, all Time appears no more than a single night. If, on the other hand, death is like taking a journey hence to some other world, and the stories are true which tell us that all the dead abide there, what greater blessing can there be than this, my judges? For if, after arriving at the House of Hades, the traveller, released from the self-styled judges, is to discover the true judges who are reported to give sentence below—Minos and Rhadamanthus, Aeacus and Triptolemus, and all the demi-gods who were righteous in their lives—would not such a journey be worth the making? To meet Orpheus and Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer,—what would not some of you give for that? If this is true, I would gladly die a dozen deaths. For myself, in particular, life there would be wonderful indeed, if ever I met Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and any other of the ancients who perished through an unjust sentence, to compare my suffering with theirs would be no unhappy experience, be sure. And above all, to go on living there, enquiring and

finding who among them is wise, and who thinks he is wise but is not ! What would one not give, my judges, to cross-examine the leader of the hosts at Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus ? One might name innumerable others—men and women—with whom it would be an untold joy to live and converse, both hearing them and asking them questions. There, assuredly, I shall not be put to death for that ! They are in all things happier than we are here ; and they live for evermore,—if the stories told us are true.

CHAPTER 33

BUT you also, my judges, ought to face death with a good hope, and consider this one thing (which is true), that no evil can befall a good man, alive or dead. Never is he neglected by the gods. My present case is no work of chance : I see quite plainly that it is better for me to die now, and be free from trouble. That is why the sign never turned me back ; and so against my accusers and condemners I feel little or no anger. Yet with no such intention did they accuse and sentence me, but because they meant me harm ; for this they deserve censure.

One request, however, I make of them : Whenever my sons grow up, punish them, vexing them as I have vexed you, if ever you see them loving money or anything else rather than virtue. And if they pretend to be something when they are nothing, upbraid them, as I have upbraided you, for not caring for what is right and for imagining they are something when they are really nothing. If you do this, I shall have met with justice at your hands, and so will my sons.

But it is already time to go—I to die, you to live. But whether life or death be better, is known to God alone.

COMMENTARY

CHAPTER I

ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι (men of Athens) Socrates is addressing his fellow-citizens generally, rather than the crowds who had come, out of curiosity, to hear his defence. Later on he formally addresses his judges as ἄνδρες δικάσται

ῥήμασι τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν (phrases and words) he is disclaiming the artistic use of such embellishments as would be employed by professional pleaders. By Attic law every man was required to plead his own cause, no 'counsel' were permitted. But if a man felt too nervous to undertake this rather formidable task, he was allowed to get somebody else to write a speech for him, this he would either commit to memory, or else, after a few prefatory words, would call on his friends and acquaintances to speak on his behalf. Thus he was not forbidden to do, but as the law did not permit anybody to be hired to speak in favour of a litigant, these 'friends,' by way of giving some colour to the proceedings, would explain that they were moved by some personal antagonism to the opposing party (Gardner and Jevons, *Greek Antiquities*, p. 594). A whole crowd of professional pleaders (λογόγραφοι) arose in Athens—certainly this was the case in the time of Isocrates—who made quite an income by composing speeches for incompetent litigants. the orator Lysias was one of them (cf. Phillipson, *The Trial of Socrates*, p. 253). Public feeling at Athens did not at all favour this method of circumventing the letter

of the law and of indirectly employing counsel, and the word λογογράφος became a term of censure.—For a good description of an Athenian trial, see Tucker, *Life in Ancient Athens*, chap. xiv. Protracted trials were apparently unknown at Athens ; the case had to be concluded in a single day.

μηδεις ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως (let no one think otherwise) : his obvious intention is to use the language of everyday life.

ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν (at the bankers' tables) : a favourite place of resort for inquisitive folk lounging about the ἀγορά, or market-place. Cf. Xenophon, *Memor.* 1. 1. 10. 'Socrates was continually in public ; for early in the morning he would go to the colonnades (περιπάτους) and the gymnasiums, and when the market-place was filling he was to be seen there, and the rest of the day he was where he was likely to meet most people : he talked for the most part, and all who chose might listen.' In Theophrastus the Man of petty ambition is said to haunt these places, as our modern 'lounge-lizards' haunt society resorts.—Becker, *Charicles*, Exc. on sc. 4.

θορυβεῖν (interrupt) : used of any kind of demonstration, whether in favour of Socrates or not. The interruptions made by numbers of the judges during Socrates' speech (and we must remember that, in the Court of Heliasts, jurors and judges were the same), and his request that they should not cry out against him, suggest that the Court was a large body of a popular kind (Phillipson, *The Trial of Socrates*, p. 228). The Heliastic Court merely represented the whole body of the Athenian δῆμος sitting in a judicial capacity.

ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα (appeared before a court), viz. on a charge. He must often have been present at trials, as a spectator.

ἔτη γεγονώς ἑβδομήκοντα (seventy years of age) a round number Socrates was just turned 70

ξένως λέξεως (a stranger to the language of a court) there is a touch of irony here. Socrates knew very well what he was about

τάληθῃ λέγειν (to speak the truth) The speaker must be δίκαιος, moral, he will therefore aim at giving the facts, not merely at seeking to persuade Mark the earnestness of these concluding words of the exordium

CHAPTER 2

τοὺς πρώτους κατηγοροὺς (my earlier accusers) Aristophanes was one of them. Socrates' main difficulty was to counter the prejudice in the minds not only of his juror-judges, but of the Athenians generally. The people who had created this prejudice he terms his 'first accusers'

τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον (Anytus and his friends) Anytus was the real instigator of the trial, and the most dangerous of the enemies of Socrates, the actual accuser was Meletus, and with him was associated Lycon, a person of no great consequence. Each of these accusers, Socrates assures us, attacked him in order to avenge supposed insults to his own class. Meletus on behalf of the poets, Lycon of the orators, Anytus of the statesmen and politicians. Anytus was an orthodox democrat, though not of the extreme type, but he had strong political convictions. He helped to secure the restoration of the democracy after the expulsion (in 403 B.C.) of the Thirty Tyrants. 'He is a type,' says Jowett, 'of the narrow-minded man of the world, who is indignant at innovation and equally detests the popular teacher and the true

philosopher'—a Conservative in the worst sense of that much-maligned word. It should be remembered that, at the time of the trial, it was the oligarchs who were the innovators; the democracy—like the Roman 'res publica' previous to Caesar's dictatorship—was the established constitution (see E. S. Thompson, *Meno*). There may well have been some personal feeling at the root of Anytus' bitter antagonism to Socrates; but the public ground for his attack was due to the fact that Anytus, like a good many other 'Conservatives,' regarded the philosopher as a dangerous underminer of those principles on which the Athenian democratic system was based. Anytus appears as one of the speakers in the *Meno* (94), where he rails against the Sophists: at the last he utters a veiled threat to Socrates: 'I warn you to be very careful! In any city it is easier to do more harm than good—particularly in Athens: and I imagine you know this (οἶμαι δὲ σὲ καὶ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι).'

σοφὸς ἄνθρωπος... φροντιστής (Socrates a wise man, who speculates): there is a spice of contempt in these words. The μετέωρα φροντιστής, says Riddell, points to the philosopher, the τὸν ἥττω... ποιῶν to the sophist. That Socrates was not unacquainted with astronomical questions is pretty certain; physical investigations were largely indulged in by the Ionian philosophers, whose speculations were fashionable topics with the learned at Athens. But he determined to work within the limits of human life and knowledge: with physical speculations and mathematical questions he would not concern himself. If in the earlier part of his career he devoted his attention to physical matters, he soon turned aside from these to what he conceived to be of more immediate value—those ethical problems which come more closely to men's business and bosoms. Aristophanes, in the

Clouds, has a dig at those who were busy prying into the secrets of earth in l 188, οὔτοι δ' ἑρεβοδιφῶσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Τάρταρον ('they are delving into the deep darkness of Tartarus') The detractors of Socrates wish to imply that he is to be numbered among the Sophists of his time Now one of the stock charges brought against the Sophists was that they cultivated the art of 'making the worse appear the better reason' (Milton, *PL* II 113) Aristotle (*Rhet* II xxiv 11) speaks of it as the 'promise of Pythagoras,' who was reputed to be its earliest exponent in Greece Isocrates the orator says that he, like Socrates, was accused of a like aim, and Aulus Gellius observes, *à propos* of Pythagoras, that he was 'insincerus philosophus, sed acerrimus sophistarum, pecuniam quippe ingentem cum a discipulis acciperet annuam, pollicebatur se id dolere quam verborum industria causa infirmior fieret fortior' But the charge, when levelled at Socrates, was really otiose Xenophon, in his *Symposium*, tells us that the word φροντιστής was applied as a nickname to Socrates 'Are you not called, Socrates, the thinking man?' Better that, said he, than to be dubbed the *unthinking* man'

εἰ τις κωμωδοποιός (a comic poet) Aristophanes is alluded to here But he was not the only comedian to make Socrates a target for his criticism, Eupolis had said μισῶ δ' ἐγὼ καὶ Σωκράτην τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολεσχήν (just as the Athenians called Paul a σπερμολόγος—'What will this babbler say?') That Plato resented these attacks on his master is clear from the passage in the *Phædo*, 70 οὐκοῦν γ' ἂν οἴμαι, ἢ δ' ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τινα νῦν ακουσαντα, οὐδ' εἰ κωμωδοποιός εἴη, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ καὶ οὐ περὶ τῶν προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι (=I think that no one who heard me now, even if he were a comic poet, would say that I talk at random about things that do not concern me) Why the comic

poets should have specially selected Socrates for their splenetic outbursts is not quite certain ; but it proves, as Burnet observes, that as early as B.C. 423, the date of the *Clouds*, Socrates was a marked man. Now, sharp as was the criticism of Aristophanes (who was a whole-hearted anti-Socratic), he does not appear to have cherished any personal animosity against Socrates : this comes out in the *Symposium*. It is a case of 'I love Mr. Gladstone, but I hate his policy' (Tennyson).

σκιαμαχεῖν (to fight with shadows), like a boxer, going through his practice motions, who strikes at an imaginary adversary. The same comparison is found in 1 *Corinth.* ix. 26 : 'Thus I fight as a boxer, not as one beating the air' (ἄερα δέρων=σκιαμαχῶν). Cf. Virgil's 'verberat ictibus auras.'

βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν (I could wish) : Socrates would prefer, if possible, an acquittal; but it must be an honourable one.

CHAPTER 3

Socrates' defence, properly so called, begins here. In the earlier stages of this 'apologia pro vita sua' there are many traces of his peculiar humour—'irony' his enemies called it ; but he is serious enough when he comes to grips with his adversaries, and sets out to defend his conduct. His whimsical humour can be deadly enough, and Meletus, Anytus and the rest were uncomfortably conscious of the fact.

ἄντωμοσίαν (affidavit). Both parties in a suit were obliged, by Attic law, to give in a written declaration on oath. This was done at the preliminary part of the trial, technically called the ἀνάκρισις. The defendant might put in a counter-plea (ἀντιγραφή : see chap. 24)

designed to parry the accuser's attack. The trial of Socrates took place before the Court of Heliasts, a body of jurymen so called from their chief court, the ἡλιαία the actual indictment (ἐγκλημα) was brought by Meletus, though we know that the 'chief devil of the piece' was Anytus

I have already stated that the Heliastic Court represented the people sitting in a judicial capacity. We must get rid of the notion that an Athenian law-case was conducted like a case in an English Court. In Athens there was no bench of specially trained judges, there were no juries, in our sense of the term, for determining questions of fact, there was no 'bar'. Any qualified Athenian citizen was eligible to sit as a 'judge' (or dicast), and he was paid for services rendered. In the fifth and fourth centuries there appear to have been 6000 enrolled dicasts, and out of this large body of citizens a certain number would be chosen by lot, each day, to sit in the various courts. We know that, at the trial of Socrates, 501 were empanelled, under the rule of a President, the extra 'judge' or dicast being added to make an odd total, in case an equal number of votes were cast on each side (see Gardner and Jevons, *Greek Antiquities*, pp 574 sq, Phillipson, *The Trial of Socrates*, chap xi). These *soi-disant* 'judges' were commonplace Athenians, without any proper legal training or knowledge of law. No wonder the courts, thus constituted, frequently gave haphazard decisions, influenced by the emotions of the moment. And there was no way by which a decision could be set aside, for an appellate tribunal seems to have been unknown (see C. R. Kennedy, *Demosthenes*, vol iii Appendix 9, on 'Civil Procedure at Athens').

περιεργάζεται (makes himself a nuisance) It follows after curious enquiries. The adj occurs in *Acts* xix 19, 'many

of those who followed curious or magical arts (τῶν τὰ περίεργα πραξάντων).’ Cf. Thucyd. v. 103, ἐπειδὴν πιεζομένους αὐτοὺς ἐπιλίπωσιν αἱ φανεραὶ ἐλπίδες, ἐπὶ τὰς ἄφανεῖς καθίστανται, — μαντικὴν τε καὶ χρησμούς καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα μετ’ ἐλπίδων λυμαίνεται (=as soon as men, in the hour of trial, lose all rational hopes, they betake themselves to visionary ones, — divination, oracles, and such like delusions which ruin them by the expectations they engender). One may recall the words of *Sirach* iii. 23, ‘Be not curious in unnecessary matters.’

περιφερόμενον (swinging about) : this refers to the *Clouds*, 218 sq., where Strepsiades is astonished to find Socrates swinging aloft in a basket and wrapt in meditation. Strepsiades exclaims :

‘Hi ! first of all pray tell me what you’re doing.’

To which Socrates gravely replies :

‘I tread the air and contemplate the sun.’

This scene, fatuous as it was, must have proved prejudicial to Socrates, who here complains of it as a mere caricature. Rogers, in his Introduction to the *Clouds*, says that we ought not to feel surprise that Plato, writing when the memory of Socrates had been hallowed by the circumstances of his death, should have put into his mouth reflections upon this passage from the comedian, ‘which he, we may be sure, would never have uttered.’ I cannot see any *prima facie* reason against holding that Socrates *did* actually make use of the words attributed to him in the *Apology* ; but, be that as it may, the passage shows that the influence of the play on the excitable and suspicious minds of the Athenian democracy must have been considerable, though not to the extent some have imagined. People forget a good deed in twenty-three years.

οὐδέν ἐπαύω (not a word of which I understand) Xenophon in the *Memorabilia* (iv 7 6) tells us that Socrates grew dissatisfied with the study of physical speculations—οὔτε χαρίζεσθαι θεοῖς ἂν ἤγειτο τὸν ζητοῦντα—and discouraged people from investigating the obscurer phenomena of the Universe. In his youth, however, so he tells us in the *Phaedo*, 96, he was strongly drawn towards the speculations of the older physicists. But he found that these studies brought him no fresh knowledge, he had even become sceptical of the knowledge he once possessed. In the future he would confine himself to more practical matters. He makes it clear, however, that he never intended seriously to disparage any sort of knowledge, provided it was *real* knowledge, and not imaginary. In saying he 'knew nothing' about these speculative questions, he is again indulging in his accustomed irony.

'The great work of Socrates was partly to maintain against the Sophists that truth and right are not conventions but things of which we can have true knowledge, partly to shift the stress of philosophy to man instead of nature' (Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God*, vol. 1 294)

τῶν τοιούτων (such themes), *sc* the things Aristophanes puts into his mouth in the play. Human nature must come first.

'Let them "lay," pray, bray—the addle-pates!—
Mine be man's thoughts, loves, hates'

So wrote Browning. Socrates and Johnson would, more or less, have agreed with the poet.

One of the grievances felt by the Sophists against Socrates was due to the fact that he would 'take no fees' for the 'lectures' he gave. In modern parlance, Socrates seemed to these professionals a 'blackleg'—very probably they regarded him as a 'quack' as well.

CHAPTER 4

GORGIAS of Leontini, in Sicily, is familiar to us mainly through Plato's dialogue which bears the great Sophist's name. He visited Athens in the early part of the Peloponnesian war, to beg for help against Syracuse. Subsequently he settled at Athens : he must have been then over sixty years of age. After an early training in natural philosophy, he turned aside to become a sort of professor of general culture, with special reference to rhetoric, and lectured to large audiences not only in Athens, but elsewhere. His 'euphuistic' style took the Greek world by storm, and it exercised an immense influence, becoming the parent of Ciceronian Latin through the medium of his pupil Isocrates (cf. Jebb's *Attic Orators*², vol. i. pp. cxx sq., and, for the fragments of Gorgias, Thompson's Appendix to his edition of the *Gorgias*). His great aim was to inculcate in the minds of his pupils the power of effective expression (λέξις). Diodorus tells us that he astonished the Athenians, with their quickness of wit and delight in language, by the distinction (τῷ ξενίζοντι, or 'the foreign air') of his style—the employment of poetic words, for example—and by the poetic nature of his prose. He was, perhaps, the first man who set out to make prose definitely artistic, as Aristotle says : 'Even to this day the mass of the uneducated (ἀπαιδευτων) look upon discourses like that of Gorgias as extremely fine. But this is not so : the language of prose and poetry are wholly different' (*Rhetoric*, iii. i § 9). Nor did this hankering after poetic prose ever desert him : just before his death he exclaimed, 'Sleep lays me at last with his brother Death.' Cicero frequently mentions him (e.g. in the *de Oratore*, and elsewhere) as a great stylist. But though his primary significance is in connection with the history of style, it must not be over-

looked that he accomplished something in the realm of thought. He wrote a treatise 'On the non-existent' (περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος), in which he undertook to prove three things (1) Nothing exists, (2) If anything exists, it is unknowable, (3) Even if it exists and is knowable, the knowledge of this cannot be communicated to others. Not a very hopeful creed, one would imagine. Gorgias survived Socrates some years, dying at a great age.

PRODICUS of Ceos (the birthplace of the poet Simonides), a great authority on the right use of words. There are several allusions to this in Plato, e.g. in the *Charmides* and the *Laches*. In the *Protagoras* a speech is put into his mouth, burlesquing his method, but he was no mere pedant. His passion for verbal niceties and subtle questions about the correct use of words did not prevent him from dealing with other matters, he wrote on ethics and religion, for example, and his allegory 'The Choice of Heracles' (preserved for us in the second book of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*) was famous. More, it was a permanent contribution to ethics. In it was shown the duty of work as opposed to a life of mere pleasure (cf. the *Tabula* of Kebes, Ignatius Loyola's *Meditation* on the *Two Standards* in the 'Spiritual Exercises', Cicero, *de Officiis*, 1 § 118. Allusions to this allegory are frequent all through classical literature)*. Socrates owed something to Prodicus, but, as Zeller points out, the remarks of the Platonic Socrates concerning the instruction he had received from Prodicus have an ironical flavour. It is not unlikely that Plato's veiled hostility to this celebrated Sophist may have been due partly to Plato's disliking anything that he thought pedantic, and partly to the fact that Aristophanes (*Clouds*, 360 sq.) had praised Prodicus at the expense of Socrates. That

* For a translation see Appendix III

a friendship existed between Socrates and Prodicus is vouched for by Xenophon: they were of about the same age. One of the Sophist's reputed sayings was δός τι καὶ λάβοις τι ('do ut des'); but Epicharmus anticipated him with his δός τι καὶ τι λάμβανε. He seems to have been a man of earnest character, who (says Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, vol. i. pp. 425-430) has had no slight influence on posterity mainly through the intervention of the Cynics.

HIPPIAS of Elis, the polymath of his time. He figures in both the *Protagoras* and *Lesser Hippias* of Plato, as well as in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. Wherever he went he was successful in his lectures, and in the fees that he got. Among other things he invented a remarkable system of mnemonics, and was as clever with his fingers as he was encyclopaedic in his knowledge. Though not the greatest of the Sophists—that title belongs to Protagoras—he was undoubtedly the most versatile. His conceit was portentous: 'What I know not is not knowledge.' Cf. Cicero, *de Oratore*, iii. 127: 'Eleus Hippias cum Olympiam venisset, maxima illa quinquennali celebritate ludorum, gloriatus est cuncta paene audiente Graecia nihil esse ulla in arte rerum omnium quod ipse nesciret.'

CALLIAS, the rich Athenian, was so extravagant in his hospitality to the Sophists that he died a poor man. Protagoras, Hippias, and Prodicus all appear as guests of Callias in the scene in the *Protagoras*, 314.

EUENUS of Paros, another of the Sophists. He is introduced in the *Phaedo* as a poet, and in the *Phaedrus* as an inventor of rhetorical figures. A few fragments of his elegiac verse are still preserved. To judge by the remarks in the *Phaedrus*, Plato seems to have had a certain contempt for him.

πέντε μνῶν the 'mina' is frequently given in Lexicons as equivalent to about £4 (pre-War). But its buying power must have been considerably more. Five minas was a modest charge compared with what Protagoras exacted—at least according to Diogenes Laertius, who tells us that Protagoras was the first to charge a fee of 100 minas for the instruction he gave. (No doubt this was for a long course of instruction.) One hundred minas appears to be a stiff charge, particularly when we remember that doctors and schoolmasters were apparently paid at the same rate as artisans and craftsmen. These men seem to have been satisfied with a very modest competence, but then their wants were simple. Φιλοκαλοῦμεν μετ' εὐτελείας such was the boast of Pericles. It may be added that fees might be charged not only for a course of instruction, but for single lectures, both Protagoras and Prodicus used to 'send the bag round' at the conclusion of a reading or discourse λόγους ἀναγινώσκοντες ἡραρίζοντο, says Diogenes Laertius.

CHAPTER 5

In the next six chapters Socrates is at some pains to explain what those peculiarities in himself were, which had led to people identifying him with the physicists and Sophists. He was convinced—and the Delphic oracle had confirmed him in the conviction—that the current pretensions to knowledge were idle and futile. Moreover, a tour of enquiry, made personally in the city, had confirmed him in this conviction, but they had created enmities everywhere, and gave his opponents a convenient pretext for accusing him of perverting the youth. This, coupled with the old prejudice against him, had led to the present trial.

τὸ ὄνομα : viz. the reputation of being a 'wise man' (σοφός).

ἀνθρωπίνῃ σοφίᾳ, a knowledge of his own ignorance. This is the keynote of all Socrates' teaching. Human wisdom is so sorry an affair that the truly wise man is one who 'knows' that he does *not* know anything to boast of (A. E. Taylor). Cf. chap. 9, and the brief comments of Lactantius in the opening chapter of his *de ira Dei*.

οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, i.e. the Sophists Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicus, already mentioned.

οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον : his hearers would be quick to catch the implied quotation here (from the *Melanippe* of Euripides), which is again alluded to in the *Symposium*, 177. Horace is thinking of this passage in *Satires*, II. ii. 2 : 'Nec meus hic sermo est sed quae praefecit Ofellus.'

CHAEREPHON was a close friend of Socrates, and, as such, girded at by Aristophanes (*Clouds*, 103, 4). It has been observed that he was the only one of the Socratic circle who was a downright democrat. He was dead at the time of the trial.

τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην : after the fall of the Athenian Empire in 404 B.C., and the capture of Athens by the Spartan Lysander, the Thirty Tyrants, with Critias at their head, made themselves masters of the city. Part of their avowed policy was to 'purge' the state of evil-doers, and a considerable number of citizens were summarily executed (many of them not as evil-doers at all, but as political opponents), and about five thousand driven into exile. The next year these exiles came back in force, drove out the Thirty, and restored the old democracy. Critias, the able and violent leader of the Thirty,

perished on the field of battle—Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, vol iv pp 200 sq, *Cambridge Ancient Hist* vol v chap xii

εις Δελφούς the great days of the Apolline Oracle at Delphi were in the seventh century It lost caste in the fifth century by appearing to take the unpatriotic side in the Persian war, consequently at the time of the trial its influence was considerably diminished People did not take the oracle quite seriously in those later days It must have been long before this trial that the impetuous Chaerephon put his enquiry Evidently Socrates was impressed by the reply, at any rate his subsequent activities were not uninfluenced by it With all its defects the Delphic Oracle had been, at one time or another, of value to Greece as the one great centre of unity and counsel in a land singularly lacking in unity of aim, though, to be sure, it made no special effort to promote *political* unity It was rather in moral matters that the 'catholicity' of the god became impressive, it was from Delphi that reverence for oaths, respect for women, care for the life of suppliants and slaves, derived in great part both their sanction and their strength (Myers on 'Greek Oracles,' in *Hellenica*) Cf Montaigne, *Essays*, ii 12 'Socrates, being advertized that the God of Wisdom had attributed the name of wise unto him, was thereat much astonished, and, diligently searching and rousing up himself and ransacking the very secrets of his heart, found no foundation or ground for this divine sentence He knew that some were as just, as temperate, as valiant and wise as he, and more eloquent, more fair, and more profitable to their country In fine, he resolved that he was distinguished from others, and reputed wise, only because he did not so esteem himself, and that his god deemed the opinion of science and wisdom a singular sottishness in man,

and that his best doctrine was the doctrine of ignorance, and simplicity his greatest wisdom.'

Tennyson, *In Memoriam* :

'Behold, we know not anything :
I can but trust.'

ὁ ἀδελφός (his brother) : Chaerecrates.

CHAPTER 6

οὐ γὰρ θέμις (it is impossible : *lit.* 'it is not right' = Lat. *fas*. Something that contravenes the divine law). Cf. Aesch. *P.V.* 1032, ψευδηγορεῖν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίσταται στόμα | τὸ Δῖον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἔπος τελεῖ, with which we may compare *Numbers* xxiii. 19 : 'God is not a man that he should lie : hath he not said, and shall he not do it ?' Clem. Rom. 27, οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον παρὰ τῷ θεῷ εἰ μὴ τό ψεύσασθαι. He is the ἀψευδής θεός (*Titus* i. 2). 'Socrates says he was at first staggered by this pronouncement [of the Delphic Oracle] and set to work to prove Apollo—never a "persona grata" at Athens—a liar' (A. E. Taylor). The higher aspects of Apollo's commerce with mankind is referred to by Pindar, *Pyth.* ix. 42, καὶ γὰρ σέ τὸν οὐ θεμιτὸν ψεύδει θιγεῖν (thou who mayest have no part in deceit), which recalls another phrase where the same poet says ψευδέων οὐχ ἄπτεται (he sets no hand to lies : *Pyth.* iii. 29). Apollo himself was bound to shun falsehood by a self-imposed law, a θεσμός.

ὀνόματι . . . λέγειν : Anytus is indicated.

οἷοιτο μὲν . . . εἶη δ' οὐ : cf. *Symposium*, 204 : αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα καλὸν κάγαθόν μηδὲ φρόνιμον δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἱκανόν· οὐκ οὐκ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ μὴ οἰόμενος ἐνδεής εἶναι οὐδ' ἂν μὴ οἶηται ἐπιδείσθαι (herein is the mischief of ignorance,

that he who is neither good nor wise is full of self-sufficiency such a man never desires that for which he feels no lack) Cicero, *Acad* 1 16. 'in omnibus fere sermonibus qui ab eis qui illum [Socratem] audierunt perscripti sunt, ita disputat ut nihil affirmet ipse, refellat alios, nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque praestare ceteris quod illi quae nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una omnis sapientia non arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat.' There is a similar comment in *Acad* 11 74 Paul in *Romans* 1 22 says of the godless that 'professing themselves to be wise they became fools (ἐμαρταιωθησαν) and their foolish heart was darkened'

καλὸν καγαθόν here of things, but in Plato usually of persons In the days of Socrates the words καλοὶ καγαθοὶ were a frequent term for the oligarchical party (cf. 'boni' = 'opimates,' in Latin), though Socrates himself would employ the term not with a political but with a moral connotation compare the words of Clement of Alexandria, *Strom* vii, 836: τὸ θεῖον μόνοις τοῖς καλοῖς καγαθοῖς φαίνεται But such a phrase in Socrates' mouth might easily arouse suspicion, specially at a moment like this 'Καλοὶ καγαθοὶ (*beaux et bons*)—that untranslatable conception which includes the "fine fellow" and the "good man"' (Gilbert Murray, *Hist Greek Lit*)

CHAPTER 7

νῆ τὸν κυνᾶ (verily *lit* 'by the dog,' the jackal-headed god of Egypt—'Iatator Anubis' in Virgil, *Aen* viii. 698) This form of oath, so the Scholiast informs us, was called the oath of Rhadamanthus, who declined to permit his worshippers to swear 'by the gods' It is a

euphemism, like the French *parbleu* or our vulgar 'by Jove.' In the days of imperial Rome oaths were taken by the 'genius Caesaris' (Euseb. *H.E.* iv. § 18, ὁμοσον τὴν Καίσαρος τύχην): Lightfoot, *u. on Martyrdom of Polycarp*, ix. In *Genesis* xlii. 15 Joseph swears by 'the life (= 'ka' or 'double') of Pharaoh, and this form of adjuration is known from Egyptian monuments (Sayce, *Religions of Egypt and Babylonia*, pp. 48 sq.). Contrast our Lord's plain condemnation of all swearing, false or otherwise—ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν, Μὴ ὁμόσαι ὅλως, in *Matth.* v. 34. The sentiment underlying this passage was a Jewish commonplace.

διθυράμβων (writers of lyrics): the dithyramb was originally a hymn in honour of Dionysus. Later on, it became divorced from its old Dionysiac setting, and the word was used of *lyrical poems* setting forth heroic subjects (the κλέα ἀνδρῶν); the idea of extravagance and exaggeration always clung to the term: hence the use of the word here. There was an old proverb: καὶ διθυράμβων νοῦν ἔχεις ἐλάττονα ('even a dithyramb has more sense than you'). In the *Gorgias*, 502, Socrates asks Callicles: 'What about dithyrambic poetry? Do you think that Cinesias [a bombastic poet, often ridiculed by his contemporaries] ever tried to make his hearers better men, or was it his aim merely to tickle the ears of the groundlings?' To the latter part of this question Callicles gave an emphatic 'Yes!'

φύσει τινί (a kind of natural power): *genius, instinct*. Here φύσις is contrasted with διδασχὴ or μελέτη. Cf. Montaigne, *Essays*, i. 37: (The beauty of poetry) 'does not beguile our judgement: it transports and overwhelms it.' Ruskin, *Stones of Venice*: 'The noblest forms of imaginative power are also in some sort ungovernable, and have in them something of the character of dreams ;

so that the vision, of whatever kind, comes uncalled' Joubert, *Pensées* 'Nothing which does not transport is poetry the lyre is a winged instrument' 'The poet,' remarks Stewart in that beautiful book *The Myths of Plato*, 'performs his essential function as a poet only so far as he arouses transcendental feeling in his patient, by inducing in him the state of dream-consciousness' In connection with this, Plato's *Ion* should be read, as a study of poetic inspiration The Greeks regularly spoke of poetic genius as a form of madness the true poet is *ἐνθεός* (cf Shakespeare 'the poet's eye in a fine frenzy rolling') Even Aristotle admits that poetry is an inspired thing *ἐνθεον γὰρ ἡ ποίησις* (*Rhet.* iii. 7) There is a passage in Plato's *Phaedrus*, 245, which is worth quoting in this connection *κάλλιον μαρτυροῦσιν οἱ παλαιοὶ μανίαν σωφροσύνης τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ τῆς παρ' ἀνθρώπων γιγνομένης ὅς δ' ἂν ἐνευ μανίας Μουσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικᾷ θύρας ἀφικηται—πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος—ἀτελής αὐτὸς τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μαινομένων ἢ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος ἠφανίσθη* (i.e. whoever untouched by the frenzy of the Muses knocks at the doors of Poetry, fondly imagining that craft alone will make him a good poet, will go with his hopes blasted, while his poetry will be put into the shade by the inspired madman) Modern versifiers may usefully take to heart these words,* and add to them Goethe's splendid dictum 'What makes poetry? A full heart, brimful of one noble passion.'

χρησμοῶδοι (prophets), frequently mentioned by Plato with *μάντιες* There does not appear to be much difference of meaning between *θεομάντιες* and *χρησμοῶδοι*, prob-

* In poetry, as in religion, πολλοὶ τοὶ ναρθηκοφόροι βραχοὶ δὲ τε παῦροι

ably as much as between our 'seer' and 'soothsayer.' In the Socratic period the function of soothsayer was apt to be contemned: Euripides attacks the μάντις vigorously (e.g. in the *Helena*, 744 sq.). Nor did Plato have any esteem for μαντική and μάντις: in the *Timaeus* he regards divination as the gift of the gods to human folly. Of the vagabond impostors who hawked about spurious oracles and predictions under the names given, Aristophanes gives us specimens (see Cope on Arist. *Rhet.* iii. 5, § 4).

CHAPTER 8

χειροτέχνος (craftsmen), people who really knew their job.

The word conveys what we mean by artists or craftsmen, as well as artisans. Craftsmanship in Greece, writes Zimmern (*The Greek Commonwealth*, p. 268), covered a far wider sphere than that which we are accustomed to associate with 'industry' to-day. It is erroneous to suppose that the Greeks of the great age looked down on manual labour, *per se*, as degrading. It was because the Greek conception of well-being was 'mens pulchra in corpore pulchro' that the Athenians and others looked down on manual labour, the notion being that labour with the hands or at the office-stool impaired the beauty of the body (Lowes Dickinson, *The Greek View of Life*, chap. iii.). There certainly were businesses which Greeks regarded as in a special degree menial, and Xenophon has a word to say about it in the *Oeconomicus* (iv. 2), where Socrates is objecting to those purely mechanical occupations which, by depriving the worker of his just share in outdoor exercise, weaken his mental powers and leave him no time for leisure and self-culture—a very modern touch, indeed, as readers of Ruskin will recognize. Such sedentary labours were termed βονουσικαί ('sordidae et selluriae'). It is unlikely that Socrates

shared in the general prejudice as regards manual work, otherwise the verse of Hesiod would not have been so often on his lips—*ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀργίη δὲ ὄνειδος* (work is no disgrace, but idleness is). The Jewish Rabbis taught, in this respect as in others, a higher doctrine than did the Greeks, and great teachers like Hillel acted up to the precept 'Hate not laborious (viz. manual) work' see *Pirgê Aboth*, i 11 (with Taylor's note). Paul was not ashamed to be engaged in a manual occupation (*Acts xviii 3*; *1 Cor iv 12*) see his advice to the Ephesian converts, *ὁ κλέπτων μηκέτι κλεπτετώ, μᾶλλον δὲ κοπιάτω ἐργαζόμενος ταῖς χερσίν*. The dignity of manual labour is asserted in the book of *Sirach*, even though it is declared to be inferior to the wisdom of the learned. Cf. Malan's note on *Proverbs xiv 23*. According to Clement of Alexandria even Pheidias and Praxiteles practised 'banausic arts,' but the words there signify arts that minister to comfort and luxury. As time went on, doubtless craftsmen and crafts fell in general estimation, mainly perhaps because sedentary occupations tended to unfit men for war and the chase, which presently came to be regarded as the proper pursuits of 'gentlemen.' At a later date, this absurd prejudice against handiwork was adopted by philosophers even Plato puts artisans in the lowest class of his Ideal State, and denied them any share in government. This may have been largely due to the fact that trades were chiefly in the hands of aliens. A time came, however, when the Greeks did begin to value the handicrafts higher, but it was at the expense of nobler, though less profitable, occupations (Newman, *Politics of Aristotle*, vol. I p 106) cf. Athenaeus, *τὰς γὰρ βαναυστοὺς τέχνας Ἕλληνας ὕστερον περὶ πλείστου μᾶλλον ἐποιοῦντο ἢ τὰς κατὰ παιδείαν γινομένας ἐπινοίας*. Aristotle thus defined 'banausic' 'Any

art, craft, science, occupation which makes the body, mind, or soul of the free man less fit for the practice of virtue is vulgar (βοναυσικός) : wherefore we call those arts vulgar which tend to deform the body, and likewise all paid employments, because they absorb and degrade the mind' (Jowett's version). Aristotle thinks that traders ought to be excluded from citizenship ; but Plato, who seems to have got more intolerant as he grew older, goes further than his pupil and actually forbade the citizens of the State in *The Laws* (846) to practise a handicraft at all ! Apparently it did not occur to the Greeks, except in rare instances, that an industrious middle class, vigorously engaged in commerce, was one of the best means of keeping the State in healthy activity. Pericles knew this, but he was far in advance of his time (Mahaffy, *Social Life in Greece*, chap xiii.). Plato and Aristotle talked a good deal of nonsense on this as on other topics. How often have we to remind ourselves of the soundness of Cyprian's great dictum—'consuetudo sine veritate vetustas erroris est' !

οἱ ἀγαθοί (our good friends) : said with veiled sarcasm.

τὰ μέγιστα (matters of the highest moment) : politics.

CHAPTER 9

διαβολάς are the prejudices and false charges made against Socrates, which were the result of the enmity he had incurred by his attitude and teaching. And the name of σοφός (clever, wise) is one of those very charges.

ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία (human wisdom) : compare the striking words of Paul in 1 Cor. i. 21, 'The world by wisdom knew not God,' and iii. 19, 'The wisdom of the world is foolishness with God.'

οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη (was not speaking of S) for an illustration of this cf *Matth xvi 18*, οὐ εἰ Πέτρος κτλ., where Peter is to be regarded not as an individual, but as the representative of a truth

ξένων (strangers) - this would include sophists and rhetoricians alike

ἐνδείκνυμαι σοφός (I prove he is not so) - cf. Tennyson, *Lancelot and Elaine*

‘and in me there dwells

No greatness, save it be some far-off touch
Of greatness to know well I am not great.’

πενία μὴρίκι (extreme poverty) - cf. *Xen. Oecon ii. 3*, where Socrates values all his possessions at five minas (query about £50 in present-day values) In order to fulfil his mission—to become an ἱερεὺς τῆς ψυχῆς—he is content to strip himself of all but the bare necessities of life. One is forcibly reminded of the words of Paul in *2 Cor viii. 9* ‘Yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye, through his poverty, might become rich’ In earlier life Socrates was probably better off

λατρεῖον (service) Socrates evidently regards his questioning and examination of his fellow-citizens as, in real fact, a divine ‘service’ In the Greek Fathers the word is regularly employed to denote whatever is done for the honour of God Similarly in NT where (*Romans xii. 1*) Paul bids his converts offer themselves as a living sacrifice to God, which is their ‘reasonable service’ (λογικὴν λατρεῖον)

CHAPTER 10

αὐτομάτοι (of their own accord) no pressure was brought to bear, these rich men were not ‘pupils’ They enjoyed going about with Socrates, partly no doubt to

amuse themselves by listening to his somewhat devastating dialectic. It is hardly surprising that the victims of that dialectic were sore and exasperated at times : most people are when they are beaten in argument, and made to look small as well.

οὐχ αὐτοῖς (not with themselves). Compare *Theaetetus*, 168 : ' If you act thus [viz. pursue a fair method in argument], your fellow-debaters will blame themselves, not you, for their confusion and perplexity, and they will follow and love you but loathe themselves, flying to philosophy to the end that, becoming different, they may forsake their old selves. But if you refuse to do this (like most people), why, then you'll find the result to be quite otherwise; and your followers will hate philosophy as they grow older.' Such would be the argument of Protagoras, ' the most brilliant representative of popular philosophizing ' in his day (Campbell, *ad loc.*).

πρόχειρα (ready-made charges). Any stone is good enough to fling at a mad dog. These ' stock ' charges are once more reiterated—as they had been, more than twenty years before, by Aristophanes in the *Clouds* (but in a different order). Xenophon alludes to this point in the *Memorabilia*, I. ii. 31.

συντεταμένως (vigorous fashion). Literally=' strenuously,' as in Aristoph. *Plut.* 325. But another reading is συντεταγμένως=' in a studied fashion,' or ' with one consent,' though it may be translated ' in set array.'

τῶν πολιτικῶν (the politicians) : Anytus was a politician as well as a business-man, so he represents both classes. ' Socrates was wont to speak slightly of mechanical arts, and a conversation, in which he had pressed an uncommercial view of education on Anytus with reference to his son, seems to have been among the causes of Anytus' personal hatred of Socrates ' (Riddell).

CHAPTER 11

Socrates now replies to the indictment of Meletus, but reserves his actual defence till later on in his speech. In the present 'reply' he is at his ironical best, he succeeds in embarrassing Meletus, and in amusing the Court at the same time. The main count in the indictment is the charge of corrupting the youth, the charge of impiety was brought in, as Adam has pointed out, to give a legal foothold to the more serious accusation. But the real motives behind all this were, on the whole, undoubtedly political. His accusers were cunning as well as unscrupulous. The charge of corruption, as they framed it, was nicely calculated to throw peculiar odium upon Socrates, and so prove perilous to him, for did not all the world know that certain eminent politicians, themselves avowed enemies of the Democracy, had been constantly in the company of Socrates—Alcibiades and Ctesias being peculiarly prominent? Xenophon stresses this point in the *Memorabilia* (1 ii. 12) • Σωκράτει ὁμιλητὰ γενομένῳ Κριτίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλείστα κακὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐποίησάτην. Did his enemies succeed in showing exactly in what ways Socrates corrupted the youth of Athens? They did not—at any rate there are no indications given in the *Apology*. Did we possess a full account of the trial, this particular matter might have been cleared up. But we have no such account. Plato's composition—this is a point justly insisted on by Bury—though it is based on facts, does not appear to supply *all* the facts.

ἔχει δὲ πῶς ὧδε (it is somewhat after this style) Socrates does not undertake to produce the precise wording of the ἀντὼμοσίαι. We are told that, as late as the days of the

Emperor Trajan, this document was still preserved in the Athenian Record Office.

δαιμόνια καινά (a strange religion). These words are not so much 'strange divinities' as 'new-fangled religious observances.' In classical writers δαιμόνιος is used of agencies and powers beyond human observation and control. For example, Demosthenes (*Phil.* iii. 54) speaks of some evil genius (δαιμόνιον τι) that appears to be hurrying Greece to disaster; on the return of Orestes, his sister Electra says δαιμόνιον αὐτὸ τίθημι ('here is the finger of God': *Soph. Electr.* 1270). As a noun, δαιμόνιον signifies a divine being or agent; and it was in this secondary sense that Socrates' accusers employ the word. Cf. Justin's *First Apology*, v.: ὅτε δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης λόγῳ ἀληθεῖ καὶ ἐξεταστικῶς (in a spirit of enquiry) ταῦτα εἰς φανερόν ἐπειρᾶτο φέρειν καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν δαιμόνων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ δαίμονες διὰ τῶν χαιρόντων τῇ κακίᾳ ἀνθρώπων ἐνήργησαν ὡς ἄθεον καὶ ἄσεβῃ ἀποκτείνεσθαι, λέγοντες καινά εἰσφέρειν αὐτὸν δαιμόνια· καὶ ὁμοίως ἐφ' ἡμῶν (as Christians) τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνεργοῦσιν. Again, in the *Second Apology*, Justin declares that the noblest of Christ's forerunners were haled into court ὡς ἄσεβεῖς καὶ περίεργοι [the very word used by Socrates himself, *supra*, chap. 3]; and the most resolute of them all, Socrates, τὰ αὐτὰ ἡμῖν ἐνεκλήθη· καὶ γὰρ ἔφασαν αὐτὸν καινὰ κ.τ.λ. Socrates was on Christ's side, says Justin, because on Truth's side.

Μέλητον . . . ἐμέλησεν. A pun: so at the close of next chapter ὦ Μέλητε . . . ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν. There are three such word-plays in the *Symposium* (174, 185, 198). Play with surnames is quite in the vein of Cicero: 'Verres' is the stock instance. Cf. Shakespeare, 2 *Rich.* II. I, 73: 'Old Gaunt indeed—and gaunt

in being old' Even in the O T there is a whole string of 'paronomasias,' as in *Miscab* i 10-16 The grave Dante did not disdain the device *Purgatorio*, xiii. 109 Savia non fui, avvegna che Sapia | Fossi chiamata There is a famous example in the *Agamemnon* (Helen—*ἑλένας, ἑλάνδρος, ἑλέπτολις*, 'Ship's-Hell, Man's-Hell, City's-Hell,' as Browning renders the words

CHAPTER 12

By Athenian law either party to a suit might put questions to the other and demand a reply (see next chapter, where Socrates says to Meletus, 'Answer me, καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι') Such interrogatories were generally of a simple kind, and, owing to the large numbers and natural impatience of the audience, any protracted examination would be out of the question (Cope, *Arist Rhet* iii. 18) The technical term for the interrogatory was ἐρωτήσεις

νη την Ἥραν (I swear) the ladies' oath, but often in the mouth of Socrates

ἀκροαται (listeners) the audience in Court.

εἰσαγείς (this prosecution) properly said of the presiding magistrate, but here of the prosecutor

CHAPTER 13

ἔστιν ὅστις βουλεται (does anyone desire) the argument is clear enough Nobody wants to be injured, but if Socrates is corrupting the young, he is injured Therefore either he is *not* guilty of the charge, or, if he is guilty, he is so unintentionally—on the principle enunciated in the *Meno* that no one sins willingly (οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν κακός) This principle follows from the Socratic

doctrine which identifies 'virtue' and 'knowledge.' In the *Symposium* we have the statement πάντας τὰγαθὰ βούλεσθαι. Ovid's famous line, 'video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor,' would have been challenged by Socrates, who taught that if once a man knew what is right, he would do it. It sounds paradoxical enough, and so it would have appeared to the writers of the N.T. (Paul, for example, in the *Romans* exclaims: 'I find then this rule, that, when I would do good, evil is present with me'; and again, 'The evil that I would not, that I do'). But we ask ourselves what exactly was meant by Socrates when he spoke of 'knowledge.' With pure science he had little sympathy. What he understood by the term 'knowledge' is that 'overmastering principle or power which lays hold primarily indeed of the intellect, but, through the intellect, of the entire personality, moulding and disciplining the will and the emotions into absolute union with itself' (Adam, *The Religious Teachers of Greece*, p. 329). Knowledge, for Socrates, was closely related to character; it must bear fruit in the life, or it is indeed a γνῶσις falsely so called. Aristotle criticizes the Socratic doctrine in the seventh book of the *Ethics*, holding that it conflicts with experience. But Socrates was not mistaken in believing that intellectual clearness about the ideal life is one of the formative influences that make for morality. In that sense he became the founder of Ethics by his demand for self-knowledge, which, in fact, was only 'a demand for a clear understanding of one's own standard of good and of the results consistently flowing from it. But he did not closely examine how the standard is obtained, or whether there are not really several standards which might each lay claim to be the fundamental one' (Höfding, *Problems of Philosophy*). Certainly man must know himself if he is to come to terms with himself;

and it is safe to say that in proportion as we 'truly and indifferently' know ourselves, we have advanced in the knowledge of God

τηλικοσδε ὢν (at your age) he was quite young at the time

δεῦρο εἰσάγεις (you bring me to a place) In chastening the wicked, says Plato in the *Laws*, 944, our object should be to make them better. That is to say, punishment is to be educative or remedial, not vindictive or retributory so Socrates argues here. Kant, on the other hand, supports the retributory theory, maintaining that the penal law is a 'categorical imperative,' and woe to him who creeps through the serpent-windings of Utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge him from the justice of punishment or even from the due measure of it (*Philosophy of Law*). It has been said that the most Christian of medieval thinkers, like Dante, insisted that divine punishments were, and human punishments should be, the expression of love. Was Thomas Aquinas one of these thinkers? Read *Summa contra Gentiles*, chap. cxlv. Among the Jews both the educative and the retributory theories went side by side (for the former doctrine cf. *Wisdom* xl. 23). For a brief discussion of the subject see Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, pp. 420 sq. Protagoras, in the dialogue that bears his name, speaks thus: 'He that would punish with reason, punishes not for the past offence—for the past cannot be undone—but for the sake of the future, that the offender himself, and all who have witnessed his punishment, may be prevented from offending hereafter.' This is the remedial theory in a nutshell.

CHAPTER 14

The question implied all through this chapter is, In what way does Socrates corrupt the youth? Meletus replies: 'By setting them an example of godlessness.' 'How is this?' says Socrates. 'Do you mean that I am an atheist?' Meletus is obviously ill at ease, for in his heart he knows this is not the case. But he obstinately sticks to his guns. 'You do not believe in the gods.' 'Strange, indeed!' answers Socrates; 'have you not just asserted that I am the introducer of a strange religion? How can I, then, both disbelieve in the gods, yet believe in them, at one and the same time? My good man, you are "talking through your hat."'

ἄθεος (an atheist). This word, in Greek writers, has three meanings: (1) as here=*atheist*; (2) *impious*, as in the *Laws*, 966; (3) *without God's help*, and so *unblest*, as in *Soph. Oed. Tyr.* 662. Ignatius uses the words of 'heathen' 'heretics' in his letter to the Trallians; the 'heathen' returned the compliment by designating Christians as ἄθεοι (as Justin complains, 1 *Apol.* 6; cf. Minucius Felix, chap. viii.). It was a term of reproach in antiquity, as it is now; but in the only place where it occurs in the Greek Bible (*Ephesians* ii. 12) the word has no sting in it, but is used 'as marking the mournful climax of Gentile disability.' We may call to mind the words αἶρε τοὺς ἄθεοὺς in the *Martyrdom of Polycarp*, ix. See Mayor on *Tertull. Apol.* chap. x.; and, for a discussion of the word itself, J. M. Robertson, *Short Hist. of Freethought*,³ vol. i. pp. 1-4.

οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην (. . . the sun and moon): in the *Symposium*, 220, Socrates is described as offering a

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prayer to the Sun, possibly because this deity symbolized ideal good, as was the case with Akhnaton and his worship of the solar disk.

ANAXAGORAS of Clazomenae, a Persian subject (born about 500 B.C., died 428), was the first philosopher to take up residence in Athens, to which he came in the Salamis year. He was the tutor of Pericles, and it was in the early days of his celebrated pupil's political career that he was tried for impiety—in other words, for avowing himself a free-thinker. The heresy alleged against him was that he held τὸν ἥλιον μύθρον εἶναι διαπύρον καὶ μείζω τῆς Πελοποννησίου (Diog. Laert. ii 15), and it is to this that Augustine alludes in his *de Civitate Dei* (xviii 41) 'miror cur Anaxagoras reus factus sit quia solem dixit esse lapidem ardentem, negans utique deum.' The enemies of Pericles, baffled in their attacks upon him, struck at him obliquely through his friend and teacher, after having already ostracized Damon, another of his teachers. A law was enacted that anyone might be prosecuted who disbelieved in 'religion' (viz. the popular mythology) or held speculative views on such high matters (Plutarch, *Pericles*, 4). The visit of Anaxagoras to Athens was like the letting in of waters. 'The full stream of Ionic culture, imperfectly realized, was poured upon sensitive minds in a condition of abnormal activity. The result was an access of enlightenment resembling the *Aufklärung* which preceded the French Revolution, and equally with that to be followed shortly by a religious reaction or fanatic outburst' (Campbell, *Religion in Greek Literature*, p. 295). Anaxagoras found himself condemned to prison, and but for the influence of Pericles might have suffered the extreme penalty, the Athenians, however, contented themselves with banishing this innovating rationalist, who finally retired to Ionia. According to Diogenes Laertius the

following inscription was placed over his grave by his fellow-townsmen :

ἐνθάδε, πλεῖστον ἀληθείας ἐπὶ τέρμα περήσας
οὐρανόιου κόσμου, κεῖται Ἀναξαγόρας.

His fame as a thinker rests on the fact that 'dethroning Chance and Necessity' (Plutarch, *l.c.* 5) he declared Νοῦς (Mind) to be the efficient cause of all things : that is why Aristotle could speak of him as standing like a sober man in contrast with his predecessors, with their random talk—this, too, despite his somewhat retrograde cosmogony (cf. *Metaphysics*, 984). But both Plato and Aristotle complain that he failed to make a full use of his own great principle, and turned aside to mechanical causes, bringing in Νοῦς as a sort of 'deus ex machina' when he found himself gravelled (*Phaedo*, 98 ; Arist. *Metaph.* 985). Socrates was disappointed because he expected from Anaxagoras a theory of the Universe based not merely on law, but on design—a teleological scheme, in short (cf. Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vol. i. pp. 125-135, and especially his note on the relation of Plato to Anaxagoras). Inge, in his *Philosophy of Plotinus*, remarks that his doctrine of a First Cause was intended to account rather for the creation of an ordered Cosmos than for its actual working. None the less, though his philosophy of Νοῦς, as *primal* cause, may have been defective (he finds no place for *final* cause), his originality is indisputable ; indeed, such was his service to the higher thought of his time that he stands out from the rest, as imposing a figure as Heraclitus himself (Archer-Hind, *Introduction to the Timaeus*). It was something for a man to be able, for the first time in Greece, to speak of the beauty and order of the Universe as due to a designing Intelligence : that is why his doctrine, however inadequately worked out,

must be regarded as a landmark in human speculation. But our admiration for his work must not make us lose sight of the fact that it was Socrates who made of the *Noûs* a genuine providence. 'We know,' he said (*Xen. Memor* IV iii 14), 'our soul by its operation, even so we know God by his works.'

Grote will have it that Anaxagoras conceived of *Noûs* as one among numerous other real agents in Nature, material like the rest yet differing from the rest. But how otherwise Anaxagoras himself seems to speak! And the voice of antiquity was on the side of those who understood the *Noûs* as a designing *Mind* (*νοῦν ἀρχὴν ἐπιστημῆς*, says Aristotle, *ἀρχὴν κινήσεως*, says Diogenes Laertius, *νοῦς—ὁ διοκοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος*, writes Plato in the *Phaedo*). And, so far, it must be regarded as personal (J H Stirling, in Schweigler's *Hist of Phil*). In attempting to make his new and fruitful idea intelligible to the men of his time, Anaxagoras was indeed obliged to have recourse to the materialistic language in common parlance, just as we ourselves are obliged to conceive of God in a quasi-anthropomorphic fashion. But surely Adam (*Religious Teachers of Greece*, chap xii) was justified in declaring the *Noûs* to be spiritual, and no mere material substance. Active reason was, for Anaxagoras, the supreme cosmic principle—For full information see Ritter and Preller, *Hist Phil Graec* §§ 117-127, Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, chap vi., Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, vol 1 chap 4. The famous sentence in which Anaxagoras introduced his doctrine runs thus *Πάντα χρηματὰ τῆν ὁμοῦ εἶτα ὁ νοῦς ἔλθων αὐτὰ διοκοσμήσε*, words found in *Diog Laert.* ii 6 and quoted—I think three times over—by Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica*. For references to Anaxagoras in Lucretius, see i 830, with Munro's notes.

βιβλία (books) : so far as we know, Anaxagoras was 'homo unius libri'; for here the plural=rolls. His 'book,' περὶ φύσεως, began with the words quoted in the last note.

δραχμῆς (a shilling) : the value, in to-day's money, would be nearer, say, five shillings. Books could be produced cheaply in antiquity, thanks to slave labour, though Becker (in his *Charicles*) will not allow that slaves were employed in multiplying books in Athens, as they were later on in Rome. It is probable that books were scarce before the Periclean age : after that they were published more freely : children, for example, used them in schools. Euthydemus, a companion of Socrates, had quite a library of poets, including Homer's works (*Xen. Mem.* iv. 2). The idea of an author selling his copyright does not seem to have been known.

It may be of interest to point out that Athenaeus records the names of several book-collectors in ancient Greece, among them Euripides and Aristotle, the latter of whom, according to Strabo, actually taught the Egyptian kings how to arrange a library (πρῶτος ἴσμεν συναγαγὼν βιβλία, καὶ διδάξας τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλέας βιβλιοθήκης σύνταξιν). Later on the Ptolemies founded a magnificent library at Alexandria, but we do not hear of any public library at Athens till Hadrian's day. The library erected there by the emperor must have been a very fine one indeed : see Frazer's note in his *Pausanias*, vol. ii. 185.

τῆς ὀρχήστρας (the Round Terrace) : this cannot mean the 'orchestra' of the temple of Dionysus, but some 'book-sellers' row' in or near the market-place ('Αγορά).

οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα (so peculiar) : Socrates would hardly have rejected these doctrines as 'absurd' (that is not what ἄτοπα means), but as 'out of the common.' Nevertheless

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he had not hesitated, as we have seen, to criticize the physical theories of Anaxagoras (Xen *Mem* iv 7 6). Compare the passage in Plato's *Laws* · 'Do but mark the effect of their words [*i.e.* the words of our younger thinkers] when you and I argue for the existence of the gods, and produce the sun, moon, stars, and earth, claiming for them a divine being, if we would listen to these philosophers we should say that these bodies are but earth and stones, which have no care at all for human affairs, and that all religion is make-believe' (886 Jowett's version)

ὥσπερ αἰνίγμα ξυντιθέντι (framing a riddle) Socrates says that Meletus is like a man propounding a riddle, in order to puzzle his hearers. What, in this case, was the riddle? It may be compared with the old riddle, 'When is a man not a man?' According to Socrates, Meletus has framed it in this form *τίς θεοὺς νομίζει οὐ νομίζων*, The charge of Meletus is no true riddle at all, but (as ὥσπερ indicates) is so far like a riddle in that its object is to keep the jury 'guessing', accordingly, in the whimsical turn Socrates gives it, what it says is that Socrates does not believe in gods, but admits, in the same breath, that he *does* believe in *δαίμονια*—Cf S E Bassett in *Class Rev* vol xlii.

CHAPTER 15

This chapter is an example of the Argument from Definition of Terms, which is the basis of all sound reasoning. Meletus has been accusing Socrates of teaching his associates not to believe in the gods recognized by the State, and of introducing a new kind of cult. Socrates argues that, on Meletus' own definition, he *does* believe in divine things (*δαίμονια*). But divine things or works imply a workman, therefore a belief in *δαίμονια* implies

a belief in the authors of these works (*i.e.* in δαίμονες). But δαίμονες are either θεοί or θεῶν παῖδες, and consequently in either case a belief in δαίμόνια still involves belief in the gods (θεοί).—From Cope's *Arist. Rhet.* ii. 23, § 8.

For the conception of δαίμων see Plato, *Republic*, 620 : Lachesis sent with each soul the destiny he had chosen φύλακα τοῦ βίου (to be the guardian of his life) ; Menander (to every man at his birth is assigned a δαίμων to be the μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου). These 'daemons' are not the spirits of the dead, but divine beings, superhuman in activity, who rule human affairs on behalf of the supreme deity—intermediaries, in fact, between gods and men. Compare what is said by Plutarch* in his essay *On the Cessation of Oracles*, where we find the story of Thamous and his message, 'Great Pan is dead' : this story forms the basis of a celebrated chapter in Rabelais (Book iv. chap. 28). Twice, at least, the word δαίμων is used in Bacchylides of Destiny (xv. 23, xvi. 46) : compare the saying of Heracleitus, ἦθος ἀνθρώπων δαίμων, 'Character is destiny.' In Soph. *frag.* 587, it is used impersonally, μὴ σπεῖρε πολλοῖς τὸν πάροντα δαίμονα (=do not broadcast thy present trouble). In the N.T. the word is used only of an evil spirit. Cf. Bevan, *Sibyls and Seers*.

ἐκ νυμφῶν (by nymphs) κ.τ.λ. Socrates declares that the word δαίμονες must mean 'bastard offspring of the gods by nymphs or others,' viz. such beings as the Homeric heroes commonly designated ἡμίθεοι (see next chapter). But he scarcely intends his words to be taken seriously.

* This passage is quoted *in extenso* by Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.* v. xvii. Thamous is the Egyptian Pan. It is to this story that Milton alludes in his *Ode to the Nativity*, xx. ; cf. Spenser, *The Shepheardes Calender* for May, with E.K.'s note.

CHAPTER 16

Most of this and of the next chapter is quoted by Eusebius in his *Præparatio Evangelica*, 659

δίκαια ἢ ἄδίκαι (actions of a good man or a bad) This passage is referred to by Marcus Aurelius in his *Meditations*, vii 44, cf. also the words of the great Stoic emperor in iii 7 'Whether a man's soul in its material shell remains at his disposal for a longer or a shorter space, he cares no whit. So soon as it is time for him to take his leave, he is as ready to go his way as to engage in any other seemly or self-respecting act, careful of one thing only, that, while life shall last, his understanding shall never disown the relation of a being possessed of mind and a social aim' (Rendall's translation) There is a similar sentiment in the *Gorgias*, to which Adam refers μή γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν, τὸ ζῆν ὅπόσον δὴ χρόνον, τὸν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἐστέον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχιτέον (i.e. the true man must not have regard merely to length of days rather he should renounce all desire for mere life, leaving all to the will of heaven) Cf. 2 *Maccabees* vi 24-28 and Justin Martyr's *Apology*, I 11, for words of like significance

ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός (the son of Thetis=Achilles) Socrates is thinking of the passage in the *Iliad* (xviii 94 sq) where Thetis appears to Achilles after the death of his friend Patroclus, and prophesies his certain doom if he avenges that death on Hector, the slayer, but Achilles nobly refuses to purchase life at the cost of (what he deems) his honour

'I would not wish

To live, and move among my fellow-men,
Unless that Hector, vanquished by my spear,
Should lose his forfeit life and pay the price
Of foul dishonour to Patroclus done.'

The same episode is referred to in the *Symposium*, 179. Cf. Arist. *Rhet.* i. 3, § 6 : (men praise Achilles because) ἐβοήθησε τῷ ἐταίρῳ Πατρόκλῳ εἰδὼς ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν, ἔξὸν 3ῃν. Isocrates in the *Panegyricus*, § 53, praises Athens for a like disinterestedness in her championship of the oppressed, εἰδότες τὰ συμβαίνοντ' ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ὅμως ἡρούμεθα τοῖς ἀσθενεστέροις καὶ παρὰ τὸ συμφέρον βοηθεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς κρείττοσι τοῦ λυσιτελοῦντος ἕνεκα συναδικεῖν.

αὐτίκα τεθναίην (let me die straightway) κ.τ.λ., quoted from memory (and with an alteration) from the same passage in the *Iliad*.

οὔ ἄν τις . . . δεῖ κ.τ.λ. (wherever a man posts himself, etc.). These final words convey the idea of *duty*, which is felt to be the motive of every noble life. This passage is quoted by Marcus Aurelius, *l.c.* vii. 45.

CHAPTER 17

Socrates now girds himself to the really serious part of his defence. His life, he knows well, is at stake ; but this danger must be faced bravely. No soldier would willingly desert the post assigned him by his commander ; ' nor,' says Socrates, ' will I desert the post assigned me by my heavenly commander. " A charge to keep I have, a God to glorify " ; and as long as life is in me, I shall remain true to my mission, which is to spend myself in following after the true wisdom and exhorting my fellowmen to do likewise.' Compare the grand words of the *Phaedo*, 61 (were they derived from Pythagoras ?) : ἐν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμέν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν (we are on guard here, and no man must free himself, no, nor run away from it). Demosthenes (*de Rhod. lib.*

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200) draws a comparison between the duties of citizens and the duties of soldiers, τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν προγόνων τάξιν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ παραδεδομένην λιπόντας, which is reminiscent of Plato, *Menexenus*, 246 Cicero, *de Senectute*, § 73 'Vetat Pythagoras injussu imperatoris—id est Dei—de praesidio et statione vitae discedere.' So, too, in the dissertations of Epictetus, iii 24 ἦν ἂν χωρὰν καὶ τάξιν ἐγχειρίσης μυριάκις ἀποθανοῦμαι πρότερον ἢ ταύτην ἐγκαταλείψω Similarly in the *Politicus* of John of Salisbury, ii 27 'Veteris philosophiae princeps Pythagoras et Plotinus prohibitionis hujus non tam auctores sunt quam praecones, omnino illicitum esse dicentes quempiam militiae servientem a praesidio [= Plato's φρουρᾶ] et commissa sibi statione discedere citra ducis vel principis jussionem Plane elegantius exemplo usi sunt, eo quod militia est vita hominis super terram' Cf Marc. Aurel ii 17 ὁ δὲ βίος πόλεμος (life is warfare), which finds an echo in Seneca, *Ep* 96, 'vivere militare est,' as well as in Epictetus' στρατεία τις ἐστὶν ὁ βίος ἐκάστου Spenser, *Faerie Queene*, i ix 41, supplies us with a good parallel to the words of Socrates

'The term of life is limited,

Ne may a man prolong nor shorten it,

The soldier may not move from watchful sted,

Nor leave his stand untill his captaine bed',

and so does Tennyson, *Lucretius*

'lend an ear to Plato where he says

That men, like soldiers, may not quit the post

Allotted by the gods'

Cf Lutoslawski, *Pre-existence and Re-incarnation* (in the chapter on 'The Parting of the Ways')

POTIDAEA, AMPHIPOLIS, DELIUM At Potidaea, in Chalcidice, Socrates, then a comparatively young man, saved

the life of Alcibiades,* who (in the *Symposium*, 220) gives us an oft-quoted account of the gallant conduct of his rescuer on that memorable campaign (432 B.C.). At an earlier date Socrates saw service at Amphipolis in Thrace ; and at Delium in Bocotia he displayed all the qualities of a fine soldier during the disastrous retreat of the Athenian army. This episode is also spoken of by Alcibiades (*op. cit.* 221 ; cf. Montaigne, *Essays*, iii. 6, 13). Thucydides gives us an account of the victory of the Thebans over the Athenians (B.C. 424) in his fourth book, chaps. 76 *sqq.*

φιλοσοφοῦντα (the life of a philosopher) : in the *Phaedrus* of Plato Socrates asks what a man should be called who works in the light of true knowledge. It might be presumptuous, he remarks, to call him σοφός (wise), but he may justly be called φιλοσοφός (a lover of wisdom). It is probable that the term 'philosopher' was not in general use at Athens till shortly before the time of Socrates ; and that, for long after that, it was the usual word applied to a man of *culture*. From the end of the fourth century B.C. it was gradually appropriated (see Thompson, *ad loc.*) to the speculative seeker after truth. There seem to have been three main stages in Greek philosophy : (1) the speculative, represented by such a man as Heraclitus ; (2) the dialectic, represented by Socrates himself ; (3) the explanatory, represented by Aristotle. Cicero in his *Academica* (ii. 23) calls philosophy an 'ars vivendi'—a definition characteristic of the post-Aristotelian systems. Whether the term φιλοσοφία is to be ascribed originally to Pythagoras or not, is of small moment : it was Socrates who made it current

* For a good popular account of this brilliant, wayward genius the reader is referred to the recent *Life of Alcibiades*, by E. F. Benson.

coin—For the meaning and scope of philosophy generally, see Hegel's penetrating criticism and exposition in the opening chapter of his *Logic*

οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς κ τ λ (nobody so much as knows) cf the book of *Sirach* xli 5, 'Fear not the sentence of death for there is no inquisition in the grave' (i.e. no questions are asked there), 1 *Corinth* xv 55, ποῦ σου, θάνατε, τὸ νεῖκος, ποῦ σου τὸ κέντρον, *Revel* xii 11, 'They loved not their life, even unto death'

ὃς ἔφη . εἰσελθεῖν (who said I ought never to have come into court) Socrates might, no doubt, have escaped the trial altogether

πεισομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ (I shall obey God) cf *Acts* v 29 'Deus cui servire regnare' (Gelasian Sacramentary), a thought implied perhaps here in Plato, and echoed by Seneca, *Dial* vii, 'deo parere libertas est,' words appropriated by Augustine, *de quant animae*, 'in Dei servitio placere perfecte sola libertas est'

πολεως μεγίστης κ τ λ (greatest city, etc) . it was no longer true At the date of the trial (399 B C) the glory of Athens had departed Aegospotami had shattered her old supremacy

της ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη (perfecting of your soul) the 'care of the soul'—this was the paramount interest of Socrates matched with that health and wealth were relatively unimportant. Cf *Mark* viii 36, 37 'What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul? for what shall a man give in exchange for (ἀντάλλαγμα) his soul?' Read the beautiful letter of Porphyry, the Neo-Platonist, to his wife Marcella, it is almost like an extended commentary on the words of Socrates, and cf the *de Imitatione Christi*, ii v ('de propria consideratione')

οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετή (virtue does not spring from wealth): *Euthydemus*, 281: ἄρ' οὖν ὄφελος τῶν ἄλλων χρημάτων ἄνευ φρονήσεως καὶ σοφίας; (is there profit in possessions apart from good sense and wisdom?). Plutarch, *Moralia*, 440: 'Wisdom—without which there is no use nor profit in all other accomplishments.' There is a gnome in Pindar (*Isth.* ii. 11), χρήματα χρήματ' ἀνὴρ, which Socrates would have scouted: rather would he have welcomed the vigorous saying of Themistocles, 'Seek rather a man without money, than money without a man' (Plutarch, *Life of Them.* xviii.: this saying is introduced, somewhat differently, by Cicero, in *de Off.* ii. § 71). Pindar is doubtless borrowing from Alcaeus, who himself quotes Aristodamus (reputed one of the Seven Sages). The saying was current in antiquity: we have something very like it as far back as Hesiod (*Works and Days*, 686). Cf. Horace, *Epp.* I. i. 53-5 (Obbarius):

“O cives, cives, quaerenda pecunia primum est;
Virtus post nummos.” Haec Janus summus ab imo
Prodocet; haec recinunt juvenes dictata senesque.

The next clause, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς (but [wealth] from virtue) has generally been misunderstood, but not by Burnet, who points out that, as Socrates was now in great poverty, he could hardly recommend ἀρετή (virtue) as a good investment.

πολλάκις τεθνάναι (die a dozen deaths): for this rhetorical flourish there are several parallels in Demosthenes. Cf., too, Cic. *ad Att.* xiv. 9: 'Nonne milliens perire est melius quam....'

CHAPTER 18

There is a long passage in the *Gorgias* that vividly illustrates this chapter. I give a paraphrase of it here, in an

abbreviated form—Callicles has been urging Socrates to be a servant of the State, and to avoid risking unpopularity (as an ἰδιώτης or *private citizen*) To this Socrates replies Do not repeat the old story that I am at the mercy of anyone who chooses to put me to death, for then I shall be forced to give my old answer, that it will be the case of a bad man killing an honest one. Certainly I should be a fool if I did not know that, in our city, anybody might suffer anything, but I am quite sure that, if I am brought to trial, it will be at some villain's instigation for no one would accuse the innocent I should not be surprised if I were put to death, and I will tell you why I am convinced that I am almost the only man in Athens who practises the true art of politics As I never speak to flatter, and aim at what is best and not what is pleasantest (for I have none of the arts and graces you recommend) I shall not have a word to say in Court. I shall be unable to rehearse the pleasures I have provided for the people, though these pleasures are often regarded as unmingled benefits And if anyone charges me with corrupting our young men, or harassing them with doubts and perplexity, or with reviling their elders in public or private, it will be useless to reply,—true though it would be,—‘I do all this for the sake of justice, and for your truest interests, my judges’ Hence there is no saying what my fate will be. And if I had to die for lack of some flattering rhetoric, I should face death calmly For no man who is not a hopeless fool or coward is afraid of death itself it is wrongdoing that he fears But to pass into the other world with a sin-laden soul—this is the last and worst of evils

μὴ θορυβεῖτε (do not keep interrupting) the closing words of the last chapter—with their ring of defiance—had evidently caused a sensation in the Court.

μύωπός τινος (a gadfly) : similarly in the *Meno*, 80, we find Socrates compared to an electric ray or narke (νάρκη), because of the shocks he administered to his audience by his dialectic. 'The mission,' writes Livingstone (*The Greek Genius*, p. 224), 'is that of a Hebrew prophet : Socrates will convince his people of sin. But there was something in his methods we do not find in Isaiah. . . . Instead of threats and terror he quietly recommended to his hearers an old Greek proverb, "Know thyself." . . . Argument, common sense, looking facts in the face—with this (he thought) the world could be healed.' He was mistaken in his diagnosis of humanity : that is all.

It is not difficult to understand the annoyance felt by people with Socrates and his (occasionally) exasperating ways. Frankly, he must have been a decided bore at times, as well as an 'electric ray' ; and boredom is hard to bear. Macaulay, in his own highly-coloured way, gives vigorous expression to the feelings experienced by average Athenians, when he writes thus in his diary for July 1853 : 'I do not much wonder at the violence of the hatred which Socrates provoked. He had, evidently, a thorough love for making men look small. There was a meek maliciousness about him which gave wounds such as must have smarted long ; and his command of temper was more provoking than noisy triumph or insolence would have been.'

θεμιτὸν . . . βλάπτεσθαι (heaven would suffer a good man to be harmed) : one may remember the words of the *Phaedo*, 67 : μὴ καθαρῶ καθαρῷ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἤ (it is impossible for the impure to reach the pure). Cf. *Matth.* x. 28, and *Wisdom* iii. 1 : 'The souls of the righteous are in the hands of God, and no evil can touch them.'

CHAPTER 19

People, Socrates goes on to say, may feel surprise that I have steadily kept clear of politics. 'The implication is that a man of the remarkable gifts of Socrates, who carefully abstains from putting them openly at the service of the community (though he is believed to have employed them freely for the service of men like Alcibiades) must be a formidable anti-democratic conspirator' (A. E. Taylor, *Plato*)

δ ὅν μελλῶ προὔτειν (any contemplated purpose). compare Cic. *de Divin.* 1. § 122 'Esse divinum quiddam quod δαιμονιον appellat, cui semper ipse paruerit, nunquam impellenti, saepe revocanti', Min. Fel. *Octav.* xxvi (eos spiritus daemones esse) 'Socrates novit, qui ad nutum et arbitrium assidentis sibi daemones vel declinabat negotia vel petebat'; Tertullian, *Apol.* xxii (Socrates himself waited on the will of a daemon. Why not?) 'cum et ipsi daemones a pueritia adhaesisse dicatur, dehortatorium plane a bono'—a characteristically spiteful touch. Lactantius, *Epitome* xxviii. 2 'Socrates habere se a prima pueritia custodem rectoremque vitae suae daemone praedicabat, sine cuius nutu et imperio nihil agere posset', Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, viii. 14 'Socrates habebat adjunctum et amicum quendam conjunctum a quo perhibetur solitus admoneri' (but see the whole chapter). Similarly Cyprian, *Quod idola di non sint* 'Socrates instrui se et regi ad arbitrium daemones praedicabat'.—The reference to the 'divine sign' at the beginning of our chapter is not to be taken 'au pied de la lettre'.

μη δημοσιεύειν (not in a public capacity). Riddell justly notes that the chief reason for Socrates' abstention from politics was that he felt his mission to be a moral and

individual one (ἰδιωτεύειν). It was far less important to guide a forbidden policy than to train up good men, thoroughly imbued with the principles of truth and justice, from whom should arise the genuine statesman. That Plato is registering his own views in these closing words, can hardly be disputed. Plato, like Socrates, had lost faith in democracy (and who can marvel at that?). I fancy he would have found a satisfaction in Bernard Shaw's apophthegm—'Democracy substitutes election by the incompetent many for the appointment by the competent few.' The best rulers are always appointed: they are never elected.

CHAPTER 20

ὁ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε (what you prize): 'You'—representing the Athenians generally, when acting as juror-judges. Cf. Aesch. *P.V.* 335, ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ τεκμαίρομαι: Xen. *Cyrp.* vi. 4, 5, τὰ γὰρ ἔργα οἰμαί σοι πιθανώτερα (aptiora ad fidem faciendam) παρεσχῆσθαι τῶν νῦν λεχθέντων λόγων. Shakespeare might almost have been thinking of Socrates when he wrote (*Coriolanus*, ii. 3. 194):

'His worthy deeds did claim no less
Than what he stood for.'

φορτικὰ καὶ δικανικά (in questionable taste, etc.). Cf. *Gorgias*, 482: 'You, Socrates, avowing truth to be your objective, are fobbing off upon your hearers a number of cheap *ad captandum* arguments, worthy of a corner-boy' (φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικά).

πρυτανεύουσα (held the presidency). The Athenian Council (βουλή) was a general committee of the sovereign people (δῆμος). There were ten standing committees, each of fifty councillors chosen from each tribe. Each of these

committees of management served for a tenth part of the year. The members were called *πρυτάνεις*, and the tribe to which they belonged *φυλὴ πρυτανευούσα*. Out of its midst a president (*ἐπιστάτης*) was daily taken, by rotation, he, as the highest officer of State for the time being, took charge of the State seal, and kept the keys of the archives. It was the duty of the president and of a third of the *πρυτάνεις* to be continually at their office in the 'Tholos,' where they messed together. They overhauled ordinary State business, convoked the full meetings of the Council, and prepared all measures (*προβουλευματα*) to be submitted to the *ἐκκλησία* (or Popular Assembly).

τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς (the ten generals) 'strictly only eight,' says Riddell. But this is not quite the case, for Conon was not included, one was dead, and two more declined to return to Athens and face the inevitable enquiry. It seems, then, that only six were tried and executed, though it is true that the Athenians wanted to try the eight.—After the battle of Arginusæ (406 B.C.), in which the Athenians defeated the Spartans, no proper measures were adopted to save the crews of the wrecked vessels, or to recover the bodies of the drowned. Indignation at Athens ran so high that a resolution was proposed to try the responsible commanders all together (*κρίνειν ὁμοῦς*) and condemn them 'en bloc.' This was illegal, and Socrates unhesitatingly voted against the proposal. He was alone in his opposition (*οὐκ ἔφη ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους πάντα ποιήσειν*, says Xenophon in his *Hellenica*). Whether Socrates was, on this memorable occasion, actually President for the day, and, as such, refused to put the question, is a moot point*.

* The passages referring to this occurrence are—(1) *Xen Mem* I i 18 and IV iv 2, (2) *Xen Hell* I vii 9-15, (3)

ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπόγειν (indict and arrest me) : Socrates was liable to be indicted and arrested for exceeding his rights in thus countering the overwhelming majority of his fellow committee-men. The effect of the indictment (ἐνδειξις) would have been the levying of a fine, the culprit being suspended from office till the fine was paid. The object of the arrest (ἀπογωγή) was to bring the offender into custody, and was a summary process. Usually the delinquent was at once brought before 'The Eleven' (οἱ ἑνδεκά).

τὴν θόλον (Rotunda), a round building, with a domed roof, which stood by the market-place alongside the Council house. Here the committee-men and their attendants banqueted at the cost of the State. (Sandys, *Aristotle on the Constitution*, 43, § 3 ; Ruhnken's *Timaeus*, s.v. θόλος.)

LEON OF SALAMIS. This man seems to have been generally respected, but fell a victim to the Thirty for no other reason than that, as a man of means, he aroused their envy and greed. He was only one among many to be illegally and wantonly killed, but his case seems to have given occasion for special resentment. Seneca, *Epist.* xxxviii. 8 : 'Triginta tyranni Socratem circumsteterunt nec potuerunt animum ejus infringere.'

διὰ τοχέων (shortly afterwards). The Reign of Terror lasted eight months. The marvel is that Socrates managed to live through this time unmolested, especially after his defiance of the Terrorists. One can only suppose that this immunity was partly due to the fact that Critias—

Axiochus, 368 ; (4) Plato, *Gorgias*, 474. (See Riddell's *n.*) There is an admirable account of the whole bad business of the 'Ten Generals' in Thirlwall's *History of Greece*, vol. iv. pp. 112-126 ; Grote, chap. 64, deals very fully with it.

the Robespierre of those days—had been, in the past, a follower of the philosopher, and—inconsistently indeed—shrank from extreme measures. Another thing Socrates had no wealth to excite cupidity. Critias perished in the battle between the Tyrants and the Exiles under Thrasybulus, B.C. 403. For an admirable survey of the character of Critias—a brilliant man, but without any fixed standard of Right and Wrong—consult Thirlwall, *Hist of Greece*, vol. iv. 200 sqq. Holm, in his history, gives an interesting explanation of the conduct of Critias, ‘cruel from a spirit of doctrinaire fanaticism.’ He saw nothing to object to in tyranny, however harsh, if there were no gods, there was no sanction for laws, no ethics, no moral obligation. See Acton, *History of Freedom*, p. 70.

CHAPTER 21

ἐμοὺς μαθητάς (disciples of mine) • Critias and Alcibiades, in particular. It was constantly brought up against Socrates, sometimes by the average thoughtless person, but more often by interested enemies, that he was answerable for the misconduct of these men.* Xenophon, in the *Memorabilia* (1. 2. 24), protests vigorously against such an accusation. ‘If these men did wrong, why should the accuser blame Socrates? nay rather, he deserves commendation for having held them in leash, when young, for it is notorious that, so long as they

* In a recently discovered papyrus fragment Socrates is introduced as replying to Alcibiades’ question, ‘Why does my association with you do me no good?’ in these words: ‘Your mighty companions undo all the good effects of my daily conversation’ (Powell and Barber, *New Chapters in the Hist of Greek Lit* 2nd series, p. 94).

associated with him, they maintained some sort of mastery over themselves. But they came to him principally to be instructed in the art of statesmanship. It was when they left him that they deteriorated. And these men were exceptional : the majority of the comrades of Socrates proved themselves men of virtue.' The enemies of Socrates argued thus : Virtue can be taught ; hence, if a pupil turns out a rascal, the teacher is to blame. Now Critias and Alcibiades were rascals, for they had grievously hurt their mother-country by what they did. But they were also pupils of Socrates : who, then, but Socrates was ultimately responsible ? Therefore punishment should fall on him. Such was the logic of enmity.

ἐγὼ δὲ δικάσκαλος οὐδενός (disciples I have never had) : in the *Republic* Plato tells us that a really good teacher will begin with a cleansing process ; and certainly Socrates observed this rule. He openly disclaimed the title of 'teacher,' because he chose to regard himself rather as a fellow-seeker after truth along with his hearers. If he himself was 'nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri,' he was, equally, the last man to wish to impose his convictions on others. And as he had no wisdom or knowledge to sell, he refused—unlike the Sophists—to take fees, for by abstaining from taking such payment he maintained he was consulting his own freedom (τούτου ἀπεχόμενος ἐνομίζεν ἐλευθερίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι : *Xen. Mem.* i. ii. 6). His one aim was to inculcate a right attitude of mind to the besetting problems of life and conduct, rather than to be a huckster of ready-made knowledge ; to secure a moral and intellectual regeneration of the whole man by a habitual process of self-examination. In a similar spirit Paul says to his Corinthian converts, πειράζετε (make trial of yourselves) εἰ ἔστὲ ἐν τῇ πίστει, ἐαυτοὺς δοκιμάζετε : 2 *Cor.* xiii. 5).

Cordially would Socrates have welcomed the lines of Tennyson (in *Oenone*)

' Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control—
These three alone lead life to sovereign power '

The ' tendance of the soul,' that it may become as good as possible—this is the *unum necessarium*, the ' lie in the soul ' the one thing to be shunned. Apart from this, no man can have lot or part in any true philosophy. To achieve such ends, a man must be brought to *know himself*, to see himself as he really is, and to recognize the imperative need of moral and intellectual wisdom—
Cf Taylor, *Plato*, chap. iii

οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει (he does not speak the truth) this emphatic assertion, as Phillipson notes (p. 283), seems to negative his association with any secret brotherhoods or sects, such as the Orphics or the Pythagoreans. Doubtless the doctrines of these esoteric sects were, more or less, current in cosmopolitan Athens, and Socrates, who cannot have been ignorant of those doctrines, may well have adopted or adapted some of their more attractive features. Similarly Paul of Tarsus must have been fairly familiar with the more striking aspects of the Mystery Religions of his time, but this does not in the least imply that he was, in any sense, an initiate. True, he borrowed (almost unconsciously) some of the familiar phraseology of these cults: indeed he could hardly avoid doing so. But too much stress should not be laid on this fact.

The reply of Socrates to his judges was parallel with that of Jesus when he declared (*John* xviii. 20) that his teaching was available for all men at all times, and that there was nothing esoteric about it. It was not till the 2nd or 3rd cent. that esoteric doctrines crept into the Church. cf Hatch, *Influence of Greek Ideas*, pp. 293-309.

CHAPTER 22

ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδὲς (a pleasant occupation) : I do not feel sure whether this is a general statement ('and indeed there is something rather attractive in watching the discomfiture of boasters') or whether it applies only to the particular persons in question.

ἐξ ἐνυπνίων (in dreams) : Socrates, if we may judge from certain references in the Platonic dialogues and elsewhere, regarded dreams or visions as significant, because through them the divine will might be revealed. (Cf. Milton, *P.L.* xii. 611, 'For God is also in sleep, and dreams advise,' and the majestic scene in Job iv. 12 *sqq.*, cf. xxxiii. 14-16.) Burnet believes that it is one of the points in which we may trace an Orphic influence. The Orphic cult in Greece was quite a century old in the days of Socrates. It was brought from Thrace, a centre of orgiastic cults, and had little in common with the orthodox national religions of Hellas. Its chief importance lay in the fact that it promoted the idea of the immortality of the soul. And it was essentially a sacramental cult. The idea of Orphism was capable of fruitful developments, but it was entangled in much foolish and indeed immoral mythology; and a good deal of its ritual was anything but elevating. Yet, notwithstanding much imperfection, the emphasis it laid upon the ethical consciousness was profoundly significant (Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, vol. i. pp. 123-134). It stood for a genuine religious revival. But it needed to be intellectualized, and this intellectualization was effected by Plato, following in the wake of Protagoras. Orphism, in its development, gave rise to a new phenomenon in Greek religion—the itinerant preachers who went about bidding men to take thought for the

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salvation of their souls, and stressing the sense of personal responsibility in so grave a matter. But, as Menzies points out (*History of Religion*), Greek religion was not thus to be reformed. Not from priests nor itinerant evangelists was the higher faith of Greece to proceed, but from the philosophers. Greek religion was rooted in humanism and rationalism. 'Otherworldliness' is not Greek, in its provenance, but Oriental, closer akin to the doctrine of the Vedanta than to that of Greek thought—See chapter v in Adam, *The Religious Teachers of Greece*, Stewart, *The Myths of Plato*, pp. 66 sqq.

θεῖα μοῖρα (divine power), here something like our 'Providence'. The phrase is important, and, though not peculiar to Plato, is frequently found there, e.g. in the *Ion*, where it is contrasted with τέχνη, the poetic craft. So in the *Meno* virtue is declared to be due to no effort on the possessor's part, but to the gift of heaven—θεῖα μοῖρα προαγγίζουμένη. Cf. *Phaedrus*, 244, and an interesting bit in the *Laws*, 642, in which we are informed by Megillus that a good Athenian is in a special degree good, because he is the only man who is genuinely good 'by the divine inspiration of his own nature' and is not manufactured (see note in England's ed.). It occurs again in Aristotle's *Ethics*, I ix 1. 'The question is raised whether happiness is secured by teaching, or habit, or some other form of training, or whether it comes by divine inspiration or even by accident'. It seems to prefigure the later Stoic identification of God and Fate. Certainly Cleanthes, in his great *Hymn*, speaks indifferently of Zeus and Destiny, but it must be admitted that the precise Stoic view is not too clearly defined in the Stoic 'creeds'.

CRITO, one of the most loyal of the friends of Socrates. It is he who gave his name to the dialogue, *The Crito*. He was

present at the death of his master, who addressed to him his last words (*Phaedo*, ad fin.)—Κρίτων, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἄλεκτρον. AESCHINES, another of the Socratic inner circle, was also with him at the end. ADEIMANTUS, Plato's brother. APOLLODORUS, one of the philosopher's most earnest admirers—he, too, was with Socrates at the last—is introduced as the narrator in the *Symposium*. PLATO himself, at this time about twenty-eight years old, was not present at the closing scene : why, is not known, though *Phaedo* suggests he was too ill to come to the prison. It is significant of his modesty that he is mentioned once only in the *Dialogues*, though his name appears twice in the *Apology*. The rest of those named here are of no special importance.

παρὰχωρῶ (I am ready to stand aside) : the time allotted to the defence was registered by the water-clock (κλεψύδρα), which was something like an old-fashioned egg-glass : see Rich, *Dict. s.v.* Socrates is quite prepared to sacrifice a portion of this allotted time to his opponents.

CHAPTER 23

Socrates has now, to all intents and purposes, closed his defence ; but he is careful to inform his judges that he has no intention of following the usual practice by making an appeal to the clemency of the Court for the sake of his family and friends. Such a course would be unworthy of himself, and an obvious device to win judgement by favour—an 'impiety,' in his estimation.

παιδία . . . ἀναβιβασόμενος (bringing his own children before you) : Xenophon (*Mem.* iv. 4, § 4) implies that such 'ad misericordiam' appeals were illegal ; but apparently this was not so, though there is a passage in Athenaeus which says that these appeals were, half a

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century or so later, made illegal because the practice had been abused in the defence of Phryne by Hypereides. This 'weeping' business in Court (cf the amusing scene at the trial in *Pickwick*) was caricatured by Aristophanes in the *Wasps* (568, 976). In the speech against Meidias Demosthenes exclaims. 'I know he will have his children in, and whine, talking very humbly, shedding tears, and making himself an object of pity' (to work on the emotion of the judges, just as might be done in French courts even to this day). Cf. also Aristoph. *Plutus*, 382-385. At the close of Lycurgus' speech against Leocrates we have these words (make an example of this man and show that) οὐ πλεον ἰσχύει παρ' ὑμῖν ἔλεος οὐδὲ δακρυα τῆς ὑπὲρ τῶν νόμων καὶ τοῦ δήμου σωτηρίας—a very proper sentiment, which may be paralleled with the conclusion of Lysias xxviii. § 11.

*Ὀμήρου = *Odys.* xix. 163 • referring to the legend that mankind originally sprang from rocks and trees. Traces of this curious belief are found among the ancient Semites (see *Jeremiab* ii. 27), as well as among savage tribes to-day: consult J. G. Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*,³ vol. 1 pp. 107 sqq. It was as natural for a Greek to quote Homer as for us to quote the Bible—even more so. Socrates frequently cites Homer • see index to Jowett's *Plato*, vol. 5.

οἱσὶς γὰρ τρεῖς (three sons)—Lampsacus, Sophroniscus and Menexenus, of whom the last was but a babe. Their mother, Xanthippe, has the unenviable reputation of having been a shrew—'mulierem admodum morosam, jurgiosam,' says John of Salisbury in the *Policraticus*, 'an arrant scold,' writes Burton in the *Anatomy of Melancholy*. But where is the evidence for this? See Bentley, *Dissertation on the Epistles of Socrates*, who contemptuously dismisses the calumny.

CHAPTER 24

ὁμώμοκεν (he has sworn) : part of the judge's oath was to give his vote without fear or favour—*ἢ μὴν ψηφιοῦμαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὧν ἂν ἡ δίωξις ᾖ, καὶ ἀκροάσομαι τῶν τε κατηγορουμένων καὶ τῶν ἀπολογουμένων ὁμοίως ἀμφοῖν*. There is an interesting passage in the *Laws*, 948, where Plato discusses the ethics of oaths. In the majority of cases he would abolish them, but adds that judges, citizens when electing magistrates, and umpires in a contest are to take the oath. See Appendix on Oaths in Kennedy's *Demosthenes*, vol. iv.

τῷ θεῷ κρίναι (God to decide) : cf. the passage—translated in Appendix I.—from Xen. *Memor.* i. iii. 2: εὐχέτο πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀπλῶς τὰγαθὰ δίδοναι, ὥς τοὺς θεοὺς κάλλιστα εἰδότας ὅποῖα ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν. The gods, said Homer, are δωτῆρες ἑάων, 'givers of all good things,' which reminds one of the hexametric line in *James* i. 17, πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ καὶ πᾶν δῶρημα τέλειον | ἄνωθέν ἐστι. Cf. Plat. *Rep.* ii. 379, for the same thought.

CHAPTER 25

Socrates has now completed his defence, and the juror-judges vote : he is found guilty by 281 votes to 220, out of a court of 501. As an indictment for impiety was reckoned by Athenian law as an ἄγων τιμητός (that is, an action where the penalty was not fixed by statute), the Court, after pronouncing sentence, was required to settle the penalty by a second vote ; but, previous to this, the actual prosecutor was himself asked to *propose* a penalty, the defendant being allowed to make a counter-proposal. Meletus demanded the death-penalty ; Socrates offered, as an alternative τίμησις, not exile (as

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perhaps his accusers rather expected), but—public maintenance for life as a public benefactor¹ To suggest a genuine counter-penalty was impossible for him, for that would be equivalent to an admission of guilt Socrates had adopted throughout his trial a 'high' tone, hardly calculated to conciliate his implacable foes, and he was ill-disposed to compromise on a matter of principle True, he made—at the urgent instance of his friends—a subsequent offer of a small money-fine, but, as Taylor points out, this was made 'with the full certainty that the Court, which had just heard Socrates' real opinion of his deserts, will reject it.' In any case, he would not ask for quarter—he intended to 'force the issue' Compromise? No! 'Compromise is too often the pact between cowardice and comfort, under the title of expediency' And that, as George Meredith said, is virtual death

χιλίας δραχμῶν (heavily fined literally 'a thousand drachmae'). in a charge of this kind, if the prosecutor failed to get a fifth of the votes, he was fined 1000 drachmae Socrates jestingly pretends that the majority had been secured by the influence of the *three* accusers (though none knew better than he that Anytus was the power behind the scenes), in that case Meletus would have secured less than 100 votes, that is well under the one-fifth legal minimum The 1000 drachmae would be paid into the Treasury, as the object of the rule was to discourage frivolous actions being brought into Court It may be observed that there was no Court of Appeal at Athens

CHAPTER 26

¹ Suppose that you are reading the Defence of Socrates in Plato, and have the whole scene before you as in a

picture : the tribunal of the Five Hundred, the pure Greek architecture, the interested Athenian public, the odious Meletus, the envious enemies, the beloved and grieving friends whose names are dear to us, and immortal ; and in the centre you see one figure draped like a poor man, in cheap and common cloth that he wears winter and summer, with a face plain to downright ugliness, but an air of such genuine courage and self-possession that no acting could imitate it ; and you hear the firm voice saying τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ἄνθρωπος θανάτου. εἶεν. You are just beginning the splendid paragraph where Socrates condemns himself to maintenance in the Prytaneum ; and, if you can only be safe from interruption till it is finished, you will have one of those minutes of noble pleasure which are the rewards of intellectual toil ' (P. G. Hamerton, *The Intellectual Life*).

παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι (to pay in person or in purse) : this was the regular legal formula.

ξυνομοσιῶν (clubs) : political clubs and cabals were rife in Athens both during and after the Peloponnesian war, ' to control trials and offices,' writes Thucydides, viii. 54. Similar clubs existed in Rome under the name of *factiones*, *sodalitates*, which, though originally social or religious gatherings, soon took on a political tinge. Under the guidance of tiresome and discontented men, these might easily be used as centres of agitation—like our modern Trades Unions. Combinations of most kinds were frowned upon under the Roman Empire.

Mark the noble insistence of Socrates on the method of the True Life, which is not to seek after 'honours,' but to love honour, to toil not for self but for others ; in Milton's words :

' To scorn delights and live laborious days.'

εὐεργέτη (benefactor) : no official distinction is signified

ἐν Πρυτανείῳ (Guildhall) the Prytaneum—distinct from the 'Rotunda'—was on the N slope of the Acropolis. Those whom the State delighted to honour (foreign ambassadors, public benefactors, and a chosen few) were entertained here. It was the domestic hearth of the city (ἑστία τῆς πόλεως), and was adorned with statues of Peace and of Hestia, the goddess of the 'hearth' and counterpart of the Roman Vesta. A light was constantly kept burning in the Prytaneum (πῦρ ἄσβεστον, Plutarch, *Numa*, 9), and was tended by elderly widows. Lucian, in his dialogue *Prometheus*, makes the luckless sufferer declare that the benefits he had conferred on mankind would have been more aptly recompensed by οἰτησις ἐν Πρυτανείῳ than by the vulture and the Caucasus (cf. Rogers on Aristoph. *Pax*, 1084). The Prytaneum of a Greek capital was its *Hôtel de Ville*, or Town-hall. see Frazer's n. on *Pausanias*, vol. II. pp. 170-172. Cicero, *de Oratore*, I. 232, refers to this passage of the *Apology* thus: (when Socrates was asked what penalty at most he admitted that he deserved, his reply was) 'sese meruisse ut amplissimus honoribus et praemiis decoraretur, et ut ei victus cotidianus in Prytaneo publice praeberetur, qui honos apud Graecos maximus habetur. Cujus responso iudices sic exarserunt ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condemnarent.' Socrates scarcely imagined that his proposal would be taken seriously—he is whimsical even at this crisis.

δοκεῖν εἶναι (apparent genuine) the audience would at once catch the reference, which is to a well-known line in the *Septem contra Thebas* of Aeschylus (592)—οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ὄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θελεῖ (referred to twice elsewhere in Plato *Rep.* 361 and 362). Cf. *Gorgias*, 527. ἀνδρὶ μελετήτεον οὐ το δοκεῖν εἶναι

ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. Cf. also Sallust, *Cat.* 54 : 'esse quam videri.'

'This contrast (says F. C. Doherty), between appearance and reality, contains the germ of Socrates' view that the ultimate realities of life lie in the realm of thought, and that the concrete phenomena of experience are merely reflections of them. This, in brief, is his *theory of Ideas*, which was afterwards developed by Plato.' The Ideal object, in Plato, has three characteristics : it is eternal and changeless ; it is absolute, or free from relativity ; it is self-existent. In the 'ideal theory' we are given a conception, clearly and unreservedly, of immaterial existence. This was a great advance on all previous thinking among Greek philosophers, and the doctrine has profoundly influenced all subsequent philosophy. It is right to point out that the Indian Vedanta offers many parallels to the idealism of Plato (cf. Monier-Williams, *Indian Wisdom*,³ chap. vi.). This idealism was no mere picture-thinking ; the transcendental Ideas are the contents of God's creative intelligence, the final causes of the world, and the inspiration of our thoughts (Inge, *Plotinus*,³ vol. i. p. 76 ; Pater, *Plato and Platonism*, chap. vii.).

Ὀλυμπίασιν (Olympia) : the point is that, at Athens, the Olympic victor had the right to live, at the public expense, in the Prytaneum. The most brilliant of all the contests at the celebrated festival was the chariot-race ; competitors made use of four-in-hands (ζεῦγος), pairs of horses (ξυνωρίς), and singles (ἵππος=κέλης)—the jockey-race. The first chronicled festival took place in 776 B.C., and continued for some time after the Christian era. Theodosius I. prohibited the festival in A.D. 394, on the ground, no doubt, that it was a survival of Paganism. A characteristic piece of intolerance : *tantum religio* ! The number of the Olympiads was utilized as a basis

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for dating Greek history I find, in the *Chronicon* of Africanus, it roundly stated that μέχρι τῶν Ὀλυμπιάδων οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς ἱστόρηται τοῖς Ἑλλησιν, πάντων συγκεχυμένων

CHAPTER 27

καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις (as it is elsewhere) at Sparta, for example Hardly a tactful remark on the part of Socrates at a critical moment like this

τοῖς ἑνδεκά the board of police consisted of ten commissioners, with a clerk (γραμματεὺς) these eleven had charge of the prisons as of the carrying out of a death-sentence

φιλοψυχία (love of life), in the unworthy sense = cowardice

διατριβας (discourses) • the word διατριβή may refer not only to the place where time is spent (e.g. a school of philosophy), but to the way it is spent. Hence often = *pastime, occupation*, and so forth For the technical sense of a 'school,' cf. Clem Alex *Strom* vii. 889 'They [the Sophists] glory in presiding over a school rather than a church' (διατριβῆς μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκκλησίας), and so, too, in Isocr *Panath* 237 τοὺς ἐσχηκότας τῆς ἐμῆς διατριβῆς (my school of rhetoric) Again, it may signify 'loss' or 'waste' of time, as in Isocr *Panegy* 164 δεῖ σπευδεῖν καὶ μηδεμίαν ποιεῖσθαι διατριβήν (we must make haste and not dally) For the meaning 'haunts,' cf. in the *Euthyphro*, ἐν Λυκείῳ καταλιπὼν διατριβας and in the *Charmides*, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ξυνήθεις διατριβάς (I was going to my usual haunts) For the word as used here in the *Apology* (=philosophic discourse), see Plut *Demosth* xxviii. 3 (Demetrius asserts that he) τῆς Ἀναξιμενους διατριβῆς μετεσχηκέναι

οἱ τούτων πατέρες (their fathers) : it is not very likely that Socrates would have been tolerated in foreign cities. Cf. the *Meno*, 80 : (I think you have done wisely not to travel abroad) εἰ γὰρ ξένος ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει τοιαῦτα ποιοῖς, τάχ' ἂν ὥς γόης ἀπαχθῇς (you would be arrested, if you did, as a wizard).

CHAPTER 28

εἰρωνευόμενῳ (guilty of affectation) : in the *Republic*, 337, Thrasymachus refers caustically to the well-known 'irony' of Socrates, which consisted in what looked superficially like deliberate understatement of the truth, evasion, mock-modesty and delicate self-depreciation (in saying, for example, he did not know things which everybody knew that he knew). Instances of this irony abound (e.g. *Symposium*, 216; *Theaetetus*, 150; Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, iv. iv. 9 ; and compare what Cicero says in the *de Officiis*, i. § 109). There is a passage in the *Ethics* of Aristotle (iv. 11) which throws some light on the subject. 'Ironical people, in depreciating themselves, manifest a certain grace of character ; for they do not speak thus to win gain, but to avoid pomposity. They are particularly apt to disclaim creditable qualities, as did Socrates. But those who make pretence in things petty and obvious are called humbugs, and are justly despised.' Grant (in his ed. of *Arist. Eth.*⁴ vol. i. 157) remarks that the Socratic irony may be viewed under several aspects. It has (1) a relative significance, being used to counter imposture and presumption (ἄλαζονεία) ; (2) it is part of good breeding, which by deference holds its own ; (3) it is a point of style, a means of avoiding dogmatism ; (4) it is a controversial device, to induce an adversary to expose the weakness of his own position ; and (5) it is humorous, 'the humour being used to

expose a contrast between the conscious strength of the wise man and the humility of his pretensions' But the habitual use of εἰρωνεία by Socrates was construed as contempt, and this contributed to his unpopularity. People not only got tired of his uniform profession of ignorance, but angry, believing him to be amusing himself, at their expense, with clever paradox. Theophrastus (*Characters*, 1=v Jebb) defines εἰρωνεία roughly as προσποίησις ἐπὶ χεῖρον πράξεων καὶ λόγων, 'an affectation of the worse in word or deed', but the 'ironical man' of Theophrastus is poles apart from Socrates, though pretended ignorance is a point in common. Nettleship (*Lectures on Plato's Republic*) says "The irony of Socrates was not a mere grace of manner in social behaviour, still less was it affectation or mock humility, it arose in him from a genuine sense of the inexhaustibility of knowledge. We may compare his expressions of it with the question in the Gospels, 'Why callest thou me good?' "*.

ανεξέταστος βίος (unexamined life) - that is, a life without those discussions in which the intellect is exercised in the quest for truth. The 'interrogatory discipline' which Socrates so firmly believed in was based on the great Delphic aphorism γνῶθι σεαυτόν (see Appendix IV). Current opinions were—and are—founded on imperfect observation, and grounded in conventionality. 'Socrates (says Riddell) sought to reconstruct human opinion on a basis of reasoned truth'. This comes out again and again in the *Memorabilia*. The first requirements for every true thinker are reflection and

* I doubt the appropriateness of this quotation from *Mark x* (= *Luke xviii*). The question put by Jesus to the rich young ruler was not in irony, but in rebuke. In *Matthew xix*, the words assume another form altogether.

investigation, for, according to Socrates, Virtue is Knowledge. It is because most men are blind, it is because 'they know not what they do' that they err from the strait path ; awake them to *think*, and we shall have laid the foundation for their moral regeneration. That is why the first step is to make men conscious of their own ignorance, and their limitations. Socrates does not bid men merely rebel against authority, but he finds the source and sanction of all authority not without, but within, in the reason and reflection of the individual. This is to Socrates 'the one thing needful,' the first principle of ethics (from Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vol. i. 68-71).—For the word ἀνεξέταστος cf. Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.* i. 3 : 'It is not true, as some assert, that Christianity is without support in reason, but that those who desire to be called Christians strengthen their opinion by an unnecessary faith and an assent without examination' (ἀλόγῳ πίστει καὶ ἀνεξετάστῳ συγκαταθέσει).

οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην (done me no hurt) : no payment of a fine could make a man worse ; and to make him worse is the only real injury that could be done him.

μνᾶν ἀργυρίου : I have translated this 'five pounds,' but this is not, of course, strictly correct : in modern currency a mina would be worth considerably more (cf. n. on chap. 4). The mina, by the way, was not a coin, but a sum of money (cf. our 'guinea').

CHAPTER 29

WAS this address to the Court, subsequent to the verdict, actually made ? The late Prof. J. B. Bury (*Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. v. 392) thinks not. In that case this whole episode, at once so dignified and so deeply

moving, must be an addition imagined by Plato. The contention is that permission would not have been granted to Socrates for any third speech. But why not? Xenophon, a good witness, makes Socrates deliver an address after his condemnation; and this fact must be given due weight even if the *Apologia* of Xenophon is not a genuine document. It is clearly more or less contemporaneous. Again, if this whole Epilogue was an invention of Plato's, how comes it that no mention of the fact is made by later writers—Aristotle, for example, or one of the orators, or Plutarch? Granted that the courts were not accustomed to allow a prisoner to speak after condemnation, they might very well make an exception in the case of a man so celebrated as Socrates. Piqued curiosity alone might easily have brought this about. That this third speech was worked up by Plato into its present artistic form, is conceivable enough, but that the substance of it is Socrates' own I do not for a moment doubt. The whole piece vibrates with the Socratic 'note,' just as the words uttered in the presence of Pilate, as recorded in John's gospel, have the inimitable 'note' of Jesus himself.

ἀττορία μὲν ἐάλωκα (I have been defeated). we may compare the words of Socrates in the *Gorgias*, 522 εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδείξ τελευτωῶν ἔγωγε, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἴδοις ἂν με φέροντα τον θάνατον (were it for lack of flattering rhetoric that I should meet my death, certainly you would see me facing it with equanimity). And he goes on 'Death itself no one but a fool or a coward fears. what a man really fears is wrong-doing; for to descend to the grave with a sin-laden soul is the supreme evil.' Cf. above, p. 136.

ἀλλ' οὐτε τότε (my duty then), viz. at the close of the defence.

θᾶπτον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ (flies faster than death) : the chances of escape from death are many, but between sin and its consequences there are none—on the principle enunciated in *Gorgias*, 509, μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀδικία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι.

καὶ νῦν . . . ἄπειμι (I go my way) : observe the solemnity of the opening καί, and compare R.V. *Acts* xx. 25, 'And now, behold, I know that ye all . . . shall see my face no more'; Byron, *Elegy on Thyrza* :

'And thou art dead, as young and fair
As aught of mortal birth.'

The colourless link-word suddenly becomes invested with a subtle significance.

CHAPTER 30

χρησμοδοῦσιν (see visions) : commentators quote the prophecy of the dying Patroclus (*Hom. Iliad*, xvi. 851) and of Hector (*ib.* xxii. 358). In the *Phaedo* Socrates tells his friends that swans sing before they die, not because they lament their death, but because, as Apollo's sacred birds, they look forward to the good life that is to come. One of the Greek commentators on Homer writes thus : 'There is an ancient belief that the soul, when about to leave the body, and within hail of the new life, is gifted with some prophetic sense,' which reminds one of Cicero's words in the *de Divinatione*, i. § 64 : 'facilius evenit, appropinquante morte, ut animi futura augurentur,' and just before 'appropinquante morte [animus] multo est diviniior.' There is an example of such χρησμοδία in the O.T. (*Genesis* xlix.), where Jacob on his death-bed foretells the future of his descendants. Cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* viii. 7, § 21 : ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ τότε δήπου θειοτάτῃ καταφαίνεται καὶ τότε τι τῶν

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μελλόντων προορᾷ (i.e. has some foresight into futurity)
There are several parallels in Shakespeare for example,
Rich II Act II.

‘O but they say the tongues of dying men
Enforce attention, like deep harmony’,

Merch of V I II :

‘Holy men, at their death, have good inspirations’,
Hamlet, v II (Hamlet to Horatio)

‘But I do prophesy the election lights
On Fortinbras he has my dying voice’

ἀποκτείνοντες ἐπισχῆσειν (by executing you will prevent) the melancholy history of religious persecution, all through the ages, affords ample proof of this impressive warning

CHAPTER 31

ὧ ἄνδρες δίκασται hitherto the form of address has been
ὧ ἄνδρες (‘Ἀθηναῖοι’) The true judges are now to be
differentiated from the false

ἐπὶ σμικροῖς (in trivial matters) cf. what Socrates says in
the *Euthydemus*, 272 ‘By a lucky accident I was sitting
alone in the Lyceum where you saw me, and was just
going my way, when at that moment ἐγένετο το εἰωθὸς
σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον So I sat down again.’ There is
also an apt parallel in the *Phaedrus*, 242 ‘Just as I was
about to cross the stream, I became aware of the custom-
ary divine sign—which invariably deters me from doing
what I propose to do—and I thought I heard a voice
(φωνὴν τινὰ) from this very spot, forbidding me to leave
till I had purified myself (πρὶν ἂν ἀφοσιωσωμαι), as
though I had sinned against heaven (εἰς τὸ θεῖον)’
This passage is enough to prove that the δαιμόνιον of
Socrates was a thing, not a person

ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ (on my way here) : this passage is translated by Cicero in the *de Divinatione*, i. § 124.

ἀγαθὸν πράξειν (fare well) : Xen. *Memor.* iv. 8, which I may paraphrase thus :—Socrates was ‘felix opportunitate mortis’ in that, first, he was already so advanced in years that, in any case, death could not be far off ; in the next place, he relinquished only the burdensome part of life, when powers of mind and body decay ; and, thirdly, he won immortal fame by his constancy, his courage, his love of truth and justice, and by his noble resignation. How could anyone have died better ?

If his death was such as the gods love, then his δαιμόνιον had done him no wrong in suffering him to meet that death.

CHAPTER 32

‘ In the impressive words of encouragement to his supporters the important thing to note is that Socrates makes his own belief in a blessed life to come for the good perfectly clear. In this respect the *Apology* agrees completely with the *Phaedo*, when we allow for the fact that, in the former, Socrates is speaking to a large audience, most of whom would not share his personal faith’ (A. E. Taylor, *Plato*, p. 167). All this is profoundly true : the only surprising thing is that anyone could doubt it.

This celebrated chapter has been frequently quoted or paraphrased. Cicero translates it in the first book of the *Tusculan Disputations* ; Plutarch refers to it ; Eusebius gives it almost complete in his *Praeparatio Evangelica* (661 sq.). Socrates, in those closing words of his, touches a height never perhaps reached before in Greece. One is more than once reminded of the grave and measured words of Lucretius in his third book ; but the hope that supported the old Athenian philosopher

was denied to the Roman poet. The average Greek, when he meditated on the mystery of the future life, would have whispered to himself the pathetic words of Euripides (in the *Hippolytus*), thus exquisitely rendered by Prof Murray

‘ But if any far-off state there be,
 Dearer than life to mortality,
 The hand of the Dark hath hold thereof,
 And mist is under and mist above
 And so we are sick for life, and cling
 On earth to this nameless and shining thing ;
 For other life is a fountain sealed,
 And the deeps below us are unrevealed,
 And we drift on legends for ever ’

There is a noble commentary on this attitude of the wistful and enquiring spirit in Browning's *Gerard de Lairese* (in ‘ Parleyings with Certain People of Importance ’), §§ 14, 15 ‘ Sad school was Hades,’ indeed !

πολλῇ ἐλπίς (strong reasons) the word ἐλπίς here is more than *hope* it implies confidence as well (το θαρρεῖν εὐελπίδος, as Aristotle puts it in the third book of the *Ethics*) so later on we have εὐελπίδος εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον In the *Phædo*, 63, we have these words of the dying Socrates ‘ Death brings me no grief, I am confident (εὐελπίς εἰμι) that the dead live, and that—as it has been said of old—it is an existence far better for the good than for the wicked ’ The righteous, we read in the book of *Wisdom*, ‘ have a full assurance (πληροφορία) of hope even to the end ’—words taken up by the unknown author of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* (vi 11) Now it is an ‘ assurance ’ like this that enables Socrates to face the poison-cup, not a mere ‘ hope ’ of immortality, for a man might indeed be immortal, leaving this

world only to find himself in a worse one. 'Socrates (says Prof. A. E. Taylor), like all great religious teachers, rests his hope for the unseen future on the goodness of God, not on the natural imperishability of the human soul.' It may not be out of place to remark here that Christianity does not primarily insist on the *immortality* of the soul, but on its *redemption* from evil; and I suspect that the words of Paul (2 *Timothy* i. 10), generally rendered 'Christ brought life and immortality to light through the gospel,' should be translated 'illuminated—shed a new light on—life and incorruption.'—For ἐλπίς = 'faith' we may compare Pindar, *frag.* 253; (the righteous man) 'possesses a comforting faith (γλυκεῖα ἐλπίς) as his companion to cheer his heart, and to tend his old age—a faith which, above all else, guides the wayward thoughts of mortals'; Aesch. *Agam.* 103: ἀγανὰ φαίνουσα ἐλπίς ἀμύνει φροντίδα (faith with her gracious beam keeps far all anxious fears); Eurip. *Hippol.* 1107 sq.: 'Surely the consolations of heaven, when they touch the soul, have balm to heal our sorrows; yet, while I cling to a secret faith in the divine wisdom (ξύνεσιν τιν' ἐλπίδι κεύθων), my spirit faints within me when I behold what deeds are matched with what fortunes!' Possibly, as Burnet suggests, the meaning 'faith' for ἐλπίς is of Orphic descent.

δυοῖν . . . θάτερον (one of two things): cf. Marc. Aurel. vii. 32: 'Death is either extinction (σβέσις) or transmutation (μετάστασις).' In Plutarch (*consol. ad Apoll.*): παραπλησίον ἐστι τὸν θάνατον ἥτοι τῷ βραδυτέρῳ ὕπνῳ ἢ ἀποδημίᾳ, μακρῶ καὶ πολυχρονίῳ, ἢ τρίτον φθορᾶ τινι καὶ ἀφανισμῷ τοῦ τε σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς· κατ' οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων κακὸν ἐστίν. Seneca, *de providentia*, 6: 'contemnite mortem quae vos aut finit aut transfert'; *ib. ep.* 65: 'mors quid est? aut finis aut transitus.' Cicero, *ad fam.* v. 16: 'saepissime et

legi et audiri nihil mali esse in morte, in qua si resideat sensus, immortalitas illa potius quam mors ducenda sit, sin sit amissus, nulla videri miseria debeat quae non sentiatur' Lucan, iii 39 'aut nihil est sensus animis a morte relictum, | aut mors ipsa nihil'

οἷον μηδεν (a complete cessation) it is doubtful if the average Greek had any decided conviction on immortality the normal man was either ignorant of such a thing as personal immortality, or looked upon it as a bare existence, without active pain but without joy—a shadow life in a realm of shadows Till the return from the Exile, Israel seems to have been in a like condition of uncertainty it was the Exile that proved the great turning-point in the belief in immortality It appears that Socrates, because of his real conviction on this matter, was introducing a new element into the thought of his fellow-countrymen Probably they would have dismissed the whole problem in the uncompromising words of Anaxandrides 'We are all dullards in divinity, we know nothing' The Mysteries of Demeter* at Eleusis did hold out the promise of a better lot in another world, and therefore of a better hope in this Yet this hope was granted to initiates only, as we see from the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter*, 480-482, beginning ὀλβιος ὃς τὰδ' ὅπωπεν (viz these mysteries) κ τ λ, which is very similar to the well-known fragment of Pindar (137), who, influenced by Orphic teaching, certainly believed in a life beyond the grave An inscription found in 1883 at Eleusis contains these words ἡ καλον εκ μακαρων μυστήριον, ου μονον ειναι τον θανατον θνητοις ου κακον αλλ' αγαθον (cf Paul's

* For modern survivals of the old Demeter cult, consult Lawson, *Modern Folk-Lore in Ancient Greek Religion*, pp 78-98

words in 1 Cor. xv. 51 : ἰδοὺ μυστήριον ὑμῖν λέγω· πάντες οὐ κοιμηθησόμεθα πάντες δὲ ἀλλαγησόμεθα). Socrates was himself, in all probability, not uninfluenced by the spiritual side of Orphism, though he certainly would have repudiated much of the Orphic scheme—its superstitions, its extravagant eschatology, and its degrading ritual. In the *Republic*, 364, complaint is made of the ill-effects on the young of the Orphic fancy that man can be ceremonialized into redemption. There were helpful ideas in Orphism, but they needed to be intellectualized, if they were to prove of any service to humanity ; this was achieved (as has been indicated previously) by the example of Socrates and the teaching of Plato. If the method of Socrates began in scepticism, the end in view was to re-establish the foundations of *real* knowledge. Socrates—in one respect—resembled Origen : he was more anxious to uproot long-standing prejudices, and to dissipate the confusions of popular opinion and an unscientific theology than merely to communicate facts *qua* facts. The first and last axiom of his philosophy was this—the supremacy of truth, be the consequences what they might be.

The reader will remark the word μετοίκησις (=change of abode) which occurs in the *Phaedo* in a similar connection : (I pray) ‘that my journey hence (τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθάδε) may be prosperous.’ The word does not occur in the N.T., but we have, by way of substitute, ἀνάλυσις (=discessio e vita) in 2 *Tim.* iv. 6 : ‘The hour for my departure is at hand.’ “Non enim hic habemus manentem civitatem sed futuram inquirimus.”

κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω (I count it a gain) : so Paul, ‘To me life is Christ (‘quicquid vivo, Christum vivo,’ Bengel) and death gain’—κέρδος, the very word employed by Socrates.

οἶον ἀποδηῆσαι (taking a journey) . not exile, but a journey into some hitherto untravelled region, as in *Phaedo*, 67 ἡ ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη μετ' ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται—again the word ἐλπίς Compare Prudentius, *Cathemerinon*, x.

' nam quod requiescere corpus
vacuom sine mente videmus,
spatium breve restat ut alu
repetat collegia sensus '

(i.e. the inanimate body is destined to seek again the partnership of the heavenly intelligence);
and Longfellow, *Resignation*

' There is no death ! What seems so is transition
This life of mortal breath
Is but a suburb of the life Elysian
Whose portal we call Death '

ἀπαντες οἱ τεθνεώτες (all the dead) the word 'all' is important Socrates, unlike the Orphists (see previous note), had no belief in immortality for a chosen few

MINOS, RHADAMANTHUS, AEACUS, TRIPTOLEMUS The first three of these are named as judges of the dead in the myth in the *Gorgias*, 523 (on which consult the commentary in Stewart's *Myths of Plato*), compare the references in Justin *M. Apol* 1 8, Cic *Tusc* 1 41, Tertull *Apol* 23 (but Aeacus is not named in the Justin or Tertullian passages) All four were connected with the mystery-cult of their native places, the Attic hero, Triptolemus (mentioned here only as a judge in Hades), was closely connected with Eleusis, centre of the worship of Demeter, the earth-goddess, whose agent he became Compare Rabelais, *Pantagruel*, iii chap 50. 'Lyncus attempted treacherously to slay the young Triptolemus, who was sent by Ceres [=Demeter] to show to mankind wheat,

then unknown, that by dying he might give it his own name and might, to his undying glory and honour, be named the discoverer of that grain, so necessary to the life of man'; Burton, *Anat. of Melanch.* iii. 4: 'Twas for a politick end, and to this purpose the old poets feigned those Elysian fields, their Aeacus, Minos, and Rhadamanthus, their infernal judges, and those Stygian lakes.' To Triptolemus legend ascribed three commandments: that men should honour their parents, offer to the gods the fruit of the earth, and to be gentle to animals—that is, to abstain from flesh. Cf. Jerome, *contra Jovinianum*, ii. 14; Frazer, *The Golden Bough*³ ('Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild,' chap. ii.), and Pater's essay on the *Myth of Demeter and Persephone*. For Rhadamanthus, see Virg. *Aen.* vi. 566-9 (in Billson's version):

'Here Rhadamanthus reigns with iron sway
And chastens fraud, and hears and makes confess
Their poor fond secrets who on earth put off
Till death's late hour their unrepented sin.'

For Triptolemus, Ovid, *Metam.* v. 652:

'Patria est clarae mihi, dixit, Athenae;
Triptolemus nomen.
Dona fero Cereris, latos quae sparsa per agros
Frugiferas messes alimentaque mitia reddant.'

For Minos, the Cretan lawgiver, who derived his laws from Zeus and went every ninth year to converse with his heavenly sire, see the opening passage of the *Laws*; Virgil, *Aen.* vi. 432:

'Quaesitor Minos urnam movet; ille silentum
Conciliumque vocat vitasque et crimina discit';
and a fragment from Oenomaus (quoted by Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.* 209): 'Minos was then lord of the sea, and a mighty man, and all Greece did him homage; and he loved justice and was a good lawgiver, so that

he seemed to be—in Homer's words [*Odys* xix. 179]—
 'frequent in converse with Zeus,' and after death he
 became a judge in Hades' Dante makes him fulfil
 the same function as is assigned by Virgil, but, oddly
 enough, transfers him into a demon (*Inferno*, cant v)—
 doubtless owing to the fact that medieval theologians,
 like the ancient Fathers of the Church, held that the
 heathen gods were devils

ORPHEUS and MUSAEUS, the great mythical poets of Greece,
 they were, as benefactors to man, constantly associated
 together, like HOMER and HESIOD Cf Milton, *Il*
Penseroso

'But O, sad Virgin' that thy power
 Might raise Musaeus from his bower,
 Or bid the soul of Orpheus sing'

All four poets are mentioned in Plat. *Protag* 316, and in
 Aristoph *Frogs*, 1032-6 The last-mentioned passage is
 thus rendered by Rogers

'First, Orpheus taught you religious rites, and from
 bloody murder to stay your hands
 Musaeus healing and oracle lore, and Hesiod all the
 culture of lands,
 The time to gather, the time to plough And gat not
 Homer his glory divine
 By singing of valour and honour and right, and the
 sheen of the battle-extended line'

The institution of Orphic rites and institutions was
 commonly attributed to Orpheus, cf Demosthenes, I
Aristogiton, 11 In the days of Socrates there were oracles
 (χρησμοί) assigned to Musaeus, as we learn from
 Herodotus, vii 6, ix 43 Aristotle once at least alludes to
 the Orphic poems, but doubts their authenticity (τα
 κολουμένα Ὀρφέως ἔπη) Pausanias (i xxii 7) thinks
 that the only authentic work of Musaeus is a hymn to

Demeter. Plato inveighs against the 'host of books by Orpheus and Musaeus,' in *Republic*, 364, criticizing adversely their doctrine of ritual forgiveness of sins. It may be that these books were (like the Egyptian *Book of the Dead*) manuals for the use of the departed. Nor is it improbable that the Voyage of Odysseus to Hades, in the eleventh *Odyssey*, was actually inspired by Orphic teachings, especially if (as Wilamowitz-Möllendorf conjectures) the passage was a late insertion. The question may naturally be asked: Why does Socrates introduce these famous names here? Burnet ingeniously suggests that he was addressing himself to those dicasts in Court who had come under the influence of Orphic ideas.

PALAMEDES was a hero of the Trojan war, who perished through the treachery of Odysseus. The story has been popularized by Virgil, *Aen.* ii. 82. In the *Memorabilia* (iv. ii. 33) Socrates is made to say that it was on account of his wisdom (διὰ τὴν σοφίαν) that Palamedes incurred the enmity of Odysseus. The three great tragedians—Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides—all wrote tragedies on the luckless hero, who was a favourite subject of declamation with the Sophists.

AJAX committed suicide because, as he thought, he had received a deadly wrong through the unjust decision of the umpires in the Award of the Arms. The story of Ajax's death is given by Sophocles in his play, though the Award itself was not dramatized by him. The story of the Award is given at length in Ovid, *Metam.* xiii. 1-398. In his speech in the seventeenth *Iliad* Ajax utters a prayer the echo of which has come down through the centuries—ἐν δὲ φάει καὶ ὀλεσσον, 'Slay me, but in the light.'

SISYPHUS, like Odysseus, was a master of craft and guile. Homer speaks of him as the 'cunningest' (κέρδιστος) of

men,' but does not tell us why he was punished in the other world, where he was doomed to roll a huge stone to the top of a hill, only to see it roll back again, when he had to begin his task afresh (cf Apollodorus, 1 ix. 3, with Frazer's note) Longfellow, *Masque of Pandora*

' With useless endeavour
For ever, for ever,
Is Sisyphus rolling
His stone up the mountain '

He was classed among ' incurable sinners ' (οἱ ἀνιάτως ἔχοντες Plato, *Phaed* 113) whose punishments are useful as deterrents or warnings (παραδείγματα) to others

ευδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν (are happier than we) Compare for the sentiment, Soph *O C* 955, *Electr* 1170, *Trachin* 1173, Eurip *Alc* 937, *Troad* 606, 638 and 641-2, Xen. *Cyrop* viii 7, 27 (of the dying Cyrus) ἐν τῷ ασφαλεῖ ἤδη ἔσομαι ὥς μηδὲν ἂν ἔτι κακὸν παθεῖν, Plato, *Phaed* 114 (towards the end of Socrates' final discourse) τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφία ἱκανῶς καθηραμένοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παραπαν εἰς τον ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἔτι τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦνται (' those who have purified themselves with philosophy live henceforward free from the trammels of the body, and come to mansions still fairer ' than any earthly tabernacle)

CHAPTER 33

ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν (no evil can befall a good man) So in the *Republic*, 613, we have almost precisely the same thought ' In the case of the just man we must assume, whether in poverty or sickness or any supposed evil, that all things work together for good, this is true of this

life as of the life beyond. For, certainly, whoever earnestly desires to become just, and who strives, by the practice of virtue, to mould himself into the divine likeness (ὁμοιοῦσθαι τῷ θεῷ)—as far as man can so do—will never be disregarded by the gods,' however much he may be neglected by his fellowmen. Cf. the words of the *Theaetetus*, 176, 'To be made like God is to become holy and righteous and wise,' and Paul's asseveration in the *Romans* (viii. 28), 'We know that all things work together for good (συνεργεῖ εἰς ἀγαθόν) to them that love God.' *Wisdom* iii. 1, 'The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God'; *John* x. 28, 'Neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand.'—ὁμοιώσις, i.e. moral assimilation to the divine goodness, implied in the words of the *Phaedrus*, 253, καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν. Cf. Dionysius the Areopagite (*de. eccl. hier.* i. 3): 'To be made divine (ἡ θέωσις) is to become like God, as far as may be, and to be made one with Him.' To Plato, God was the source of eternal Ideas; above all, of the idea of τὸ καλόν. And the noblest minds, ever since, have been inspired with that thought; their sense of the beautiful and their desire to become like the unseen Ideal have enabled them to live the divine life, even amid the mists and storms of this present existence. But it must needs be otherwise for the bulk of mankind: conceptions of abstract beauty, though they may thrill the philosopher, leave the ordinary man untouched. There is a fine passage in Eusebius (*Praep. Evangel.* iii. 13) where he calls on teachers and preachers alike to worship God, not by sacrifice and vain oblations, but in purity of intention, 'and with a soul free from passion, and by growing as far as possible like Him' (ἐν ἀπαθείᾳ ψυχῆς καὶ τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁμοιώσει—surely an echo of Plato). Again,

the same thought is stressed by Porphyry in his beautiful *Letter to Marcella*. 'You honour God best when you make your mind like God' The following striking words from the deacon Agapetus to the Emperor Justinian deserve to be quoted, they are prefixed as a text to one of the Discourses of John Smith, the 17th century Cambridge Platonist. ὁ ἑαυτὸν γνούς γνωσεται θεόν θεὸν δὲ ὁ γνούς ὁμοιωθήσεται θεῷ ὁμοιωθήσεται δὲ θεῷ ὁ ἄξιος γενομενος θεοῦ ἄξιος δὲ γίνεται θεοῦ ὁ μηδὲν ἀνάξιον πράττων θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ φρονῶν μὲν τὰ αὐτοῦ, λαλῶν δὲ ἅ φρονεῖ, ποιῶν δὲ ἅ λαλεῖ The true lover of knowledge, says Socrates in the *Republic*, 490, 'having approached and held communion with that which verily exists (τῷ ὄντως ὄντι) begets wisdom and truth, and only then enjoys true life, and is freed from his travail-pangs'

ἀπηλλαγθῆαι πραγμάτων (free from trouble), i.e. the wants and hardships of old age (Riddell) Cf Milton's *Sonnet*

'thou didst resign this earthly load
Of death, called life.'

Revel xiv 23, ἵνα ἀναπαυσωνται ἐκ τῶν κόπων (that they may rest from their labours) When Socrates was about to drink the hemlock, he did not encourage his friends to mourn for him He might well have anticipated the words of Antiphanes 'Let us not mourn overmuch for our dear ones they are not dead; they have gone before us on a road that all must travel Some day we shall reach the same inn, to spend the rest of our existence in their company'

τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες (something when they are nothing) compare *Galatians* ii. 6, τῶν δοκούντων εἶναι τι, and vi. 3, εἰ γὰρ δοκεῖ τις εἶναι τι μηδὲν ὢν, φρεναπατᾷ ἑαυτὸν So in Latin *aliquis*, e.g. Juvenal, l. 74, 'si vis

esse aliquis' (*v.l.* aliquid) : cf. Theocr. xi. 79, κήγών τις φαίνομαι εἶναι (so Fritsche : *v.l.* ἡμεν).

πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ (to God alone) : these concluding words are thus translated by Cicero in the *Tusculans*, i. 99 : 'sed tempus est jam hinc abire, me, ut moriar ; vos, ut vitam agatis. utrum autem sit melius di immortales sciunt : hominem quidem scire arbitror neminem.' The diapason note on which this noble speech closes is almost unequalled, in all Greek literature, for its mingled pathos and dignity. We can, even now, all but feel the solemn hush that must have fallen on the crowded Court as Socrates bade his friends this quiet last farewell.*

* In English, the word God—when used seriously—suggests attributes (*e.g.* justice, love, omnipotence) that θεός does not of itself imply. Our word is 'too stiff, too personal, and too anthropomorphic' (G. Murray, *Five Stages*). Plato will speak of 'God' or 'the gods' indifferently, as indeed he does in this chapter—ὕπὸ θεῶν, but πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ. In Greek the essential attribute of θεός appears to be freedom from decay, *immortality*,—though this word has no necessary connection with what we understand by 'personality,' for which Greek has no one term. Aeschylus can define 'success' as a god, τὸ δ' εὐτυχεῖν, τὸ δ' ἐν βροτοῖς θεός : and Euripides (in a *frag.*) writes, ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἐν ἐκάστῳ θεός, the word expressing some indwelling and divine virtue. Cf. Menander : τὸ κρατοῦν γὰρ πᾶν νομίζεται θεός. Plato, *Laws*, 775, ἀρχὴ καὶ θεός ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἰδρυμένη σώζει πάντα ('for Beginning, established as a very god among men, preserves all things'). Cf. also Virgil, *Aen.* ix. 185 : 'an sua cuique deus fit dira cupido ?' We must not, then, as Burnet shows (*Early Greek Philosophy*,³ p. 14), be misled by the use of θεός by early Ionian philosophers, who employ the word without any religious sense being attached to it.

THE LIFE OF SOCRATES :

BY DIOGENES LAËRTIUS*

SOCRATES was the son of Sophroniscus, a worker in stone, and of Phaenarete, a midwife ; he was a citizen of Athens, of the parish of Alopece. He was commonly reputed to have assisted Euripides in writing his plays. Some authors have asserted that he attended the lectures of Anaxagoras ; after the latter's condemnation he became a pupil of Archelaus,† the natural philosopher, whose favourite he was. Duris declares that he was a slave, and worked as a sculptor, and

* Diogenes Laërtius, author of the *Lives and Opinions of Famous Philosophers*, probably lived somewhere in the third century of our era ; but we know practically nothing about him. His work consists of ten books, which are but a compilation, uncritical, and more remarkable for the personal details he likes to introduce than for any real knowledge of philosophy. But, provided we regard it as merely a series of biographical sketches, the book has considerable value, because, apart from the vigilant curiosity and unwearying industry of the compiler, an immense number of interesting data would have been lost for ever. Gossip is not without its uses.—I have given the ' Life of Socrates ' in abridged form.

† Diog. Laërt. ii. chap. 4 ; Euseb. *Praep. Evangel.* 504, 753 ; Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, vol. i. 377 ; Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil. Graec.* §§ 169-171 ; Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*,³ pp. 358 *sq.* Archelaus was the last of the early cosmologists, and a disciple of Anaxagoras.

it is reported that the draped Graces on the Acropolis were his. As a public speaker he showed great ability, and Xenophon says that the Thirty refused to let him teach the art of speaking, while Aristophanes * ridicules him for making the worse appear the better cause. He was the first to discourse on how to live, and the first philosopher to be condemned to death.

Demetrius of Byzantium tells us that Crito withdrew Socrates from his workshop, and trained him, being in love with his charm of soul, and says that, having ascertained that theorizing on nature is valueless to man, Socrates devoted himself to the discussion of ethics in the market-place and elsewhere. Owing to the rigour of his arguments in the course of such enquiries, he was frequently assaulted, but these attacks he laughed at, for the most part, suffering fools patiently.

He never travelled abroad, like most people, except when on military service. He preferred to remain at home, conversing with his fellows, his object invariably being to find out the truth rather than to change men's views.

He was very keen to keep fit physically. During the battle of Delium† he saved the life of Xenophon, who had been thrown from his horse. In the rout of the Athenians he withdrew quietly, but was quite ready to defend himself if attacked. On another occasion he served as a soldier at Potidaea,‡ and while there he is reported to have spent a whole night in one position, and to have won the Order of Merit.

* *Clouds*, 112-115

† For this battle in Boeotia (424 B.C.), when the Athenians suffered defeat at the hands of Thebes, see note on *Apol.* xvii

‡ One of the Athenian dependencies. In 432 B.C. the Potidaeans revolted, and had to undergo a protracted siege.

He displayed his strength of will by his refusal to give way to Critias and his gang, when they bade him bring Leon of Salamis before them, 'to be put to death ; and, furthermore, by having the courage alone to give his vote for the acquittal of the ten generals. At the end of his life he refused to break gaol *—though he might have done so—rebuking his friends for lamenting his lot, and uttering those beautiful last words when he lay in prison.

Socrates was a man of singular independence and nobility. Frequently, when looking at the shop windows and seeing the number of things for sale there, he used to say : ' What a host of things there are that I do not need ! ' And he showed his contempt for the three princes, Archelaus of Macedon, † Scopas, and Eurylochus, by refusing to attend their courts or receive money at their hands. His mode of living was so well ordered that on several occasions, when plagues attacked Athens, he alone escaped the sickness.

Aristotle tells us that he married twice : his second wife was Myrto, daughter of Aristides the Just ; the first, Xanthippe.

He took no notice of those who mocked him, and would pride himself on ' plain living and high thinking.' Moreover, he never exacted fees for his teaching. He often used to say that the simplest food, without sauce, suited him best, and such drink as did not create a thirst for more ; and that he was close to the gods because his wants were so few. The

* See the *Crito* of Plato. Crito was one of the oldest and most faithful of the friends of Socrates, as we learn from the *Apology* and *Phaedo*.

† Euripides, in 408 B.C., retired to the court of this hellenizing prince and died there. Socrates, true to himself, refused, as he was doubtless aware of the crimes by which Archelaus had secured his position : Aristotle, *Rhet.* ii. 23, § 8 ; Plato, *Gorg.* 470-471.

truth of this may be seen from the comedians who, when they thought they were holding him up to derision, were often really praising him. Thus Aristophanes *

'O thou who wouldst fain great wisdom attain, and
comest to us in thy need,
All Hellas around shall thy glory resound, such a prosperous life thou shalt lead
So thou art but endued with a memory good, and
accustomed profoundly to think,
And thy soul wilt inure all wants to endure and from
no undertaking to shrink,
And art hardy and bold to bear up against cold, and
with patience a supper thou lovest,
Nor too much dost incline to gymnastics and wine, but
all lusts of the body refusest.' †

He never condescended to flatter anyone, and this pride of spirit was emphasized by Aristophanes when he wrote ‡

'How sideways you throw your eyes as you go, and are
all affectation and fuss,
No shoes you will wear, but assume the grand air on
the strength of your dealings with us'

Yet sometimes, when occasion required, he would array himself in smart clothes, as we are told in Plato's *Symposium* §

Socrates was clever in the arts both of persuasion and dissuasion. Thus by his exhortations he made Lysis quite a

* *Clouds*, 412-417. But not a single line is quoted accurately. I have given Rogers' version.

† Cf. *Xen. Mem.* 1 vi. 'You live, Socrates, in a way which would disgust a slave—food and drink poor in quality, clothes mean and shabby, while, summer or winter, you go without shoes (αὐτοπόδητος) or coat.'

‡ *Clouds*, 362, 3

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moral character ; on the other hand, when his son Lamprocles flew into a rage against his mother, he made him ashamed of his conduct * : for he had the knack of deriving arguments from the facts of the case.

In his opinion knowledge † was the sole good, ignorance the sole evil in life. Wealth and high birth he esteemed as of little consequence—no blessing, but a bane. When Plato had been taken prisoner in war, he bade Crito ransom him from slavery, and thus secured Plato for philosophy.

He learned to play the lyre when he was quite old, saying there was nothing ridiculous in learning something fresh. He danced, too, regularly, in the conviction that such exercise was good for bodily health and vigour. He was in the habit of maintaining that his Divine Sign foretold the future to him, and that he knew nothing save the fact that he knew nothing. On one occasion, when asked what was a young man's best endowment, he replied, 'In never running to excess.' ‡

On being asked one day whether it was better to marry or to remain single, he answered : Whatever course you take, you will regret it.' He frequently expressed surprise that sculptors took such care to achieve a true likeness in stone,

* Xen. *Memor.* II. ii.

† By 'knowledge' Socrates did not mean pure science (as we call it), but something closely bound up with character—'an overmastering principle' moulding, through the intellect, the entire personality.—Adam, *Religious Teachers of Greece*, chaps. xvi., xvii.

‡ Cf. the apophthegm μηδὲν ἄγαν, ascribed to Solon. It is quoted by Theognis, 335. Cf. Eurip. *Phoen.* 584, μέθετον τὸ λίον ('cast all excess aside'), and Pseud. Phocyl. 36, πάντων μέτρον ἄριστον. Terence calls the saying Life's golden rule—*ne quid nimis*, and Milton (*P.L.* xi. 531) echoes this. Erasmus, *Adagia*, p. 513 (ed. 1643).

but cared nothing if they turned themselves into the semblance of blocks.

Once he gave a dinner-party, and invited some wealthy men to dine. Xanthippe, cumbered about much serving, was ashamed of the menu, but Socrates comforted her by saying, 'If they are worth anything, our guests will not mind, if they are worthless, why trouble about them?' He used to say that whereas all other men lived to eat, he ate to live.

To a man who said, 'Socrates, you have been condemned to death by the Athenians,' he replied, 'And they too have been condemned to death—by Nature.' When his wife said, 'You are condemned unjustly,' his answer was, 'Well, would you wish me to be condemned justly?' On being told that somebody or other spoke ill of him, he said, 'Of course, for he has never learned to speak well.' He maintained that one ought freely to submit to the satire of the comic poets, on this ground. If they criticize us justly, they will be doing us a service, if not, they cannot harm.

It was in testimony to such words and deeds that the Pythian priestess gave the celebrated response, 'Socrates is the wisest of mankind.' This was the cause of the jealousy felt against him, and, furthermore, because he would insist on proving conceited folk to be fools, as in the case of Anytus. The latter, infuriated by the ridicule of Socrates, finally persuaded Meletus to bring an action against him for impiety and corrupting young men. The indictment was in these terms: 'This affidavit is sworn by Meletus against Socrates: "Socrates is guilty of not acknowledging the gods acknowledged by the city, and of introducing other new divinities. Further, he is guilty of corrupting the youth. Penalty—death."' The orator Lysias wrote out a defence for him.*

* Some ten years or so after the death of Socrates, the Sophist Polycrates published an 'epideictic' accusation of

but when Socrates had read it, he said : ' Quite a good speech, Lysias, but not at all fitting for me.' For it was obviously rather forensic than philosophic.

He was condemned by a majority vote. When the judges were discussing what punishment should be awarded, or what fine he should pay, Socrates said that he would pay twenty-five drachmas. The judges shouted him down ; whereupon he remarked : ' Well, then, as a reward for my services, I propose the following penalty : free maintenance in the Town Hall.' So they sentenced him to death by an increased majority of eighty votes. He was imprisoned, and a few days later drank the hemlock, after a long and noble discourse preserved by Plato in the *Phaedo*. Shortly after the execution, the Athenians repented of what they had done ; they banished the other accusers, and put Meletus to death * ; but Socrates they honoured with a bronze effigy, the work of Lysippus.†

According to Xenophon, he confined himself to discussions on ethics.‡ But Plato, in his *Apology*, deals with

Socrates, and in reply to it Lysias wrote a defence. ' This was extant in antiquity ; and someone who had heard it, but knew nothing of the circumstances under which it was written, probably invented the story that it had been offered to, and rejected by, the philosopher ' (Jebb, *Attic Orators*,² i. 151). Cf. Cic. *de Oratore*, i. § 231.

* These stories are fabrications.

† One of the most prolific artists of antiquity. For his ' Apoxyomenos ' (an admirable copy of this statue is now in the Vatican Museum, Rome), see Furtwängler and Ulrich's *Greek and Roman Sculpture*, plate xxiv. (E.T. p. 123) ; Nettleship and Sandys' ed. of Seyffert's *Dict. Class. Antiq.*

‡ Cf. Eusebius, *Praep. Evangel.* 855 : ' Socrates was right in saying that, of existing things, some are above us, others

subjects which Socrates declined to touch, although in that work he assigns everything to Socrates personally. Of his successors—the Socratics, as they are called—the most eminent were Plato, Xenophon,* and Antisthenes†. Plato was the

nothing to us, for the secrets of nature are above us, and the conditions after death nothing to us, but the affairs of human life alone concern us' (Gifford's translation), Aristotle, *Metaph* 987 'Socrates busied himself with ethical questions, neglecting the physical world as a whole', Cic. *Acad* 1 15 (with Reid's n), and the well-known words in the *Tusc Disp* v § 10 'Socrates was the first to fetch down philosophy from heaven and bring it into the cities and houses of men, compelling them to enquire about life, and morality, and good and evil,' a sentence which was doubtless in the mind of Augustine when he wrote 'Socrates primus universam philosophiam ad corrigendos componendosque mores flexisse memoratur, cum ante illum omnes magis physica—id est naturalibus—rebus perscrutandis operam maximam impenderent' (*de Civ Dei*, viii 3), Milton, *P R.* iv 272 sqq. 'To sage Philosophy next lend thine ear, | From heaven descended to the low-roofed house | Of Socrates | Whom, well-inspired, the oracle pronounced | Wisest of men', Pater, *Plato and Platonism*, chap iv, Archer Butler, *Lectures*, pp 233 sq.

* Xenophon († 440-355 B.C.), author of the *Anabasis*, endeavoured to set his master in the true light by clearing his memory of the imputation of impiety levelled against him by his accusers. This he did in the *Memorabilia* ('Memoirs of Socrates'). Xenophon was no philosopher, in the strict sense, he was something far better—a great gentleman. Coleridge (*Table Talk*) makes this just remark. 'Negatively, there may be more of the philosophy of Socrates in the *Memorabilia* than in Plato—that is, there is less of what does not belong to Socrates, but the general spirit of, and

founder of the first Academy ; with him begin the ' Ten Schools ' of Moral Philosophy. ‡

impression left by, Plato are more Socratic.' Xenophon seems to be a first-rate authority on the everyday life of Socrates, and the substantial truth of his testimony is unimpeachable.—I am glad to find Phillipson in agreement on this point : see his *Trial of Socrates*, chap. i.

† The founder of the Cynic and, indirectly, of the Stoic School of philosophy. ' The Cynics were the mendicant Friars of their time ' (J. B. Mayor, *Ancient Philosophy*). The teaching of Antisthenes is an abstract expression for the Socratic moral ideal. His fault lay in taking a negative view of Virtue, which, for him, consisted mainly in avoiding evil (i.e. those desires which bind us to enjoyments). He lacked the rich humanity of his master.—Cf. Schwegeler, *Hist. of Philosophy*.

‡ According to Diogenes Laertius the ten schools are as follows :—Academic (Plato), Cyrenaic, Elian, Megarian, Cynic, Eretrian, Dialectic, Peripatetic (Aristotle), Stoic (Zeno of Citium), Epicurean.

APPENDIX I

The Piety of Socrates

Taken from XENOPHON, *Memorabilia*, I. i. iii. iv. ; IV. *ad fin.*

I HAVE often wondered by what arguments the accusers of Socrates could have convinced the Athenians that he was guilty of death ; for the indictment ran thus :—‘ Socrates breaks the law in declining to recognize the gods publicly acknowledged and worshipped by the city, and in introducing other strange divinities ; further, he is guilty of corrupting the young.’

To begin with : What proof did they bring that Socrates did not recognize the gods acknowledged by the city ? He was constantly engaged in sacrifice, both at home and at the public altars, and he employed divination openly ; * indeed, it was common talk that he was accustomed to say, ‘ The divinity grants me a sign.’ It was probably from this circumstance that he was charged with introducing novel divinities. Yet there was nothing new in this : others did much the same, relying on all sorts of omens, and practising various kinds of divination. Furthermore, he would often urge his friends to do this, and not do that, on the ground that he had a revelation from heaven ; and those that heeded his advice prospered, and those that disregarded it were sorry afterwards.† Now, it is quite clear that he would never

* Cf. *Memorabilia*, IV. vii. § 10. Xenophon, like Plato, compares Socrates’ converse with his ‘genius,’ with μαντική or ‘inspiration.’

† Cf. *Hellenica*,² pp. 314-316.

have made forecasts had he not believed that they would come true. But, in matters of this kind, on whom would anyone rely if not on God? And how could a man who trusted in the gods disbelieve in their existence?

Socrates was constantly in the public eye, for every morning he would go early to the arcades and training schools, at midday he was still to be seen there, and the rest of the day he was always found where the concourse was largest. He was generally busy talking, and anyone who liked could listen. Yet no one ever heard him say, or saw him do, what was irreligious or profane.

His method of prayer was simple. 'Vouchsafe unto me whatsoever things are good,' for (said he) the gods know best what is good*. He was convinced that the gods delighted most in the offerings of the righteous, and would quote, with approval, the line of Hesiod †

'According to thine ability do sacrifice to the Immortals' Such, indeed, was Socrates—so pious that he did nothing without the sanction of heaven, so just that he wronged no man, so temperate, that he never put pleasure before virtue, so wise, that he never failed to distinguish right from

* Compare the poet's prayer in Plato, *Alcib* ii 143 (and also in *Anth Pal* x 108)

Zeῦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἐσθλά καὶ εὐχομένοις καὶ
ἀνευκτοῖς

ἄμμι δίδου, τὰ δὲ δεινὰ καὶ εὐχομένοισι ἀπαλέξειν
[v] ἀπαλέξοις]

'The good, unasked, in mercy grant, | The ill, tho' asked, deny' "In its perfect faith and self-repression, the Socratic formula of prayer is more Christian than Greek" (Adam, *The Religious Teachers of Greece*, p. 352) Cf n on chap xxiv

† *Works and Days*, 336

wrong ; never rendering any man less virtuous, but always striving to make better those with whom he had to do.*

Well, then, might Xenophon close the second chapter of the first book of his *Memorabilia* with these apt words : ‘ How was it possible for such a man to be guilty of the charges levelled at him ? a man who, so far from denying the gods, as was stated in the indictment, obviously paid them exceptional honour ; a man who, instead of corrupting the youth, as the accuser declared, definitely led those of his associates who leaned towards vice, to cease from this, and besought them to cherish a love for all that was honourable and of good report, whereby states and families are successfully governed. How, then, pursuing such a course of life, could Socrates fail to deserve high respect at the hands of the city ? ’

APPENDIX II

(*The Divine Sign*, τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον)

‘ AFTER all that has been written on the subject,’ says Dr. Adam, ‘ it seems to me clear that Socrates regarded his “divine sign” as a special revelation from God, without submitting it to further analysis.’ That Socrates understood it to signify some sort of divine agency—not a divine being †—seems certain. Apparently he regarded himself as singu-

* Compare the words in [Xenophon’s] *Apology of Socrates* : ‘ I know,’ said Socrates to his judges, ‘ that testimony will be borne in the days to come, as it has been in the past, that I never wronged any man, or made any one worse than I found him, but that I bettered those with whom I associated, by teaching them, freely, whatever good I found within my power.’

† Socrates nowhere indicated the particular deity from whom he believed it emanated.

larly endowed in possessing this gift, he did not urge others to seek for anything of a like nature. He had possessed the gift from childhood—it was a voice,* speaking to him out of the silence, giving warning upon some meditated course of acting, and we are told that its function was negative, rather than positive—dissuading him from the act contemplated, but not urging him to any definite line of conduct.† Xenophon, however, attributes to the sign an approving as well as a disapproving force, and Plutarch agrees with Xenophon. It was, says Riddell, Socrates' substitute for *μαντική* ‡ The late Prof Henry Jackson explains the phenomenon as due to a hallucination of the sense of hearing, §

* See W James, *Principles of Psychology*, II 117

† Cf Augustine, *de Civ Dei*, viii 14, where he is quoting Apuleius. In one case mentioned by Plato, in the *Phaedrus* (see n on chap 31), its warning enabled Socrates to perform a duty which otherwise he might have overlooked—See Adam, *Religious Teachers of Greece*, pp 321/324.

‡ The Stoic philosopher Chrysippus of Soli (third century B C) defined 'mantike' as a systematic understanding of the signs, bearing on human life, sent by gods and daemons.

§ 'The rational suggestions of his own brain seemed to be projected without him, and to be returned through the outward ear' Dr E R. Bevan, in his recent work, *Sibyls and Seers*, writes as follows 'This δαιμόνιον τι would be perhaps, in the Greek world, the thing most like the experience of Christians when they have suddenly felt 'It is God's will that I should do this, or not do that—an experience which, even if it falls short of an audition, they may naturally describe as hearing the voice of God' Note that δαιμόνιον, in the Socratic connexion, is not the diminutive of δαίμων (used later by Jews and Christians as meaning an evil spirit), but the neuter of δαιμόνιος, 'a divine something'—Other

and it may be so. But how explain the source of the hallucination itself? Others regard it as a case of what Richet calls 'pre-monitory crypt-aesthesia'—a well-established psychic fact. Socrates certainly appears to have had presentiments of a vivid nature, which he took for definite monitions from a supernatural source; and in this respect he was not unlike Mohammed, when the latter heard (or thought he heard) the voice of the Angel Gabriel, at a time of intense mental exaltation (cf. Margoliouth, *Mohammed*, chap. iii.). The revelations he produced find a close parallel in those of modern Spiritism; and Spiritists have, in the case of Socrates, attributed to him a belief in a sort of guardian angel (δαίμων); but Socrates himself did not entertain this notion. That he was entirely sincere in his belief in the Divine Sign is vouched for by Xenophon—a good witness. Some writers have gone so far as to say he was mad, just as the contemporaries of Jesus Christ did of Him ('He hath a devil—δαίμόνιον * ἔχει—and is mad'); and as, later on, Festus cried out to Paul, 'Thou art mad' †; but that a man like Socrates was really subject to hallucinations of reason as well

examples of 'hallucination of the sense of hearing' are Augustine's *Tolle, lege* (*Confessions*, viii. 12); the Voice that Samuel heard in the night watches (1 Sam. iii.); the whispers of saints to Joan of Arc; the 'still small Voice' to Elijah on Horeb; the message to Paul on his journey to Damascus.

* This δαίμόνιον is, in form, a diminutive of δαίμων. For the word δαίμων in Greek literature, cf. J. C. Lawson, *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion*, pp. 290, 291.

† Acts xxvi. 25 (though μαινῇ in this passage probably means 'you are a wild enthusiast, talking speculative nonsense.' Festus could hardly have supposed Paul to be literally mad).

as of sense, is manifestly untenable. Many of the Fathers of the Church* roundly declared that he was 'possessed', for they had read how he had become, on occasions, so completely absorbed in speculation as to be wholly oblivious of the outer world. In fact, he appeared like one in a trance, and trance-states would be reckoned by these ecclesiastics as symptoms of demonic possession. The late F W H. Myers, in his famous work on *Human Personality*, refers to the Socratic δαίμωνιον as an example of wise automatism, of the possibility that the messages conveyed to the superliminal mind from subliminal strata of the personality may issue from some self whose monitions convey to us a wisdom profounder than we know.

Hear what that shrewd critic, Montaigne,† says 'The daemon of Socrates was peradventure a certain impulsion of will, which, without the consent of his reason, presented itself unto him. In a mind so well purified, and by continual exercise of wisdom and virtue so well prepared, as his was, it is likely his inclinations (though sudden and unconsidered) were ever of great moment and worthy to be followed. Every man feelth in himself some image of such stirrings of a prompt, vehement, and casual opinion. I too have had some of them, equally weak in reason and violent in persuasion and dissuasion, by which I have so happily and so profitably suffered myself to be transported, that they might perhaps be thought to contain some matter of divine inspiration.'

* See J E B Mayor's note on Tertullian, *Apol* p 310. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*,³ vol. II 202.

† *Essays*, I II (Florio's version, amended) — There is an interesting account of Socrates and his 'divine sign' in Plutarch (*de genio Socr*). According to Plutarch it was no hallucination, but a spiritual intuition.

APPENDIX III

*The Allegory * of Prodicus on the 'Choice of Heracles' †*

'HESIOD, the poet, has these words‡ :

'Vice can be got easily and in plenty : the road to her is smooth and it dwells near us. But the immortal gods have placed the sweat of labour betwixt us and Virtue : long and steep is the way that leads to her, and rough at the first ; but as soon as one has reached the summit, then indeed it is easy, though once so hard.'

* Aristippus, a philosopher, has been maintaining that the only life worth living is the life of pleasure and ease ; whereupon Socrates relates this moral fable, or allegory, putting it into the mouth of Prodicus.

Aristippus, the Cyrenaic, was celebrated for his witticisms, as well as for the philosophy of hedonism which he taught (cf. Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil. Graec.*). Of this seductive philosophy he was not only the teacher, but himself the example. The couplet of Horace (*Epist.* i. i. 18, 19) expresses the ethical ideal of Aristippus :

'Nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor,
Et mihi res, non me rebus, subjungere conor'

(i.e. My own inclinations are the guiding principle of my life). One of his aphorisms is worth quoting : 'He is the true conqueror of pleasure who can use it without being carried away by it, not he who abstains altogether.' This aphorism may be commended to the notice of American prohibitionists.

† Heracles—the type of struggling humanity at its highest.

‡ *Works and Days*, 286 sq. This passage has often been imitated, e.g. by Milton in his tractate on Education. Cf. Rabelais, iv. 57 ; Lucian, *Hermotimus*, c. 2.

Epicharmus * gives this testimony -

' The gods sell us all good things at the price of toil ',
and in another place he says

' Fool ' seek not the soft lest you find the hard '

And Prodicus the philosopher, in the story about Heracles which, as you are aware, he is so fond of declaiming, expresses a similar opinion about Virtue, somewhat after this fashion, if my memory serves me. The story is that, when Heracles was growing to manhood (a time when young men, becoming their own masters, show whether they intend to enter on life by the path of virtue or of vice) he withdrew to a lonely place and sat down, being at a loss which of these two paths he should follow. Now he thought he saw two tall women coming towards him, one fair to look on and graceful, with a clear complexion, downcast looks, and modesty of demeanour, and she was clad in white raiment; the other soft and well favoured, but with face so skilfully adorned by art that she appeared fairer and ruddier than she really was, while her carriage was such that she seemed taller than her true height. Her eyes were bold, and she wore a transparent robe to reveal her youthful beauty, and oftentimes she would gaze at herself, watching to see if anyone was looking at her, and would frequently turn to observe her own shadow. As they drew near to Heracles, the former of these women moved with stately steps, but the other, eager to outpace her, ran up to Heracles and thus accosted him - ' I see, Heracles, that you are doubtful what path to take as you enter upon

* A Sicilian writer of comedies (Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil. Graec.* § 48). Born 540, died 450 B.C. Perhaps his most celebrated saying is *vûpe kai μένεται ἀπιστεῖν* (be wise and learn to distrust)—a valuable hint, even to-day, for those who would put their trust in political and other wizards.

life ; if, then, you make me your friend, I shall guide you by the pleasantest and easiest way, and you shall taste all the sweets of life, passing your time free from all troubles. First of all, you shall take no thought for war or politics, but only have to bethink you how best to gratify your appetite, how to enjoy every sight and sound and smell and touch, how to sleep most luxuriously, and how to enjoy all these good things without toil. Should you ever be fearful of being unable to obtain these pleasures, be of good cheer : never shall I bid you win them at any cost of suffering, either of mind or body. Nay, rather, what others win with toil and trouble, you shall enjoy without effort ; the sources of all profitable things shall be yours ; for I give my disciples liberty to follow their own bent, even as they will.'

And Heracles, on hearing this, said : ' What, Lady, is your name ? ' And she answered : ' My friends call me Joy ; but those that hate me name me, in disparagement, Vice.'

By this time the other woman had approached, and now she spoke. ' Heracles, I have come to you, for I knew your parents, and have marked your character from earliest years ; and from it I cherish the hope that if you will follow the path that leads to my abode you will prove yourself a worker of all that is honourable and of good report, and that I shall win renown by your noble deeds. I shall not deceive you with promises of pleasure, but set before you things as they really are, even as the gods have ordained them. The good things of this world are never granted to men by the gods apart from toil and care. If you wish the gods to be propitious to you, you must worship them ; if you wish to be loved by your friends, you must serve them ; if you desire to be honoured by a city, you must benefit that city ; if you ask to be admired by all Greece for your virtue, you must strive to do well to Greece ; if you want the land to yield fruits in plenty, you must tend the land ; if you think your cattle

should yield you wealth, you must look after them, if you are eager to advantage yourself by war, to secure freedom for your friends and subdue your foes, you must learn the arts of war from those who understand such arts, and practise how to employ them, and if, moreover, you wish to be strong in body, you must train the body to obey the mind, and exercise it by labour and sweat.

Here Vice (so Prodicus tells us) broke in, and said 'Ah, Heracles, do you mark how hard and long is the road by which this woman brings you to pleasure? But I will take you to happiness by a short and easy path.'

'Alas,' cried Virtue, 'what good thing do you possess? or what pleasure do you know, who are unwilling to do aught for the winning of it? For you do not even wait for the desire of what is pleasant, but, anticipating desire, you fill yourself with all manner of dainties, eating before you are hungry and drinking before you are thirsty. To eat with pleasure you procure cooks; and, to drink with pleasure, you get costly wines, running about looking for snow in summer. To sleep pleasantly you take care not only to have your bedding soft, but provide yourself with beds to put it on, and furnish these with rockers,* for the truth is you long for sleep not because you labour, but because you have nothing to do. Further, you excite the passions, by every device in your power. You are a goddess, I know, but the gods have cast you forth from among them, and by good men you are scorned, the fairest of all sounds, praise of yourself by mankind,†—this you never hear, and the sweetest sight in the world, a noble work fashioned by your own hand,—this you have never seen. Who would believe a single word you say? who would help you in the hour of need?

* υποθαλα

† Cic *pro Arch* § 20. Xen *Hiero*, I. § 14. τοῦ ἡδίστου ἀκροαματος—ἐπαίνου.

or what honest man would dare to join your revels ? Those who are of your company in the days of their youth are feeble in body ; and when they are grown old, are senseless in soul. They are brought up in brilliant ease when young, but in toil and sorrow they pass their age, ashamed of what they have done, burdened by what they do ; they have run through their pleasures in youth, but have laid up misery for their old age. But it is not so with me : I consort with gods, and with good men ; no fair deed, whether divine or human, is done apart from me. Most of all am I honoured by the gods and by men to whom it is given to honour me ; among artisans I am looked on as a welcome fellow-worker, among masters as a trusty guardian of their homes ; I am a true upholder of the works of peace, a sure ally in the labours of war, the best of sharers in friendship. My friends have a sweet and untroubled enjoyment of meat and drink, inasmuch as they abstain from them till they desire them. Their sleep is sweeter than the sleep of idlers ; if they lose it they are not vexed, nor for its sake do they forsake their duty. The young delight in the praises of the old, the old in the honour paid them by the young. With joy they remember their past acts, and take pleasure in doing well what lies before them. Thanks to me they are dear to heaven, loved by their friends, honoured by their country. And when the appointed end comes, they do not lie forgotten and dishonoured, but, celebrated in song, live in the memory of mankind for evermore. By such conduct, Heracles, you may win the most blessed happiness.'

APPENDIX IV

To Thales is attributed the celebrated aphorism γνῶθι σεαυτόν (*nosce te ipsum*), which Juvenal spoke of as a 'heaven-born' saying, 'E coelo descendit' γνῶθι σεαυτόν

(xi 27), and which is familiar to readers of Chaucer from the line in the *Monkes Tale*,

‘ Ful wys is he that can himselven knowe ’,

and to readers of Pope from the oft-quoted couplet in his *Epistles*

‘ Know then thyself, presume not God to scan
The proper study of mankind is man ’

We find it quoted by Aeschylus, *P V* 309 ·

γινώσκε σαυτόν, καὶ μεθάρμοσαι τρόπους
νέους

Again, in Menander ‘ In many things you do ill to say *know yourself*, better to say *know others* ’ The same comedian, in another play, has this ‘ This is the meaning of *know thyself*, that you become acquainted with your own powers, and know what you ought to do ’ We read in the *Protagoras* of Plato (343) οὗτοι [i.e. the seven sages] καὶ κοινῇ συνελθόντες ἀπαρχὴν τῆς σοφίας ἀνέθεσαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι εἰς τὸν νεῶν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, γράψαντες ταῦτα, ἃ δὴ πάντες ὕμνουσι, γνῶθι σαυτόν, καὶ μηδὲν ἄγαν (= nothing in excess *ne quid nimis*) Pausanias (x. 24) has told us that in the forecourt of the temple at Delphi the two maxims were inscribed, according to a passage in Plutarch (*de garrulitate*) there were three maxims engraved in the sanctuary by order of the Amphictyonic Council (see Frazer’s *Pausanias*, vol v p 348) These two maxims were, in the eyes of the Greeks, the embodiment of all practical wisdom Plutarch, in his life of Demosthenes, says that the great precept ‘ Know thyself ’ would probably never have been counted as divine, if every man could have reduced it to practice (εἰ παντὸς ἦν ἔχειν πρόχειρον) Xenophon, *Memor* iv ii 24 ‘ Euthydemus,’ said Socrates, ‘ have you ever been to Delphi ? ’ ‘ Yes, twice ’ ‘ Did you observe that on the temple was engraved the precept γνῶθι σαυτόν ? ’ Cicero, *Tusc Disp* i § 52 ‘ Est illud quidem

vel maximum animo ipso animum videre, et nimirum hanc habet vim praeceptum Apollinis quo monet ut se quisque noscat. . . . Cum igitur *Nosce te* dicit, hoc dicit *Nosce animum tuum.*’ Boethius, *de consol. philos.* ii. 5 : ‘Humanae quippe naturae ista condicio est, ut tum tantum ceteris rebus, cum se cognoscit, excellat.’ Cf. Erasmus, *Adagia*, where he cites Ovid, *de Arte Amat.* ii. 500. One might add Persius, *Sat.* iv. 52 : ‘Tecum habita ; noris quam sit tibi curta supellex’ for a similar idea. Rabelais, *Pantagruel*, iii. 24 : ‘He does not know the very ABC of philosophy, which is KNOW THYSELF’ ; Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, ii. 42 (the Knight to Sancho) : ‘First of all thou must fear God : secondly thou must consider who thou art and *know thyself*, which is the hardest kind of knowledge that may be imagined.’ Montaigne, *Essays*, ii. 7 (end of chapter) and iii. 13 : ‘The advice given to every man *Know thyself* should have great influence, since the god of light and learning had it engraved on the front of his temple, as comprising all he had to counsel us. Plato says that wisdom is but the execution of this command.’ Pascal, *Pensées* : ‘We must know ourselves ; and if this does not serve to discover the truth, it at least serves to regulate our lives.’ Tennyson, *Oenone* :

‘Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control—
These three alone lead life to sovereign power.’

Cf. Cicero *ad Q.F.* iii. 6, 7 : Cessator esse noli, et illud γνῶθι σεαυτὸν noli putare ad arrogantiam minuendam solum esse dictum, verum etiam ut bona nostra norimus. Clement of Alexandria puts the matter in the highest religious light : ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, πάντων μέγιστον μαθημάτων, τὸ γινῶναι αὐτόν· ἑαυτὸν γάρ τις ἐὰν γνῶη, θεὸν εἴσεται· θεὸν δὲ εἰδὼς ἑξομοιωθήσεται θεῷ (*Paedag.* III. 1) : cf. *Strom.* vii. 840. The Hindu maxim *Atmānan ātmana paśya* (‘Know thyself by thyself’) seems to go even deeper than the Greek maxim. There is a

Vedântic tract, in verse, called *Ātma-bodha*, 'Knowledge of soul,' which is worth noting (translation by Monier-Williams) 'The soul needeth no other knowledge to know itself, even as a shining light requires no light to make itself perceived' Cf. Max-Müller, *Lectures on the Vedānta Philosophy*, pp 89 sq

The scope of Socrates' labours, says Campbell (*Religion in Greek Literature*, p 325), was characterized by himself as a continual endeavour to follow the great precept by interrogating other men This was the first step in the sciences of ethics, logic, and psychology—Cf Phillipson, *The Trial of Socrates*, pp 107 sq

APPENDIX V

FOR purposes of ready study, I have grouped together here a few of the chief ancient references to the character and teaching of Socrates

Socrates rightly called the 'father of philosophy' Cic *de fin* II 1, § 1, *Acad* I 4, § 18, *de nat deor* II 66, § 167, *de orat* I 10, § 42, III 16, § 60, *de repub* I 10, *Tusc Disp* V 4, § 11, *Vell Pat* I 16, § 4, *Quint* I 10, § 13, *Minuc Felix* XIII §§ 1-2 His dislike of physical speculations *Aristot Met* I 6, 987, *de part animal* I 1, 642, *Xen. Memor* I 1, § 6, *Plat Phaed* 96, *Repub* VII 529, *August de Civ Dei*, VIII 3 His assumed ignorance Cic *Acad* II § 74 His adversaries accuse him of neglecting practical affairs for philosophy *Plat Gorg* 484, 485 (an important passage) Describes himself as an intellectual midwife, bringing thoughts of others to birth *Plat Theaet* 149, cf *Symp* 206 (Diotima's speech) His habitual 'irony' *Xen. Memor* I 3, § 8, Cic *Acad* II § 15, *Quint* IX 2 § 46 Employs the inductive method—quae Graece ἐνταύωγη νόμι-
natur, Cic *Top* 42—*Xen. Memor* IV 6, § 13 His love of clear definition, the starting-point of all science *Aristot*

Met. XIII. 4, 1078. Takes no fees for his teaching : *Xen. Memor.* I. 2, § 6 ; 6, § 13. His attitude to religion generally : *Xen. Memor.* I. 4, § 4. Wisdom he regards as continence (ἐγκράτεια= self-control) : *Xen. Memor.* III. 9, § 4 ; incontinence (lack of self-control) he makes convertible with ignorance : *Aristot. Eth.* VII. 2, § 1 ; cf. *Plat. Protag.* 345, the central theme of which is οὐδείς ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει, because Virtue=Knowledge, and Vice=Ignorance.* He inculcates a reverence for the laws : *Xen. Memor.* IV. 4, § 12 ; *Plat. Crit.* 50 ; and holds it is better to be wronged than to do wrong : *Plat. Gorg.* 475. His unvarying serenity alike in good fortune and bad : *Cic. Tusc. Disp.* III. 15, § 31 ; IV. 15, § 31 ; *Seneca, dial.* IV. 71 ; *Aelian, v. hist.* IX. 7. His stay-at-home habits (cf. Dr. Johnson) : *Plato, Crit.* 52 ; *Phaed.* 230. Socrates adjudged the wisest of mankind : *Xen. Apol.* XIV ; *Tertullian, de anim.* I ; *Val. Max.* III. 4 ; *Lactantius, Epit.* xxxvii (= *Instit.* III. 20).

* For Sin as 'ignorance' cf. Slavonic Enoch, xxx. 15, which rather indicates that Platonic thought had not been without its effect on Hellenistic Judaism.—For the 'Two Ways' (Append. III.) add these reff., *Deut.* xxx. 15 ; *Jeremiah*, xxi. 8 ; *Sirach*, xv. 17 ; 1 *Enoch*, xci. 18, and *Slav. Enoch*, xxx. 15 ; *Sibyll. Orac.* viii. 399 ; *Ep. of Barnabas*, xviii.—I might add here this remark, that whereas, until his day, Greek religion was largely mechanical and external in its outlook, Socrates *internalized* it : a man's duty was to justify his life before some inward tribunal—that of conscience guided by reason (*Crit.* 46, *Phaed.* 100). Finally, was not the true philosopher's life the study and practice of death ? (*Phaed.* 64).

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καὶ τοὺς θησαυροὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν
οὓς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες,
ἀνελίττων κοινῇ σὺν τοῖς φίλοις διέρχομαι, καὶ
ἂν τι ὀρῶμεν ἀγαθὸν ἐκλεγόμεθα καὶ μέγα
νομίζομεν κέρδος, ἀλλήλοις φίλοι γινώμεθα.

‘As many as shall read this book, pardon (I
beseech you) if aught I have erred in accent acute
and grave, in apostrophe, in breathing soft or
aspirate ; and may God save you all ! Amen.’

—*From a medieval manuscript.*